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STATE OF IDAHO
Sirius LC, A Wyoming Limited Liabiliv Company
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THE REAL PROPERTY DESCRIBED AS
I
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)

1
1

CARIBOU COUNTY, iDAHO
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SECTION 27 LOTS 1 AND 2 , N1/2 NW1/4,
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NWli4 NWU4
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APPEAL from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in
and for the County of Caribou.
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Bryan D.Smith
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SLRIUS LC, a Wyoming Limited Liability
Co~npany,

)

Plaintiff-Respondent,

REMITTITUX

v.

NO. 32582

)
BRYCE H. ERICKSON, and ANY PERSON
CLAIMING UNDER BY OR THROUGH
)
BRYCE H. ERICKSON IN AND TO THE REAL )
PROPERTY DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS:
CARIBOU COUNTY, D A H O : TOWNSHIP 5
)
SOUTH, RANGE 46 E.B.M., SECTION 27:
LOTS I AND 2, N 112 NW 114, EXCEPT
THEREFROM THE S 112 NE 114 NW 114
NW 114,
)

1

Defendants-Appellants.
TO:

SIXTH JUDICLAL DISTRICT, COUNTY OF CARIBOU.

The Court having announced its Opinion in this cause March 28, 2007, which has
now become final; therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the District C o ~ ~shall
r t forthwith co~nplywith
the directive of the Opinion, if any action is required. No costs or attorney fees on appeal.
DATED this 19"' day of April, 2007

%@h"
Kh!$Mb
\

~lerk'ofthe supreme co r
STATEOFDAHO V
cc:

Counsel of Record
District Court Clerk
District Judge

**--

62

Bryan D. Smith, Esq. -- ISE3 No. 4 4 1
3.J. DriseoII, Esq, --- ISB No. 7010
h,%cGUTIrF,MEACBrth5 & SMITE, PLLC

P.0'BOX9-0731
4 14 Shoup ,4\re11ue
Idaho Fails, Idaho 83405
Telephone: (203) 524-073 1
Teiefax: (208) 529-4166

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JGDICL4L DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF DAHO, ITN AND FOR THE COLYTY OF Cfiii1BOU

SIRIUS LC, a Wyorning Limited
Liability Gornpmy,

P1ailsintiff.

1
1
1
)

>

VS,

)

BRYCE E-I, ERICKSON. AND ANY PERSON
j
CLALMR"jG UNDER BY OR THROUGH
?
BRUCE H. ENCKSON AND TO THE
1
REAL PROPERTY DESCRBED A S FOLLOWS: )
CARIBOU GOLDJTU, IDAHO:

1
1
1

TBJ"ulTSHIP5 SOUTH, RANGE 46 E.B.M.,
SECTION 27: LOTS 1 AND 2, X1i2
fa;Wli4, EXCEPT TXEREFROM THE S ?/z
NElj4 NW $4 NIVl;4,

1
1
1
1

Defendants.

Case No. CV-04-284

,4FFZDAVXT OF
SUDITE A. SHIVELY

JUDITEX A. SHIVELV, being first duly sworn on oath. deposes and says:

(1)

I m over die age of 21 and make this ;a2i&tvivit based on my o v a persorial

(2)

I h w e been remined imd disclosed by the defendant Bxycs Crickson as

expert to

review "Ixliiiihm Bagley's represelltation of Bryce Erickscin in bdcruptey.

(3)

Attached hereto ar~dmarked as Exhibit '2"
is a true and correct copy o f a

orla1 and profess~oaalbacic,m-omd.
_ - -_- - - hereto and marked as Ext~ibii-"BEl"' incorporaieci as my test~rnoi~y
by

_____

reference herein is a true and correct COPY ofa report showing my analysis of Vqiili=~ Bagley's

Fur-ther your affiant sayeth naught.

DATED this

:.

l"r1

day of Mayqi,2008.
i-.

-'p%

SiiBSCRIBED AND SWOilZT 10 before me&s: iht

i

'
.

.
\J

day ofM3-y. ?OOS.

'

Notaiy PU%~~C.
for CoieiaB

.>?

- '

!
- J w, CT; /I i*Residing at
{
T
l
j.,4,'9'
h.iy Gc~rfi~~issiun
Expires: <, , -jr . .2 . - t , ~1 *
xt8

N F I D A V I T OF JfiTDLTXI A. SMVELY - 2
G ' Documents and SeMhgs\Jr?dirhiLoza' Setrrngs Temporag?
A"f.Shively.aoc

b
,

i

fm

i-8

b

111tsriiet Files~Clonte~,t.!ES
4TMZ*~i'3U7\042

7

I IIEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day ofklay, 2008,I caused a true snd
correct copy o f t h e foregoing AFFIDAVB
ITH A. SEIIWELU to be served, by placing
the sane in a sealed envelope and depositing i t in the United Skates Maif, postage prepaid, or
band delivery, facsimile tra~sn~issior~
or ovesni;gt:t deliveq: addressed to the following:
A, B~LICG
Lassoa, Esq,
Attorney at Law
Horizora Plaza Ste 235

1070 Hitine Road
Pocatelio, Idaho 83201-2935
Fax: 475-7602

LWFIDA$STOF JUDITH A. SEIVELk' - 3
F \f)L1EKI'S iBDS\-IS3 3Piea&~g~\042
,iL"f.Shvel) doc

[ /US.
[ 1
[ ]

E

~aifb

FAX

Hand Delivery
Ovemi&t Delivery

Eduea~onatBackground:
A
Ur?l;iversivof Denver
M.A. UPaiversity of Denver
S.D. LJniversifyof Denver
Prtofessionnaf Experience:

--

--

-- -

-

M ~ a g t&
e Adolescat nerapist
Propedy Managment
Finmcial M m a p e n t
Profesess~onalPractice
Cornpkoljer
USDA Progrm
Finarrcial Mmagement
hensurmce Agency
-h3G~
& Associates _
- -- Law
-- Cia& &t A x q m e ~ _
- i k t f s m e y - --Dworb&-ShiveleC
SEvely & Demos, PC
-Attorney

Since 1985, approximately ninety percent of clients are employed in an aeculture
business endeavor, The main office of Sbi~ely& Demos, P.C. is focated in Erie,
ty in the norlfiern D e n ~ ~ mebopoiiitstn
er
areaer- and- 1
Eastern
in Yuma, Colorado, a smsllf agrrculmal co
have a sateltit
Colorado, near where 1 was born and spent the Erst seventeen years of my life. I have
filed between 25-30 Chapter 12 cases since the inception of Chapter 12 in 1986. The
main focus has been
tor representation but I have also represerrted secured
tcies. I have represented the debtor in several Cfraphr I. 1
creditors in Chapter 12
tcies.
tcies and have dsa represented the secured creditor in Chapter 1I b

EmERT WITNESS mPORT
JUDITH A, SHXFrELY, ESQ.
1,

PACTS OF TEE CASE

Agorney WWam D. Bagley represented Bvce Lf. Erickson in a Chapter f l
bauliruptey case Eited on October 8, 1998. llnless a m o ~ o nwas Faed for an
extension of time, the Ckapter 11 plan of reorganktm~onfor Bwce Ericksan was lo
be filed withia 120 days of the date of the petiaon, which h this case would batre
been on or about Februav 5,1998. On Februam 19,1999, mTUarrz-D. Ibagtey frlied
aa vofrmtaw pelitfaon under Chapter PI for Kathleen E. Ericksoe, A plan of
reorganbation under Chapter 1%was not caafwmed iia either case, On May PI,
1999, the ease was dislmissed for sufBcienl cause upon the moGorn to d i s ~ s Taed
s
by
the United States Trustee.

--

--

-- - -

--

For a period of months following May of 1399, Mr. BagIey urnsuccessfay
attempted negoGs"iions with the secured creditors. Fo
a secured creditor and on December 3,1999&r.-B-a@
-baahuptcyfo&r;~.e&riekson;-Byrce
Eriekson-had vrngaidaaor~epfees-owe&to-Mr. Bagiey for the Chapter 11bankuptcy. On. NoventkPer 13,1999, after Mr.
Bagley bad been w o r m g on the Chapter 12 baaknptcy petiLion and schedules,
Mr. Bagley prepared a prodssor3f nste secarred by a moreage and req&ed that
Mr. Erickson sign a prorruissory note secured by a mortgage, on real prolpem Mr.
En'ckson owned in Idaho, In his deposition, Mr. BagEey tes~fied&at he agreed to
f i e a new Chapter 12 ease only if Bryce Eriekscrn gave Mr. Bagley the note anad
secmria;F.'.
-

--

-

- -

----- --

-

As an expert wiaess, in this ease, f was asked to address the mager of
whether Rr2HamD. Bagley met the required standard of care and whether he
pros4ded competent representation to Bryce Erickson. The various issues to be
addressed will be discussed separately.

11, Chapter 11 F b g vs. Chapter 12 F h g
On October 27,1986, Congress enacted a spedal bankruptcy for farmers,
caPled Chapter 12. Prior to that dale, f a d y farmers olrEy had the option of erit.iher ra
Chapter I3 (reorganhation banhuptcy for wage earners) or a Chapter 11. Family
farmers found that Chapter 11was needlessly compBeated, unduly t h e g, hordhately expsenslve and, iin many eases unworkable.
Chapter 12 was designed to give f a d y hrmers h e k g barrkuptcy a chance
to reorganhe their debts and keep their land. It offers f a M y farmers protection
from creditors and, at the same time, ensures that farm Benders receive a fair
payment. Under Chapter 12, it is easier for a f a d y farm to csrafrrm a plan o f
reorganbadon.
-

-

Slince Chapter 12 was a new bankuptcy, speemcslly for f a d y farmers,
Congress provided a seven year sunset to evaluate the eanthrrkg need and aasa the
effec~venessof Chapter 12. After the fwst seven year sunset, Congress conhued
to reenact Chapter I2 for vaqfrag periods of h e . A sunset of Chapter 12 occurred
on September 30,1998. On October 21,1998, Csngress reertlacted Chapter 12,
retreracGve to October 1,1998 to April 1,1999, Chapter 12 was reenacted several
additionso1 f;irnesand was in effect: when Mr, Erictkson's Chapter 12 was fded on
December 3, 5999.
fa his deposition tesbormgi, Mu, Ba@ey was not %%Yare
that Chapter 12 had
been reenacted h October crf 1998, Mr. Bregley's tes~morrywas that Chapter 12
had expired when he started to represent Bryce and was reinstated sametime
bemeen the Chapter 11 a"rled for Mr. Ericksonr and the subsequent Chapter 12 Tied
for Mr.. Eri~kson,

- - -- --- -

Had Mr, Bagfey been aware that Chapter 12 bad been reenacted on October
27,1998, with an efEeel.ive date of October 1,2808, Mr. Bagley could have
theChapter
p a ~ w i t h three
h
wegks after the
-- - eor~vet-ted
---- -- 11 c a s a o a C h a p t e ~ g
---petitiorrwa~-f"rled1-Theprcr~s10n-of Ghapter &I-eoaatahed h-&&USC+ 11-1ZCd)states: The court may convert a case under this chapter to a case under chapter 12
of this fitle If (3) the debtor requests conversie>mto chapter 12 of this title,
such. conversion is equitable. There is no reason to befieve that the Banhuptey
Judge woul(d not have converted this ease to a Chapter 12 when the case had only
been recently fied. IPI ]his deposi~an,Mr. BagIey tesaed that he would have Pied
a Chapter 12 if Chapter 12 had been avagiable. Mr. Bagley further testifred that
the Chapter 12 worald be less costly and debtor friendly. Mr, Bagley did not seem
lo have any hornledge of other advantages of Chapter 112 such as the requhement
that only ;;a plan needs to be fled in Chapter $2, whereas in Chapter 11a Disclosure
g bushess operation and Is extreme h
Statement (tihat does not fit with a far
complrexitJ:) and a plan of reorganhation are req&ed. Far a farmer, eonfurnation
of a plan of reorganization in a Chapter 12 is more ~ e l y .

. ..

11.

...

Johder of Katkleen Erickson as a Debtor

At the time the Chapter 51 was filed for B v c e Erickssn, Bryce and his wife,
Kathleen Erickson, had fded far a dissolution of their marriage, and Kathleen
Eriickson rehsed the suggestion of f ~ a joint
g hibankruptcy with Bryce Erickson,
Mr. Xtagfey, hhis deposlitiion, hdicates an numerous oceasiorns &at the major
problem in Mr. Erickson's Chapter $1ihamz~riiptcywas the factor that Kathleen
Eriekssn was antat a joint debtor nritb Bryce E P ~ C ~ S O B ~ .
If ,Mr, Bagley had converted the Chapter 11case to a case under Chapter
12, the provisions of 11 USG 8 1281 would harye applied to the case. Pursuant to
19 GSG 8 11201, the automatic stay is apphcablle ko a codebtepr, also Gable on the
d e b t s ~ i t ha-debtor wi& the r e q u k e m e f a t t the plan fded by t h d e b t o r must

-

- -___- -

propose to pay the c l a h s of the creditors. This protvhslon of Chapter 12 is not
ut&ed often shee the hasband aad wife uslaally f"Ie zt joht pegaon. However,
this case, had Mr. EBaGey competently represented Mr. Erickson and eortverted the
case tci :Q Chapter 12 and had Mr. Bti&ey bad h o d e d g e of 6 1201, the only
requkement in l-he Chapter 12 wauld have been nogee ar~da rigbt to abject lo any
motions e f f e c ~ the
g rights of Kathleen Erfckson as a j o h t oBaer of both the
personal properq armd the real proper*. As an example QE kcompetence, Mr.
Bagley tesGGed in his deposiaon that he would not have converted te, a Chapter 12
unm Kathleen Erieksort had johed h the peti~on.L&ewlse in his deposiGorrs, Mr,
Bagley tesafied that he did h o w if he could have esntrertied the Chapter f l to a
Chapter 12 ease,
Regardless of a eonact OE hterest based upon the par@esbehg in a
dissolrrtriion of marriage proceedkg with divergent goals as to groper@ d i ~ p o s i ~ o n ,
on LTebruary 19,1999, Mr. Bagley 17tled a pegaon mder chapter I1 for ~ t h t e e a
Ericbaa, Wi-t_houtany basis in stabte sr 'biankrrptcy case law, om December f 41998, priczr to f ~ thegpetitian, for IC;rtbheee\ Erickson, Mr. Bstdey fded a m o ~ s nto
j o h Kathleen Erickssn as a eo-debtor and for amendment of I-be cspkiioa of Mr--Erickso&s
banhup*-cnse,-The
C3grkqf e o u r s d s i g d tbe nnoHon to join.

-

-

- --

-

--

-

--

---

--- -- - -- -

--

-

----

FhaUy ran March 24,1899, Mr. BagIey made a mstiosp for joint
stration of the two Chapter 11 banhuptey cases for Bryce Erickson and the
other for Kattrfeen ErIcksort, For his deposition tes
h o w the dzference bemeen csnrsoada~onand )o
ophion, pursuant ta BanrIiruptcy Rule 1015, joht
~ O ~ O iin
B this
I
case. However, the exelusivi;@period for F ~ a Chapter
g
11
laisclosbtre statement and pEsn in Bryce Erickson9scase is now 6 weeks past due.
111,

Motion for Use of Gash Collateral

As with most farm bankuptey eases, the secured creditors had a collateral
hterest in most of the assets, hclelualiing, but not M l e d to, e a ~ l ecrops,
,
farm
mracfahery and eqdpment, the proceeds from the safe of the elma&el properCrJr laad,
of coarse, the real proper@. Bryce Erickson bad no operatirng capital and could
not 6abtah an speratiag loan. Bryce Eriekson, as a debtor in possession. h the
Chapter II ease, eould not use cash conatera1 tvit.bout first o b t a h h g an order for
use af cash collateral from the Ba&ruptey Court. There is almost always an
urgency t&tf"ie a motion for use of cash eoUateraz1 hmedliately after f"mgthe
Chapter If. or Chapter lL2 case of reorganhation, Bthemise, there is no money to
care for and feed the cattle and nct money to hanTestand mmrrkel the crops, In
addieon, payments must be made to utfliQ providers and some funds are requked
for living expensese

hfr, Bagley did not fade a modon for use o f cash collateral until one month
after the petition for Mr. Erickson was Tied, I1 USC $j363 provides that the
-

--

-

-

-

-

debtor in possession may not use cash collateral unless the secured creditor
consents or the courh after neace and hearhg, autbcrrkes the use of cash colliaterml,
It is fkst of all hpodant: that debtar's eounsef co
unieate with the secured
creditor lo deter
e the posiaoa of the secured
lor as to the use of 11s
coltatern1 and second the rrtoGotl far US^ of cash collateraf must be careftuny drafted
to speelficafly set forth the necessar;): expenses and the source of the f u d s from the
sa1e of collateraf. In his deposiaon t e s h a n y , Mr. Bagley agreed that he should
have eansulted wlth au aeeourtlant in the preparaaon of the motion for use of cash
eouateral The problem, of csurse, was that? at this b e , Mr. BagIey had not even
Cllled an appllca~oufor employment of an iaceouatank, Further in his depcrsi~on
tersamony, Mr, BagXey could not recaU that he bad ever before fded a moGokz far
use s f cash collateral. The blatant errors of the msaon hatclueled an o p e r a ~ g
budget witb projected hcome from October of 11998 through September of I999 iin
the total amount of $320,973 and projected expenses from October s f 1998 through
h%ayof 1939 h the tatal amomt of $167,205; use of one seclrred creditor's
collateral to make payments to another secured creditor; and other expenses to be
paid to unsecured crediitorsifady members that an aftomey with experience in
ba&uptcy tvould never have hcluded as part of the e&ibit. It would appear that
M
L Bagb w a x e
q f g h co&ter&h
tke2mount of $167x205. PEt -- -addi~owthepfan
aGon-is dueto befded-om orb?efclre-Februaq-59-P999 -and an order for use of cash coHateraI is nod sequlired after a plan of seorganba~sn
is corrfirmed, ObjecGorms to (-fiemotion. were filed by two o f the major secured
whose cash couateral was at: issue. The Bankruptcy Court set a
r y hearhg far the emergency use of cash coHateraB and the Court granted
the M t e d use of cash collateral in the amount of $23,858 to pay emergency post
pe&i~on
debts due in October, November and Beeember of 1998. Mr. Ba@ey did
not hBow Bankruptcy RuIe 40631@) for his motion and the Gsurt elearly
authrrrhed the use of only t b d amount of cash collateral as is necessary to avoid
immeaate and irreparable harm to the estate pendhg a fmal hearhg.
b o t h e r important matter in a motion. for use of eash collateral is the
adequate prstecgsn that the?debtor is offerkg to the secured cre&tor. Adequate?
protection baslcagy means iireplacement lien so that a secured creditor remahs h
the same secured position as before the coUlateraE is used by the debtor. E l is
difaeult in many farm cases to offer adequate protection to the secured creditor.
However, &Zr. Eriekson had equiQ in real proper9 and could have offered an
additional Een l o the secured creditor for the use of cash cohEateralt. In. a d d i ~ 11
o~
ates the Een on post petlieion crops and post petiGoar crops conid
have been used as adequate protection for the secured creditor aihnowirtg use of eash
cobaatersl, Mr, Bagley does not adequately address the issue of adequate proteeGon
in his motion for use of eash collateral.

The accountkg requrhred for the use of cash collateral was never fded with
the Court and the fmal hearkg on the motion for use of cash callaterill set for
December 22,1998 was vacated by Mr. Bagley far the reason that there was only a
I-amount-glf aeI&aonal cash collateral to 61 eoasiidered snd he was in

-

--

process of preparhg a pfaa ts be considered by the creditors and the court h early
1899. It is iirateresag that there is no further explanaae)~of why the cash csBateraI
in the amournt In excess sf $300,008, disclosed la the orighal mer~can,is new a
ial amount of adtdiaamai cash eolJLsntersi .

IV,

Appllcadsns for Employment of Professlcrmals

The debtor is requked, under Barahaxptey Rufe 2014, to obtalirn an order
strpprovhxag the employmeat of attorneys, accountants and for Mr. Erkckson9s
Chapter 11 case, a seattor. Elither upon hterrirar appKcadon or fmaE applleatican, the
fees and expenses o f the professionals musk be approved by the Court prior to
payment as an ad
i s & s ~ v eexpense by the debtor.

- -- - -- -

In iWr. Esickson" ease, an order agpsovhg the employment b~fMr. Bagley
was requked and, ernM that order is obtained from the B a h u p t e y gSoul"l, the fees
and expenses of the aMomey, heusred prior to approval, may not be approved by
the C g ~ t J~aChgpt_er&
.
de@Bed =thjyEma~cM
h&d&
a balance
- -sheets profit anaft-Soss-statemernt,reconcaaGtiron-of-bank statements-and other - ---hformation is reqraked by the United Stales Trustee. It is imperative that the
debtor have an srder apgrovhg the employment of an accountant as soan as
possible after the peGtioar is fded. Mr. Bagley unndershoad that It was the htent of
Mr. Eriekson to propose a plain of reorgani;zz~lfionzwith the sale of a pofiota of his
real propere to pay aH secured and unsecured creditors. Mr. Esckso~t,&erefore,
needed am srder a p p r o d g the employment of a realtar ts enable the realtor $0 list
and market the preperq for sale, The realtor was essential far assistance in
preparhg the Chapter Ik disclosure statement and the plan sf reorgan&a~or_a,

~qms,

-

The requkements for properly preparhg an appfricaGon for approval sf
employment of prafessioaals, is set d'srth in Bat~kruptgtpR d e 2064, If Mr, Bagley
had fouawed the rule, the applicaaisns w o d d hwe been apprwed on the first
appBicstion. Mr. BagIey did not me appgea~onsfor employment of an aecomksnt,
a realitor and as the aMorney for the debtor unt-il December 8,1998, W o months
after the petigion was fdled, Nose of the three appficaticsrms met the?requkernents of
Rule 2014 and, on December 10,1998, the Court entered an order denykg the
apptications, On, December 21,1998, Mr. Bagfey filed tke veriaed statement of
aBorney and the order for debtor-ia-possessim to retab af-komey was simed by the
Corxrt on December 23, f998. Mr. BagHq made two addidma1 appllcatfozes for
appohtment of ;maaccountant a ~ t dapgohtment of a realtor and PmaUy on ltaarcin
15,1999 perdttiing the debtor to retah ant aeeountaatt and a realtor. Mr. Bagtey is
now past the exclarsiviQ perisd for f k g the disclosure statement and the plan sf
reorganhation for ~oi~hich
he needs the assistance of an accountant and a realtor.

--

-

Had the case a t been disdsseb upon motion of Cbe United States Trustee
r-vithjohder sf two of llre secured crerSitors, Mr, Ba@ey would have been requtked
to Eile an applicifltioa for approrial of his fees and expenses hcutrred in the Chapter
11 case, The sppLicaLian far cempertsaki;auof professional persons is governed by
11 USG 8 330 which provides that the court may award lo s professional person
reasonable cumpeasaaon for achal, necessary s e d c e s rendered by the
prokssionai person and reimbursement for actual, necessary expenses. The Court
reviews the time spent on senices, the rates charged, whether the s e f i c e were
aeeessaq to the sd
i s t r a ~ a noiI; o r beneficial at the ~rmeat which the s e d c e was
rendered louofard the eofmpletictn of the case and whelbrer the s e d c e s were
performed withh a reasonable amount of time cs
ernsurate with the ctznrpled$8i,
importance, and n a b r e of the problem, issue, or task addressed.

--

--

- -

- --

If Mr. fi2a@ey9sPees had been srabd&ed Is the court for approval, it b .i&eBy
&at his fees wodd have been signmcantly reduced based upon dup&caGon,in the
appHeaGcan oFpro&ssionals, the hsndequacy sf the sf the pleadirmgs %"rtedin the case
and the amount of h e charged for the benefit to the baarhuptcy estate, Witfit a
conrf"xmed plan of reorganization, the fees wodd have become an ad
expense
-- with
--a frrsf ~ i o r i Q
f ~ r e& Ecitvever ~ @ he d i s d s s a i o f the easeP
-- there wasazo re+<ewd&Mr;Ba
es-and eosts and MeBag;legde~sedt
his omw----payment plan through the pronrisstlry note secured by a mortgage. Bryce Eriekson
did naf:always receive his mall because he was *
tg
to s a e ~ v by
e d r i h g a truck
across eountt-y so Mr. Erickson does not beEeve he received all of the statements for
legal fees from Mr. Bagley. Mr. Erickssn does lot recall reviewkg statements aE
legal fees and expenses before file signed the prohssory mote for appro
$29,008. Mr. Erickson teseified at his deposiGon that Mr. IBa@eyhad the
pronirssoy note and mortgage prepared for his slipahre when he met; wilb Mr.
Ba@ey cearcemhg the Chapter 12 bankruptcy. Mr. Bagey cannot locate the
statements sf legal fees and expenses far review in this case. Therefore, Mr. BagIey
has not prodded a detafled accounthg of the semices provided for the amount of
the p r o ~ s s o r gnote
i
plus the retaker of $5,000 paid by Mr. Erickson.
Bi.

Dismissal of the Case

,Mr. Bagley" hitial testhorry at his deposi~anwas that his ree6;rHee~o~
was
that the pfaa was confumed and that, sa behalf of Mr, Erieksora, Mr. Bagley had
voli~rlntarllydisdssed the Chapter I1 banhuptcy. Mr. Bagley tesaE"ne that the
ease was voluatarUy disnaf-ssed to end the d s e r y , to work wiith creditors outside of
banlicrruptcy, for e c o n c r ~ creasens to save the costs, hcIu&g the casts of legal fees
ate the Chapter 11, which had ceased to s8me any purpose.

Ia his deposition, Mr. Bragley a d ~ t t e that
d Bryce Erickssn's Chapter 11
was not a compficaked ease. Further, ,Mr. Bagley agreed %haatthe snly substsn~ve
action in the! Chapter f 1 was the motion far use 0%cash eoafrateral. Ms.Bagley
tesafied &at ultimately he &d not get the Ckapter 11cases '"shaped up." In Ms

*stimony, Mr. Bagley accepted respcansibMb for not e f f e c m h g a plan.

--

-

Mr. EagIey jusafied Ms legal fees and expenses charged to Bryce Erlcksaa,
based upon m e e ~ his
g stated goal of keepllag the aulohna~cstay in place so that
creditors could nett c o n ~ r a legal
e
aedon. to cokaeet sa the debts, If, h fact,
obtahhg b e was Mr. Ba@ey9sprhrary goal for the Chapter 11, without any
htermGoa of propaskg a plan of reorgankalifia, the ea&e ease would have been a
bad faith f&g, It%-,Ba@ey testiged that he be&eved it was reasonable to charge
saorney" fees serd costs to Bryee as he was m a h g "progress,?' The questfan then
becomes whether Mr. Bagley did make any progress in the case.

--

-

-

hIr. Erickson was charged totaf fees and expenses of $34,673.38 and the only
sccrrmpHshmegit h the Chapter 11 was a stay of ac~ormby the creditors for the
seven months from Betaber 8,11998 to May 11,1999. On Mareh 3,1999, the United
States Trustee fded a maBon ts dfsdss the case. The basis of the mo~srpto d i s ~ s s
is that the debtor has not l"rled a plan and a disdosure statement and has made little
progress h advanekg this case to ~ocsnfwcaratiao,hforesver, even though the
debtor" wife had filed a chapter 11peGastn, Mr. EEa@ey &d not f i e an appUcaQicsn
for eaaplsymeat u n a December 8,1998 and did not &scfsse to the court that he
hadl bgcm r e p r e s ~ q t h g a edeb&r% wifeI. TA-U.SLQus&epri;hted out the delays--h obtaiurhg-spgoht1~1e1t~tbof
~needed-garafessicz~aI8and
the-resulihg h p a c t - s n t h w
istra-tisn of the case. The Iasl ma8;eer addressed by the U,S. Trustee was the
kcomplete, rnoathfy reports alad faaure to pay the qurarlerjy fee.

- ---

Xa. a Chapter 11 banhuptcy ease, complete monthly repods are essential to
provide ~fomnaticmabout the Fmances of the case, not only to enable the 42,s.
Trustee to monitor the ease but for the creditors as weU. It is not surprishg that
tke monthly reports were hcrtmplete. The order retaking the acesarnts~rtwas not
entered unt2 BXarch 25, f 999. Mr. Eriekso~would not be expected lo have the
bowledge or t r a h h g , without the assistance of an aceouatrmnat, to have Tded the
monthly reports csnrtairrhg a balance sheet; profit and loss statements, s u p p o r ~ g
schedules and the bank statements. The quarterly fees, reqmked in a Chapter 11,
are based on the monthly asbursenments disclosed in the monthEy reports.. Mr.
Erickscsgi would not have had a figare for the quarterly fee vtiifborut accurate
manthfy reports.

Even though two of the major secured creditors joked hthe Trrastee's
mo6on to disMss the ease, the Court entered au carder aua~ovvhgten days for the
debtor to cure the items conrtahed im the Trustee's motion ta disdss. The monthly
reports fled by the debtor, lia an effort to comply wrfth the Court's order were not
adequate ia substathmce, were not complete h the &formation proljded by the
debtor and conlraq to banhragtcy law, the d e b h r was not current 0x1 post-petition
expenses. A competent ;a&-torrreywould have assisted the acecluntrsltlt h pprepan;mkg
the monthly reports and wodd have carefuHy re~riewedthe hformatickn in the
moathly reports. It is k t e r e s ~ to
g note that the U,S, Trustee" stabs report
indicates that fiam the RXrareb monlhIy report, the debtor owed Mr. Bagley $7,008
-hfees over the hftiaif r e t a k e r of $5,000, S h c e BkBcagIey hamot been able to

-

-

-

---

produce m y statements fer the legal fees charged to Mr. Erieksran, the only
doerrmentsgon niEch supports Mr. Efa@ey9se l a h for fees is the March, 1999,
report which indicates the total fees charged by Mr. Bagley was $12,000,
It is clear from the plerrdhrtgs E"iled in Mr. Erlcksonis Chapter 11 ease, that
by A p r l of 1999 the case was quricMily dishtegrakg. Mr. Ba@ey had aast been
unicatiag wit&the secured credjitorf to obtain their h p u t for the disclosure
statement and plan. Mr.Bagfey bad failed severali disclosures statements an&pEanst
all of which did not contab adequate hferrnaac.n pursumt ts USC $jl f 23. On
AprH 22,1999, First MadonaI Bank obtahed an order for relIief from stay to take
possession sf all of the debtor" sremahhg cattle, A hearkg on the U,S. Trustee's
mo6iion to disdss was set for Aprg 28,1999.

-

--

On May 11,1999, the Court issued an order dr;sdssh;ltgthe case for
swfficient cause pursuant to 11 USC iji flk2@), Section 6112@) p r o ~ d that
e ~ on the
request of ;a parQ in hterest or the U.S. Trustee, the court may convert a chapter
I1I case to a ehapker 7 or may d l s d s s a case in chapter 18, for cause, hcludh-klg:
u ~ o of
n the estate and absence of a reasonable memood
con~uiinrgBoss to or d
the debtor
- -- o f- rehab&taGoxr;
-- h a b E @ to ef&c@aLu pJa& g g r g a s o ~ ~ g & & _ b y
-&at io-preg'udiciakto-creditovsan&other-eausesUs"ied kthat sectr;oa of the - -Bakrrptey Code. The Court believes, and I wsrrId support, that Mr. Erirekson's
Chapter PI had faaech for afl sf the reasons kcfaded h that p a f i c d a r proviisiion of
Chsp(;er f 1.

-

&Ir.Bagley testiBed in his dept~si~on.
that, regardjess of the drisrmni;ssal of the
case, he beEeved he was jarslified in his representaGon of Mr. Ericksona because he
bad held the creditors at- bay for seven monk.kns, and that Bryce Erickson's ease had
not beem converted to a Chapter 7 BqjuidaC-ion ease, Once agah, Mr. Bagley lack sf
f a d a n i l y with the Banhuptcg: Code is evident. Pursuant to II US67 $jIPf2(c), the
court may not eginvert a case under Chapter If to a case under Chapter 7 if the
debtor is a farmer.

Gonfiet of kterest is a cancept that every attorney, at one t h e or another,
must weigh and act upon, The general rule is that kin agomey shaD not represent a
cfienl if the representation of that client will be directly adverse to the interests s f
anocher client. The issue here is one of loyal@ in iaalin al&omey9srelaGcons&p with a
client. There is an excep~oigonin that the aeomey may obtah the eonsent of both
cX_lieatsbf the attorney beaeves the representation will lnst adversely affect the
relationship with the other cEernt. As in this ease, wit&&Mr.Bagley r e p r e s e n ~ g
Bryce Erieksoa and then eo
eachg representation of Kathleen Erieksoaz, an
imperdssible canfict of Interest existed before! the representaacrn of Kathleen
Eriickson was undertaken and hqr. Bagley had a duty of EoyaYQ to B q c e Erickson
do d e e b e representation of Kathleen Erickson.
-

----

--

-

-

-

- -

-

-

---

-

-

__

-__

-

--- -

-

-

Bryce Ericboa and fCssth.hXeenEriclkson had ftled for s dissofurtion. of tbek
marriage prior to the F ~ sf gthe chapter I1 ease on Octsber 8,1998, IBhis
deposf~ontesenraony, Mr. Bagley staled that he did not r e c o p h e any coafict: on"
hterest although there may have been. a potential conmet of hterest, in that the
cBents may have had divergent:hterest in presemrhg proper@, Mr. Ba@ey further
teseaeti that the csumet of hterest beween the p a r ~ e would
s
have been more of an
Issue lirr the divorce court. It is hteresb-ing to note that Mr. Bagley could r e c o w e
t h ~ his
f dual representaaoa of the pades would zlecessarBy present a cornmet 6tf
hsrterest: in the divorce eourk, where they would be deaihg with a proper@
scalemen4 however the presence of those same issues h the b a k u p t c y
proceedhgs? which refated to the disposition o f properv and debts, would not
present a conmet of hteresk.

-

--

--

-

--

--

-- --

h2r. Bagdey lesWied in his depcrsiGon that the p a s ~ e were
s
not "ion the same
pagef% the baarkuptcy, Mr. Bagley Ifpxrther tes~fied&a&he did not see that there
w o d d be a eonmet of hterest and he did not consult with Mr, Erickson and did not
disclose to Mr. Erickso-n &at ;a coaflbl.e&of hterest did or may have efisted. With
even a cursoq understandkg of the chapter I1 ease, it is sbGaus that: there was a
h p z d s s & l e conBct &@tierest befgne Mr*BagiqIs represend-a~ono f KatMeen
-- -Erickson~smmeneedLa- ---

-

--

-

Although the biIILag stakemernts are not avagable for review, Mr. Bagley
kesGGed &:hathe did not distinguish beween the b m g s for Bryce Erickson and for
Kathleen Ericksora, Even though there was no separate b W g for s e ~ c e s
p r o ~ d e dfor KatlrHeen Ericksor?;,Mr. Bagley tes~i"redthat be belleved he had a
nonverbal, express agreement with Bryce Erickson. that Mr. Erickson would pay
for Kathleen's agomey fees and costs. F e can the^ smly assume that the secured
pso~sso~
note,
y executed only by Bryce Erickssn and not Kathleen EriEctisoaz,
contakaas all of the legal fees and costs hcarrred in representa~olaof Kathleen
Erickson.

Mr. Bagley eoakaaed to represent both Bryce Erickson and PCathleenr
Erlekslsn bel-weent the cfisrnissat af the Chapter 11amd the r W g of the Chapter IS;.
Mr. Bagley did p~.o\~ide
his statements for semlees bemnaittg $me 5,1999. The
skatemen$ for sen6ees helirrded b m g s tm a given day in which Mr. Bagley wodd
communicate .Mith Bryce Ericksoa and on that same day esmmanicate w7ith
Kathleen. Erickson. Bryce Ericksrsn anad Kathleen Eriekson are, at this t h e period,
c r ~ n ~ u with
h g their dissoluGo;n of marriage case, The hterests of each party were
i~ertahlydivergent at this h e and there is no doubt that the confict @sf hterest
was comGhuhgl It is h t e r e s ~ to
g note that from June 3,1998 tbrsngh October 27,
f 999, whBe representing both Bryce Ericksrtn and a t h l e e n EP-ickson iu ma&ers
related to ctlgttact with creditors, the dissofution 06 marriage and prepilr8~0nfor
f m g a Chapter 12 BPa&hpptcy, Mr. Bagley bilfred to Bryce Erickson a total of 2'7
$ Q U ~at $165 per hour for a total c~f$4,455. Mr. Bagley tesafied that all mpaid
attorney fees and costs were roIiled into the prodssow note, payable to Sirins LC.
-

--

---fofl29,173,3Qton-M0vemberH,-Ii994~-

--

- --

-

-

-

--

-

Ba@eycould not recafl if he was able to obtah a confurmed gftam s f reorgzanhaaon.
h any of the Chapter kl, cases, Mr. Bla&leytestlBed &at he had ooldy handled one
Chapter 12 ease prior to Mr. Erickson's Chapter 12 and ahat he had been
successhf likl obtahhg conf"rrmrelionof a plan of reorganiizs~on,for the farmer, in
that case, Mr. Ericksct-a%Chapter 12 case was the second and on& other Chapter
12 case in which hir, Ba@ey served as aMerney for a debtar.
The issue of damsges to Mr. Erickson h the Chapter 11 case is the crucial
faattor to be eonsidered. Mr. Entickson was charged for two f h g fees of $838) - one
for Mr. Ericksoa's Chapter I1 case f w g and another for KaitMeen Erickson? ease
f h g for a ~ B ) E oS f~ $1,660. Mr. Erlckson suffered damages as a result o f the kept
h a n d h g of the moGon far use of cash eoHateraE in not havhnrg sufEcient funds to
adequately care for his cattle and crops, Only Mr. Erickson would be able to
a: those damages.

-

- -- - -

-

In s Chapter l l , a s weII as ha Chapher 12, if these is equi&y in the ecrHaberal
seeurkg a loan, the secured creditor can recover all of tbe atlomey" fees and costs
@%edby the secured ere&tor7sateosgtey in pprotee~gthe cofiakerafi d u r h g the
- -- Chapjer-- 81 case.
In Mr. Ericksonkgase&e s e x e d ereditg-id
&ayevalue in
--- -collateral-h-excess of-6:Iaeamount of-the loans, The a$torney-for Fksk-Seeari ---B a d was aggressive in both the Chapter %Iand Chapter 12 eases and the total
al-aomey's fees anel costs were $9,750 for the Chapter 11.
First. Nakioeah Barrk, through its aeomeys, also played an active role in the
representation sf the Bank's hterests h the Chapter liP case. Fkst Na~onsebihFa&
opposed the request for use of sash. collateral in the Chapter 111 ease, The Court
entered an order in Firs(.National Bank's favor, First National Bank j o k e d the
U, S,Trustee's mergoa to disdss the Deblozs Ckapt-er I1 ease and the Court
agreed and disdssed the Chapter f I. First NaGonal Bank fded a motion for relief
from stay the Court granted the mot-;on. First N a ~ o n aBank
l
woarld also have
istratlive mafters in the Chapter II
heurred attorney's fees related to general ad
case. IYitIaouC asa ite&ed statement, a conservative esemate sf the attorney's fees
and costs added to the E ~ I c ~ snote
o B ~wodd be $8,500.

%-ashhgtoicl Cg.r.hearQBank" proof of claim iur the Chapter 112 hcludes
ab-lormey's fees and costs, heurred prior to the Chapter 12, of $338.46,

VkIL Reasonable A&torney9sFees for the Erickson Chapter 1%
Case
the understandkg that Bryce Erickson's Chapter 11ease was
d i s d s s e d for cause, an esa
aGom of the legal fees that would nornarauy result
from the f i g band prosecu~onof the case by the debtar9saM.~meyhrela~onship
to the pleadhgs fd"Ble by Mr. Baghey, are t e w g , and are set forth bejaw:

- -

--

__
--

--

Eshated
kaessosmwbfe T h e

Aeend 341 Mee&g

1.5 hours

MoGon for use of cash cohfrateral

3.41 hours

(3). appGcaGons for appoiintmenl of
professionals hclu&g verified statements

- -- - --

---

-

* Mr. Bagley testified in his deposiGcm that a reasonable amount of t h e for
preparhg the peGtiarp and schedules w o d d be four 4.0 six hours. Mr, BagEey had
a b~i o t n s l ~abtabed
al
fmancial d o ~ u m e ~ & $ r o ~debtcar,
he
I s . tax rehms9reg@
fmaneiaE-stateoinentt~~eopies
o f hvoiceg9ppriarta eeamplee~gthe sehednlesfded on-October 8,1998. Mr. Bagley prepared three amendments to the schedules - one
extensive amendment on December 9,1998; another on December 28,19952 and the
f"malamendment on Pebruaq 19,1999. 11 is not unusual that
of the schedules would be required followhg the m e e k g of cre
case occurred ou November 13,1998. However, three amendments of the
schedules 'vultb more khan four months after the peG~onwas rded is unusual,
especiaEly since the plan of reorganhation should have been fied tvith 128 days o f
the peGilkion T u g date,
HE, as stated by Mr. Bagey in his deposit-iou t e s b o n y , the acco9lapEslament of iMr,
Erieksoo" Chapter l a case was crbtairrirmg the automatic stay, then the value of Mr,
Bagley's servi-ces in pursrrhg the Chapter II for Ms. Eriekssa was the six hours
spent preparhg the peGaon and f ~ &atrigger
g
the autonmnadc stay. Based upon
that premise, the value sf servm'ces Mr. Erjckssn aclualIy received weald not have
exceeded $990.00. With sa stretch in assesshg the vahe o f sefices provided by Mr,
Bagley to Mr, Ericksnn, 83.5 kasrikrs have been hskeluded above, The total attorney
fees would be $2,227.58 and there would remah _a balance of the $5,000 retaker
paid &a&&Is.BagIey by Mr. Erickso9t.

Pleadhrags related to Kathleen Erickssn" smg of Chapter 11, kcIudhg the mgljHon
islration, have not been helraded because the %"&gand mc~~orrm
would not have been required had Mr, Bagley converted the case Po a Chapter 12,
as a prudent S B M O ~ wou116-I
E L ~ ~ have done.
--

--

The preparation of the several &scEosure statements and plans also has not been
kdrmscenable " o g s because the pleadkgs were not

-----hduded-k-the*

-_

prepared in a manner ebae wsdd resultt Iln a coxrfwmation of a Chapter 1I plan, Xn
his deposfaiion t e s b o n y , Mr. Ba@ey c f a h e d respouslli>fill;yfor not effechsang a
pian, Likewise, the monlhfy reports were never accepted by the United States
Trustee and the lack of accuracy and completeness was hclueded by the U S ,
Trustee as a basis for the msaon to dis&ss,
I t is not reasonable for Mr. Baeey to charge for his Incompetenee in three rounds
for preparhg the appEcaaons far employment of professionals, The requkements
are clearly set f0rl.k in inhe Biarnbaxpky Rules, but Rlr, Bagey neglected to fsMow
them, The sedces of the accoarartmt rand the realtor were necessary h this case
shortly after f h g By the t h e the accountant and reantor were employed, by order
of the court, the case was close to disdssaL
CONCLUSION

--

-- - - --

The best csurse of acGon in the Chapter 11case wodd have been a
conversion of the case from Chapter 11 to Chapter 62, Conversion of the ease
could have beea accompfisbed m r i t b the month after the Chapter 11 case was Bed.
in the
_____- - -- The-appEcg~o~fogrofes&nraJp3rsSonsw08~iBcahave SEE beea rq-wed
- ~Ittapte1--1-2--ease-a~
\vaufd a moCion-for useof a s h eoflaterigt;--However,the joinder - - - -of Kat-bleen.Erickson h tbc Chapter L2 would not have neeessaray been an issue.
Mr. Bat;Eey would not have had a eonEet of hterest sil-tgaGoaa if he had converted
the case to a Chapter 12 with Bryce Erieksebm as the onlly debfor. The only
requkeaaeat in the Chapter 1%tvould have been for Mr. Bagley to give n s ~ c oe f all
proposed sctlclns in tke Chapter 12 with the right of KatMeen Eriekson to object
andl be heard by the Banhuptcy Court.
g operatianti.. The
A Chapter 12 is desjgned exclusively for fa
procedures for a farmer ita ;a Chapter 12 are not as cornfslleated as ita a Chapter 11,
The memood of obta
g a confirmed plan h a Chapter 1%is greater, espeeiaHy
in B q e e Erickson's case which was arot a esmpllcated ease in terms of assets and
debts. Because the Chapter It2 is designed for far
g operations and the
procedures are not as complex, "gbe costs, h terms of legal fees, would have beer?;

substanaaHy less.
Moreover, Mr. Bagley camnot even produce ite&eb statements to verify the
r W g of fihe fees to Mr. Ericksoa. The success sf the Chapter 13 case was deemed
to fa%from the very b e g h h g and the total fees charged by Mr, Bagley h the
arnonnk of $34,f 7338 are not justified for the kept represenkaaon provided lo Mr,
Eriek~o~r.
TWOsecured creditor sreomeys, h strccessfufity represen*g theha cfiiients,
only hcurred 8tte)rney~fees and costs in the lotit amount of appro

$rs,s@o.

-

I reiiedi upon the foFcntl@wing
informatiion In prepaPiirzg the expert reps&:

Review of pleadings flied Sin the Chapter 11ease
Review of pleadings filed in the Chapter 12 case
Discorreq responses produced by Mr, Bagley in this case
Ms. Bagleyv"sdepasitioa tes~monyfrom nates taken at the depositioa
Baxakmptq Code
Bankruptcy Rules
Rules of Professional Conduct

Dated this 30& day of April, 20848.
Respeeguliy sabmi.l-ied,

Bryan D. Smith. Esq. ISB No. 441 1
B.J. Driscoi;l, Esq. - ISB No. '701 0
h4eGMTH, MEACBAlbf & SMITH, PLLC
P,0, Box 50731
414 Shoup Avenue
Idalto Falls, Id&o 83405
s elepbone: (208)524-073 1
Tclefm: (208)529-4166
---.

-

Attorneys for Defendait

Bryce 13. Erickson

THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE S E T H JUDICLAL DISTRICT OF THZ
ST 4TE C)E IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COL?\n7

STRIGS LC, a UTyomingLiinited
L~abilityCo~npany?

OF CARlTOU

i
i

1
Plaintiff,

f

Case Ko. CV-04-284

1

>
>

xrs.

BRYCE H. EMGKSON, i 4 % ~AM' PERSON

)

CLAh\4mG b . D E R BY OR THROUGH
1
BRYCE H. ERICKSOK IhT
AND TO THE
-REAL, PROPERTY D E S G m E D AS FBLtOIyS: )

CAiXE30U COLTNTT'I', IDAHO:

TOWNSHIP 5 SOUTH, RANGE 36 E.B.M..
EETTION 27: LOTS 1 AND 2, T<l/2
NWl l4. EXCEPT THEEFROM THE S $12
NE1,'if YW % NWl.'4.
Defeildants,

.MFDh\TT OF B. JJDHSCOLL - 1
F \GLIEKTS BDS -453PIeadmgi\O"3 Al'fED 306

1
1

1
1

1
1
1
1
1

AFFIDAVIT OF

B.J, DIIPXSGOLL

1

STATE OF DLMQ

1

ss.

1

County o f Bormev~llc

B.J. DRtSflOU, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:
il j

1an one sf the alaomeys for the defeedclilt in ?,heabuve-referenceii matter.

(2)

1make thrs affidaxdit based on my own personal knowledge.

(3)

Attackd hereto and marked as Exhibit *'A9'is z ti-ile m,?d
correct copy ofthe

Response to De%ndmt Bryce Erdekson's First Set of hterrogatones to Sir!irs LC

Requests

for Pro&~zlicmof Documents.
(4)

Attached hereto and marked as E-dxibit "'B" is a tme and co1Teci copy of billings

%om Wiiliarz D. Bagley to Bryce Enckson covering the t i m e per;od from h e 3, 1999 to June 5,
2001 produced by the plail~r~ffin
nts verified diseovev responses.
(5)

Attached hereto md marked as Exhibit "6'3s a true ;
i
dconect copy of "khe Order

Rescindillg Order For Debtor In Possession To Retain Attorney &om Case No. 99-2 1 500 of the

United States Ba114ilq;cy Court 6;
ilie District of Wyoilling.
(5)

Attached hereto and marked as Exhibit "-6)" is a true 2nd correct CCBPYo f the

docket report printed fioni PACER for Case No. 99-11 500 ofthe Uriited States Ba~z'mptcyCourt
for the District of JVyorni~zg.

Fui"lSler yom affiant sayeth i ~ a ~ ~ h f .
DATED this -

day ofhlay. l O Z 8 .

_WP;mAVI[TOF B, J. DMSCOLL - 2

F:iCLIEFrS\BDSrJ453
9leadirrgs\O43 A3 BJD doc

(SEAL')

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
day of May, 2008,I caused a true and
I HEREBY CERTIFY elat on this
,
DntSSGOEL to be served, by placing the
correct copy of the forcgnil-ig AFFIDAVP
saline in a sealed elivziopr and depositing it in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, or hand
delivery, facsimile trlulsmission or overnight delivery, addressed to the following:
A. Bruce Lason, Esq.
Attorney at Law
E-iorizon Plaza Ste 225
1870Hiline Road
Pocateilo, Idaho 53101-2935
Fax: 478-7602

[

i 1
[ 1
[ ]

U .S. ~

a i f b ~

Hand Delivery
Ox~ernaghtDelivery

RECEIVED APK O 8 2005

'4. Bruce Larson - ISB S o , 2093
Horizon Piaza, Ste 225 - 1070 Wiline Road
Prrcaxeili~,ID 83201-2935
Telephone: (208)478-7600
Fax: (208) 478-7682

INTHE DISTTCIGTeouw OF TZE SIIITH J m I e I A L DISTHGT OF THE
STATE 01:IDAHO, SN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANBOU
SIRIUS LC, a %'y oxtbing Li~nicedLiab3iq )
Company,
)
)

Pf aintiff,

Case No. CV-2004-284

1
vs.

)

)
BRYCE B. FRICKSON, AND ANY PERSON )

CLAIMING UNDER, BY OR THWOUGS
BRYCE M. EXUCKSON IN AND TO THE )

REAL PROPERTY
FQLLOIVS:

DESCRIBED

mSPONSE T o DEFENAPdTT BRYCE
EM@WON9SFIWT SET OF
INTERROGATORIES TO SIRIUS LC
QR PRODUCTION
OF DOG

AS

1
1

Ci"nHh30U COUNTY, IDAHO:

1
TOWNSHIP 5 SOUTH, KkNGE 46 E.B.M., j
SECTION 27: LOTS I PnED 2 , Nl;/zNW%, )
EXCEPT
T H E R E F R O M THE)
SvzNEYil";W%NiV%,
J
Defendant9

)

COklES %OW Plaintiff, pursuaat to the Idaho Ruks of Civil Procedure and makes
the foilowing Answers to Defendant Bryce Erickson's First Set of Interrogatories to Sirius

Response to Defendant Bryce Eriebon" First Set of lis1erregatories to Siriu
Request k r hoduction of Docments
Page L

% m""

LC.

IPr'lBMOGATORY N u :With respect to all witnesses that YOU ir~cendor
expect to call at the trial of this action, please provide the foiiowing information:
(a)

The n m e of the tvrtness;

(b)

The address and telephone cumber of the witness;

(c)

A brief surmnai-y of the respective expected teatbony of each such il'iliiess.

&VSWER TO IWEMOGATORU NO, 1:

(a)

The name of the witness: Mrillim D. Bagiey

(bj

The address and telephurre r m b e r of the witness: 1107 West 6th Avenue,

Cheyenne, W 82001; 307-634-0446
jc)

A brief sumurrary of the respective expected testimony of each such witnrss.

I will testify concerning ( I ) my represelltation o f Mr.and Mrs. Ericksun wbicfi rc
detailed in response to Interrogatory No. 7, (3)the execution of the note and mortgage, (3) our

SUGC~SS%I
efforts to continue Court protection until a sale could be made, and (4) ccarnp~tationof
the amount due on the secured note.

LNTEmOGGTQlRS' NO. 2: Please state whether you have engaged ar;y experr
witnesses in testi6 at the trial of this cause, if so, please state the expert's:
(a)

Name.

(b)

Address ar?d telephone n ~ r ~ l b e r .

Respame ro Debadant Bryce Erichon's First Set of I~~terrogatories
to Sirius
Request for Reduction of Docurere~ts
Page 2

(c)

The substance of any opinion, or olher rsstimo:~ythat the expert is expected

to g:ve ah trial of this cause.
id)

The specific &cis md data on which such opiniuns are based.

mSWER TO HNTEmBGATORY NO. 2: The Plaintiff has not yet identified

persons who may be called as expert witnesses at the trial of this matter. The Plaintiff will
disclose expert witnesses, if and when identified, in accordance with the Idaho Kuies of Civil

Procedure an3 any applicable Scheclufing Order. This response will be supplement to comply
with Rule 26jb)j4)(A)(1) and X E 705.

INTEMOGATORPI NO.3: Please identify a q axid all documents that you expect
to use at the trial of this matter, i.e., billings, cheeks, maps, drawings, photographs, sketches,

reproduciions, wriicen staternellr;~obtained mdl'or in the possession of [Be plai~ltlffand its agents,

represeaatives and arrorneys yeralrzing

m any sf the allegations of plaintiffs Complaint on file

herein,

&WSVlTER
TO INTEmOGATOIRU NO. 3 : The Plabtiff has not yet determined
which documents or things it may introduce as exhibits at a trial of this matter. The Piahtiff
reserves the right to introduce sny document or thing produced or identified by either party

through discover. Notwit&hstandingthe foregoing, the following documents will be introduced as
exhibits at the trial of this rnaaer: (I) the N~vernber13, 1999 Promissory Note and Xlsrtgage,

(2) Debtors-in-Possess60n's Application for Order Allowkg Retention of Attorney dated and Eled

Response la Defendmt Bryce Erickon" First Set sf hterrogatcsries to Sirius
Request for $rodaction of Docmermts
Page 3

SE

December 29,1999, (3) computation o f die amount due, (4) Mr , and Mrs. Erickson' s Property
Settlement Agreement and Order in their divorce action and (5) the thee Bankruptcy Petitions and
their dockets. Discovery in this mztier IS ongoing mci the Plainiiffresesi~esthe right to supplemcnt
this answei/iesponse if and to the extent additional responsive information is identified.
nTTEmOGATORYNo, 4 : State the stikqes and addresses of each and every

person who has ho-vledge or purports to have my knowledge of the facts of this case and
describe the facts and information which each such person purports to have,
Ai*IS%VERTO IkTEmOGATORY NO, 4: William D.Bagley. 1107 iVest 6th
Aveme, Cheyenne, WU $2001; Bryce H. Erickson, Kaaleen Erickson,

BWEmOGATOIRY Pi@. 5: Please provide an zccolaatirag of m y and afI mounts
paid to you on tile Note identified in your Complallit as executed on November 13. 1999.
iLP;iS&VERTO LNTEmOGATBRU NO, 5: No payments were made. The entire
bakmce plus interest and accruing aMorney fees is due.

INTEmOGATORY NO. 6: Please identie any and ail b
which William D.Sagley has represented a party, nnd for each matter specificat@ including the
following iafoi-matlon:

(I)

The name of the parry Mr. Bzgiey represented in the bafzlr~uptcymatter;

(2)

The lypmof the ba

t ~ mansr,
y
i.t,
Chapter 7,Chapter 9, Gkapzr I I ,

Chapter 12, or Chapter 13; and

Respame to Defendant Bryce Erickiscan" First Set of Interrogatories lo Sirius LC and
Request for &aduction of Docments
32
Page 4

(3)

Whether the party h l r Bagley represented was a debtor, a creditor, or a

third-put:;.

ANSWER TO INTERBOGATCbRU NO. 5:
(1)

My practice is civil. 1do not accept crin~inal,divorce and personal injury

1 have no way to identify dle name of each creditor or debtor represented by me in the inst 19

years.
(2)

1 represent creditors in all matters. 1represent debtors in Chapter 7 , 11 and

12 matters. 111rhe past 12 months I have represented debtors in one (1) Chapter 11 and forty-three
(43) Chapter 7 c a s e This is probably typical. I filed the first Chapter I 1 "Arraogement" in

Wyoming for Tcton Homes in Carper, Wyomiilg in about 1970, and that company continues to
manufacmre mobile homes m d has about 350 employees.
43)

1 represent debtors or creditors and for the rime B served as a Trustee

INTEMOGATORY NO.7: Please identie each matter in whricb William D.
Bagley rendered legal advice or kgal services to Bryce Erickson, specifically identieing the
foHowisag for e;ieh matter:
(1j

Tte general nature of the matter; and

(2)

The time period during which Mr, Bagley rendered legal advice or legal

services or: the particular r~rakaet:

Response to Defendant Bryce Erichon" First Set of Interrogatories 60 Skius LC md
Request far Production of Documents
33
Page 5

ARSWER TO ENTEmBGATBRY Nod:

(I)

Mr. Crickson, was the defendant en a pendkg divorce action tvben he was

referred to nne bj his divorce attorney (now District Judge Demis Sanderson) to file proceedings

in the Ba&upecy

Court to stay a penrii~gbar& foreclosure on the family fzrn-:, which was

ownedjointly by Bryce Erickscln and hs wife Kad~leen.T h e to file was short and she was not
tsrilling to join in rbe preiceedi~gs.The Chapter 12 opdon had expired and not yet been reinstated.
Tile only choice we had was to file a Chapter I I b d m p t c y ivirZluut the joint owner. Tine '"plm'"
was to protect [lie substmtiaf equity by stopping foreclosure and selling sufficient fmd to pay fbe

creditors. His Chapter 11 Reor,oankaticrrr Petition was filed October 8, 1998 as Case #38-2 1393.

Subsequently, Mrs. Eriekson agreed that our actio~m s necessary to protect their
cquity, x ~ Idfiled her Chapter 11 February 19, 1999 (#99-20 162). We sought to have the Court

consolidate the actions, but &is was noe allowed, m d after a year with nu sales, in September of

1999,we dismissed both actiacs and attempted to work with tbe creditors without Court
inrroltrernent.

This worked for awhile, but unfor%naeefy there was no cash flow to support a
iroluntxy workout and, as a resuit. of extznsive highway construction between Star Valley and

Jackson, the anticipated real estate aarket did not: produce my offers, Mr.Erickson was best able

to earn income ivorking 6s a truck driver. The r a k e o f the land was in its potendal recrsationaf
use rather than in agricu1luraI.

Response to D e h d m t Bryce Ericksun's Fist Set: of Interrogatories to Sirius LC and
Request for Production of Docrm~ents
34
Page 6

After a period of t h e new foreciosure actions were breatened or brought and a
new voluntary Chapter 12 was filed by M r Erickson oil December 3. 1999 (#99-2 1500). Again
the pian was

rfi

sell property, pay ail creditors

in

hill, and pieszrve

a5

much equity as possible.

These proceedings continued until the creditors and Court were frustrated, and rile stalding
Chapter 12 Tmstee to& aver. A "Third m e n d e d Plan" wan approved June 4, 2001, aid
subseqn~ntlyproperty was sold and the matrer concluded in 2004, within the three year term. The

process took six yews.
(2)

Semvices began prior to October 1, 1998 and ended August. 28,2000.

f W E ~ 0 G i a i r 0 R YNO. 8: For each of the matters you identified in yoltr
response to Interrogatory No, 8 here&, please provide the ioIEowing:

(4)

Am accounting of the hours worked by Mr. Bagley on behalf o f Mr.

(2)

-41accountkg
3
of &he a~nnuntscharged by Mr. Bagley to Ms.Erickson for

Erickson;

hlir. Bagley's services; anif

(3)

Amounts paid by or on behalf of Mr. Eriekscsn for services prc-vided by Mr ,

Bagley .

ANSfVER T 8 INTERROGATORY S O . 8: The avaliable billng is attached. It
reflects a pyrnernt by Note and Mortgage and a write off

~ f o $15,9C48.313
f
on

Response to Defendmerat Bryce Ericbon's First Set of hterrogatories to Shirrs
Request for Bodnrc~onof Docmeats
Parre 7

*??

h n e 1,2001.

INTEmOGATORB" NO, 9: Please identify any and ail officers, directors,
owners, employees members, and managers of Sirius LC fro% Jkouary 1, 1998 to the present,
and for each person identified, please indicate the flsllow~ing:
(2)

The n m e , address, and telephone nrsrnber of the person;

(2)

The capaciq or title of the person; and

(3)

The period of t h e that the person has been affiliated with Sirius LC.

ANSU'ER TO IhTEMOGATORP? Neb, 9: Sirius LC was formed July 13, 1993
by William D. Bagiey and Masrgaret A. Bagley , husband and wife, for fmify invesgsrreents. They

;ere 50i50 partners or 'Members" wifhout further tittes. The office is 1107 Wrest 4th Avenue,
Cheqienne, !XiY 82001; 307-634-5446, Residence: 400 West 6th Avenue, Cheyenne, WU 82001;
307-632-3232.

NTS
FOR PRODUCTION NO. 1: All documents relating to payments
received by you on the Note identified in your Coqfalnt as executed on Xovember 13, l9953.
:

No payments have

been made.
: Any and all exhibirs and/or docmeats

which you intend on. expect to utilize at the trial of this cause,

Response to Defendnot Bryce Erickan's First Set of fnterragafories to Sirius B a n d
Requst for hoductim of Docments

: See response to

Interrogatory N o 3. Ail docii~uentshave been iur.?ished except the attached three D a n h p t c y
Pstitians and their Dockers.
: Any and all documents referred to in

or used to prepare pour responses to Defendant Brjce Bickson 's First Set of Interrogatories to
Plaintiff.
: See responses to

Request No. 1and the billing records produced in response to Interrogatory No. 8.
: Ally and

documents relating or

pertaining to ail matter in which Willianl D. Bagley rendered legal advice o r legal services to
Bryce Erlchsoa as idedified by you in your response to Inrerroga.ior). No. 7 o f Dekndant Bryce

Erickson's First Set of Interrogatories to Plaintiff.
: See

Request No. 3 and interrogatory Eo. 8

DATED this

+&
2
day of April, 2005.

Attorney for Plaintiff

Response to Defendant Bryce Erieksan's First Set o f hterrogatories ts Skius L3ynd
Request for h~.odrretisnof Documents
Paire 9

response t o

GERTlFICATE dCPP SERVICE

I BEmBli' CERTIFY that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing
document to be deli1ered to the following tndi.tiidual(s) by the me&od indicated:
Bryan D.Smith
B ..IDriscoX1
.
McGrafA, Meacham BL Smith, PLLG
P.O. Box 50731
Edzko Falls, ID 831105-0'335

H l J .S. Mail, Postage Prepad
1 1 Nand Deiiveq
[ 3 O~iernightDeiivery

fi
- Fax: 529-4166

Response l o Defe~dmtBryce ;EricBrsi:n5sFirst Set of Interrogatories to Sirius t g y d
Request for fiosoduetion of Docmerats
Page I1

WILLIkF1 D. EXGLEY
2107 WEST SIXTH AVEbJUE
CHEYENNE, W'f 22301
Telephone (307! 624-3446
Fax (307) 6 J 7 - 7 4 4 5

Page: :

Z R I "SON,
BRYCE
P . O . BOX 155

FREEDSId, r,"SY

os/el/?s
AGCOb7;IT iiu'rl) :

i

33120

'F36rrnL3

Telephone conference xith B r y c e : call Brcce and
First Security; call K a t h y , leave aessage.

-80

Conference with Bryce and Dennis Sanderson on
pending ma'tters ,

-60

O f f i c e conference w i t h i3cyce regarding need for

new lnformal plan.

.30

Conference with Dennis Sanderson on needed
infornation.

-30

Telephone conference with Kathy regarding
Washington County Bank and New Holland.

Telephone conference with Kurt at Washington
County Bank; letter to Kathy.

.63

Telephone conference w L t h Washington County Bank;
l e c z e r to Bryce; return call to Kathy*

.33

Recieve and review Gotice of Incent to Forclose;
conference with Dennis Sandereon; call Neil
Clark; call i3oll;nd and Hart regarding ''what can
we d o u ; report to Dennis; report letter to
Sricksons.
2eturn

call to .Kurt at Washington County Bank,

1.80
.30

~

~

-

"

'

J

~

Page: 2
ERTGKSON,

BRYCE

ci8/'0~/99
101-7lIq

ACCC?9XT NO:

HOURS

to B r y c e a113 Kathy; CC??, t~ J e r r y
;nd D ~ ; , z n i s ;r e s e a r c h T i t l o ?I Ag M e d i a t i s n .

~ 7 / ' : 3 / 5 3 Repor.: l e t t e r

.5i3

97 i 2 ~ ~ 9 . C
9 o r - f e r e n c i with Bryce regarding F ~ r e c l n s u r eand
Waah:nz~~nCocnty Bank and drs12-r. co s e p x a i - e
p r o p e r t y & x d refile,
,

/5

t

i 1
Q
K t ; conference w i t h Kichy on
;u get a ; ~ e l ss~e p a r a t e d a x d / o r w o r k with

bariic .

~ 7 / 3 0 / 9 ~ ~ ' 0 n f e r e lwith
i c e D t l l n i i .'acdersc.n sn pezdiny
matters .

TOTAL TUXRENT WORK
06/26/99

(kdjastnent f o r Mote f o r Kortgagei
EZALLYCE DUE

PLEASE RETU2N A COPY 22

***

THIS STATEME!fT WITH YOUE REM1TY;JiiCE
TFT$K YOU * * *

rr
c3

z<!

m i-:+i

9

k: r,

C)

(U t-h

.

i-'

k--'

(D
-.
CZ

iu

t-'
P

!d?
LQ

3
f-t-

m
Y

P-

3

P
91

Y
iu

3
rRi

"r
0
(

$
UZ"
U1

cC2
iu

ERI CKfON, a R Y G b

PLEASE XETURN A COPY OF F T B I SSTkTZM31r'T WIYB YOUR EEMITT.XqCE

***

TH&VK YOU

***

WILLIN4 D . BAGLEY
1107 WEST SIXTH P.*JEWUE
CHEYEtJNZ, WY G2005.
Telephane (307) 634-0445
Fax :307j 637-7445

ST-&TEMENT CF SERVICES

Page: ;
09,'3 0,'39
101 -7iM

$1,766.07

PREVIOUS B A L m G B
BOURS

Telephcne conference w i t h New Hollan3,
New

Hollend: Call from Michelle Federer.

-30
.30

Gonference'with Dennis Sanderson regarding
deadline; prepare copies Chapter X I documents.

1.80

Coi~fererlcew i t h David st New Holland credit;
office conference with Bryce; revise Chapter 12
Petition and Application to Appoint Actorney and
Zealtor,

3 .O r j

Review files, rework Petition, letter to Bryce.

3.03

R e v i e w file, work on Petition; letter to Bryce;

telephone ccnference with Bryce; send draft
Petition and letter tc B r y e e ; telephone
cocference with Dennis.

4,08

Telephone conference w l t h Kathy Erizkson and
Trustee; fax waiver to T r u s t e e .

.30

Message from Dennis r e g a r d i n g 33 day extensi~nin
foreclosure.

FOR CUXRENT SSP.71 CSS P.EKDZREC

.20

_____

22,30

_--__-2123.51

AGCOWST

NO:

101-7LK

WILLIAM G . 2kGLEY
3.107 WEST SIXTH AVENUE
CHEYENNE, WY 82001
Telephone (3371 634-0445
Pax 13571 c37-"444

STATEMEST OF SER1;I ZeS
Page: I
11/~1,~99

SRICKSCllJ, BRYCE
P.Q. BOX 155
FptRDQM, WY 83120

10/06/99

10/12/99

ACCGt"Ii-T 153 :

Telephone conference with Dennis Sandersor.; fax
statutes to Sandersonis offlce.
R e - ~ l e w Eilg; call D e n n ~ sSanderson; letter to

3ryce.
L0:'15/99

MEW HOLL-WD : Telephone conference w i t h Laura
Bryant, le",ter to Brycfli.

23/21/99

P-evrew

13/27/99

Confireree with Dennis Sanderson on New Holland,
Divorce, property division, p o t e n t i a l 5i:lancing
and f o r e c l o s u r e status.

file; call Dahlsten Trucking.

FGR CURRENT SERVICES RENDERED
TOTAL CURRENT WGEK

PLEAS3 P.ETUR1.T A

COPY 33 TdIS

***

STATEMENT WITH

TKP-YK YOU

***

47

YOUX XEMLTTmCE

L33-7*!~3

WZLLL-Ufl D . BAGLEY
11.07 WEST SIXTH AVElFJE
JHE-fENNE, W'f 820 31
Teltphine (3":) 634-0446
Fax (337) 637-7445

Page: 1
i2/03/'43
1 C i 3_ - 7216

E R I S K S 3 N , BRYGS
P . 3 . BCX 155
FkEEDOL4, W-f
8 3 129

HOURS

1 1 / 7 ~ 3 / 9 9 W3y.k on petition; cffice c o n f 2 r " n c e with Bryce;

f ~ ~ a l i zPetition.
e

3.09

1 5 / 9 5

Conierence with Dermis Sarderson regar3'rng
foreclosure c a ~ t i n u a i c eand inforrnatxon f r o m
divorce; receive and r e i l e w d i ~ o r c ed o c u r n e n ~ a t i u n
for DenniG Sanderson; incorp~ratenew information
2.00
i n Petition.

11/27/33

Review pleadings; call Dennis S a n d e r s o n ; call
aryce.

12/03/99

Telephone conference with Eryce; finalize and
file Petition; send c ~ p yto Bryce: n o t i f y Bank
attorney of filing.

~

srn
.

2

*

2.00

-___ ______-

FCX CURRENT SERVICES RENDERED

TOTAL CURRENT WORK
21/ 2.3 / 99

REGUL$X PAYI4ENT

CREEIT BFFL&I;iCE

PLEASE F.ETURq A COPY OF THIS STATEIrlENT WITH
* * * TH1;1:dK YOU tt * *

YO'JR 'nEliITTP23CZ

ERICKSQN, ERYCE
F . 0 . B3>1 155
FP-ZEDOM, W U 9312G

; ,/C,IC/?~

12/15/99

r e v r e w Petition and S t a t u t e ; conference witn
E r y c e ; complete and file Petiticn; conference
with Holland and Hart, Bank F - t i ~ ~ n econference
~ ;
with Trusfeeis office regarding location for

hearing.

2.00

Receive and review Trustees Directive; make copy
for Bryce, cffice clnference with Eryce .

1.90

12/2~/99 Psvirw file, pleadings and correspondence.

12/29/99

12/31/99

Office co.;ference with Bryce; research; review
reporting requirements; prepare reports; prepare
and file new Application and Order far Attorney;
call Tom Davis on I R S ; call New Holland; call
Artorney Bluinel; Hearing; organize file.
Csnferenre with Attorney Blumel cn law sair.
FCR

CURRENT SERVICES RETqDERED

: QmLr ~ j CUXREKT

r-l

2.90

7.00
-30
----.-

______

12.39

2629.53

WORK

34.LP23CE i-i - ~ r ;
T f r t

PLEASE R E T ~ ~ RAN ~ 3 r - yOF THIS STITEMSICT WIT3 1OCR REMITTPIJCE
* r

*

TyJkTr- YQTJ

***

'rye

V Y - ~ J L I FD.
S ~ BAGLEU

1107 WEST S I X T H AVENGE
CHEqfENNE, KY 82 061
Telephoce ( J O " ) 534-0446
Fax (3Q7) 637-7445

ERICKSOTJ ,

BRY JE

P.O. E3X 155
'Js,EEDC.[4, Wy
83122

PREVIOUS BALPJgCE
01/13/00
01/18/80

R e v i e w material from Attorney BLuemel; i e r t e r to
Dennis, copy to Bryce.

Finalize apd send D e n n i s Sandersan l e t t e r on Law
suit.

OL/'31/00

Conference with Dencis Sanderson on p e n d i n g s u i t .
FOR CUZRENT SEXVICES RENDERED
TOTAIL CURRENT WORK
BZ-,LAJVCE DUE

PLEASE RXTCXj$ A CO2-T OF THIS STATEMENT WIT3 YOUR RSKITTmCE
+*

*

TzmTK YCU

***

WIELTklcq D. BAGLEY
1107 WEST' SZXTR AVENUE
CHEYENNE, WY 62301
Telephsae (397) 634-6446
Pax (32'7) 637-7445

PREVIOUS BkLMtCZ
02/14/00

P r e p a r e , file and serve mcnthly report for
December.
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WLLLEm D. BAGLEY
1107 WEST SIXTH AiTEfSliE
CBEYEhTS3, W-i 82001
Talephone (307: 634-0445
Fax (307: 537-7445
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WIliLIAiJi I?.
EAGTLIESf
SIXTH Aij"ENU2
GHEYEWNE, WY 8 2 0 g i
Telephcrie (507) 6 3 4 - 3 4 4 E
Fax (337) 537-7445
l i 3 7 WEST

Page. L
05,/03/551
101 -7135

3x1CESOIJ, BRYCE
P , 3 . BOX 3.55
FREEDOM, WY 83120

PREVIOUS BALANCE
TIOURS

04/05/03

Review Pleadings, w o r k on P l a n .

04/96/00

Work on propsed Plan

04/~0!30

Call Tom ~ a v i sregarding insurance; teleph~ne
conference w i t h Neil Clark; prepare Objection to
H o t i o ~ : to Dismiss and to Lift S t a y ; w o r k an Plan. 10.00

04/11/00

Work on Plan and Objection; review

&

2.50

Disclosure Statemsnt.

all

documents; prepare new draft; teleph~ne
conference with Neil Clark regarding letter and
agreement.
04/12/00

Make additional 'Iflnaln revisiocs on prcpcsed
Plan; prepare new draft of Plan; do Affidavits
for professional persens and letters; H e x r i n g ;
fax revisions tg !qr. Eass: ?repare and file Order
alicwing extensicn; finalizs and file Xrnsndrnent.

and review ~ a t e r i a l s ;teleph~ne
sonference with Xs. Sass.

3 4 / ' ~ 4 / 3 ~3rgazize

C4/15/36

10.1310

W ~ r kcn Plan; fax copy to Mr. 3ass; telephone
conference with Bryce; finalize Objection to

Stay; finalize draft of Plan; office conference
with Eyrce; fax new copy to I q r . B ~ s s .
04/13/0n

3.02

Premare
drafc c f Resistanze znd OI3jection to
r
Mstlori to Dismiss;-work on P l a n cnacges and

Budget Projection; prepare draft of R e l i e f fror

10.90

3.30

HOURS

7.o i l

S t a y sn First S e ~ ~ r l tBank.
y
4

7

, Work

22

PLan; -;ilxzferer?ze 5;1th B r y c e ; f i ~ a l i z e ;

s e r ~ dDJ Fe6 Ex to B y r c e .
~4/19,'00

FLPS1: SEC"sr1T'f 3;lii:K.
Called recjardrng John Deere
T.I a z s f zr-Edward a n d L i n d a Jeck~nsnave t r a c t o r ?
k o ~ g k tit? W5rk on ?:an, wcrk cn O b - j e z t l c n t 3
MGZLCZ to D i s n i s s , w3rk 33 F i n c h N o r l o n for

5.09

R e l l c ~and Order.
03/20/'00 Paepzr- and file C e r t i f i c a t e of S e r v L ~ ecn Z r d e r
a i l r ; w i r l g 2 x t ~ n s ~ o r and
.i
on Plan; f i n a l s z c , and f i l e
Plan; s e r v e Order and P l a n ; p r e p s r e N ~ t i i c e ; f i l e
and serve Notice; ? r e p a r e , file and s e r v e
Qkjee5iori to Motion co C l s r n i s s ; p r e p a r e , f i l e and
serve

Motion to Confirm.

10.00

Telephone c o n f e r e n c e s with 2yrce on claims f o r
caxes tin3 o t h e r claims.

-4C

04/24/00

C 3 r i f e r e n c e with Dennis S a n d e r s c n cn Finch suit.

.30

34/27/00

~cheduling'Hearing with J u d g e ; conference with
counsel; prepare Motion and Order to Continuance
to May 24, 2000; conference w i t h Allen T u r n e r
regarding Affidavit a n 2 t a x returz; finalize
Motion an3 C r d e r ; f a x to BeLcher f a r review; file
and serve Motnon.

04/21/00

05/32/03

Letter to Bryce r e g a r d i n g May 2 4 t h Rearing;
review pleadings.
FOX CURRENT SERVICES RENDERED

04/13/00
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and mailing costs
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TGTAL CDSTS
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PREVIOUS BALPLdCE

$12,771;. 3 1
ilOURS

95:94/00

Prepare and file M ~ n t h l y'Report; s a v e copies.

. iu

ci/l:/oo

Call Dennis regarding nuzbir; czll JB Eunt and
Leave message.

-52

05/l8/00

Call JB sunt and leave second message.

.40

35/24/00

O f L i c e conference; telephn~econference wlth Ton
Da- is; conference with Jim Belcher on exhihi~s;

ri?

organize exhibits; preparation for Hearing;
Hearing; conference with Trustee Bass.
5/25/00

6.09

Coaference w l t h Cindy Harnett regarding State
Farm Loan Board question.

Co:lferance with Mr. Bass; fax documents

( j / j i / i ~

r JR ':'URP,ENT

7-

5 / ? 7 / ~ 0 Fed

SERVICES RZIJGEKED

Ex charges 4/18/00
4/23/00

$13.52
$13.52
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WLLLIXfL1 D. BXGLEY
1157 WEST SIXTH XbTEKUE
CHEYENNE, WY e2032
Tele~hane !30?) 634-0446
Fsx 3337) 637-7445

Page: i

ERICKSCIC,

O~/SO/'CO

9Xqf6E

P . 3 . BOX 155
FREEDOM, K Y 63120

PREVIOUS BALXSCE
OG/Oi/Oii

Telephone conference with C a r l i i r l c k s n n ; r e v i ~ w
C o u r t O r d e r ; organize files,

06/33/00

P r e p a r e , file and s e r v e May F i n a n c i a l R e p o r i .

06/16/00

Conference with Bryce and B i l l 3ass; priority
mail b e t t e r to Bryce with C 3 u r t Orders, copy to
Bass.

36/33/00

Cofiference with B i l l a s s regarding how 1 can
help.
FOR CURRENT SERVICES RENDEXED
TOTAL CURRENT WORK
E5ALmCE DUE
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WILLIAM 3 . BAGLEY
11Q7 WEST S I X T H A72ENUE
CHEYENNE, WY 62681

Telephone i 3 6 7 ) 534-0445
Fax 1307] 627-7445

STATEEENT OF SERVICES
CRXCli.SON, ERYGE
P . * 3 . BQX 155
F R Z E L J ~ M , %Y 63 120

07/12/Q3

R t i - l e u : Trustee S t a t u s R e p o r t ; letter to Bryce and
letter to Dennis Sanderson abcut what needs to be

done.
37/28/05

1.00

Letter to aryce with bank statements.

.30

--...-

FOR CURRENT SERVICES RENDERED

07/31/00

1.30

Fed Ex c o s t cn 4/17/2000
Fed Ex cost on 4/18/2000
TOTAL COSTS
-

TOTAL CURRENT WORK
BAL-QiGE

DUE

-----214.53

D . EAGLE';
1107 WEST SIXTH AVENUE
WILLEirLrq

w-r

sZHEvfENNE, f i 1 3 2 0 3 f
Telephone (307) 639-9446
f a > : ( 3 9 7 ) 537-"445
Tt

c5/28/GO

Conferer-ce

with B i l l bass r e g a r d i n g need t
-

hear from B r y c e .
F 9 K CURRENT SERVICES RENDERED
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V;ILLIMq D. BAGLEY
13.07 WEST SIXTH XVEhVE
CHEYEE4E, WY 62003

PREVIOUS BALPBCE
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JUN - 6 2000

Cast: No. 99-21500
CHAPTER 12

On December 3, 1999, the debtor in possession o f this chapter 12 estate, Bvce H.
Erisksan, filed rn &plic&Ian i'or Order Allowkg Retmisn ofr4aomey. The debtor sought
crserrt trerthori~kn employ Wiflim Bs~gley.
In the application, Mr. Bririchoa stated that the aEomey heEd no inrerest adverse to xhe

estate. In m applie&ion Eled December 29,1999, W. Ericbcssn disclosed that thc ak&rPmey
w a a secured creditor of the eg&te, hotding a mortgage ~n propem of the estate to secepre

aprepetitiisn claim in the momf o f $29,175.00. The court ordered that counsel rnust file an
effid~vieand Rule 2016 disctosure sbtement,

On Jxfiuary 3,20630, the court indvei%ent&entered the order autkroriaing emp'boyment
of Mr. Bagiey, even thou& counsel had not Gted the requisite and proper affidavit and

diselosur~statcmcnt. rin reInIewesiBzrriness:Equ@menf,lnc: 23 F.3d 3 11 (18""Cir, f 994),
No objec~anwas filed by the United States Tmstee,
A istcr r6;vicw of the file by the court, reflected &,hat a ~ c 2 ~ ~creditor
r e d sfthe estatc,

Sirius, LC,was served in care of Mr. Bagley. The cone ordered the debtor lo file a statement
regarding the nature ofh%r,
Bagleyk selatlcnsbip to Skius, LC,The; debtor did not eompiy.

cP"

Nobntit a hearing held hiay 24,2000, did the coun realize its enor in authorizing Mr.

Bagiv's empiopeat. Tire court coneludes Tvlr. Bagiey is d i s ~ a I i B e d&am representing the
debtor.

Pwsarmt lo 14 '&",S,G.!j 327, the trustee may, with the court" approval, ernpHay an
attorney that does not hold or rwrcsent. an interest adverse to the esiale m d tvhro is

disinterested. A chapter 12debtstor in possession is a fiduciav of the estate, and liIiewise, his

~atlnseicmaot halid m intcrcst adverse to the estttte a d mmf be dishterested. It? re Bwke,
147 B.R. 78'7,800(B&.

N.D. Okia. 1992). The provisions of 5 327 are applicable to the

profkssionds employed by a debtor irr possessiofi of a chapter 12 estate,

Under $ TOlC14), the Code defines rr dis~terestedperson srs one that is not a creditor.
Mr. Brzglq is a creditor.
in B previous chapter 1 3 b

claim is for prepetlla-iona,tb:arnt=j,fees kcuaed, at least in p w ,

pky case filed by iW.E ~ c b a nand his fonner spouse, T%e

s c c u ~ i Lqteresr,
y
in estate property could possibly be a preferential transfer. The divorce of

the E ~ C ~ C
may
IM
impact
S the extent t~ wwhj~hthe cIkm is valid against t h i s estate.
Accordingly, it is OmEmD &at the court's J m u q 3,2000 order a u t h o r ~ n gPvlr.

Erichsn ra ernploy Mr, Bagfey is vacated, and &e application is denied.

Caf;,c. 9*2!460
Form ~ d :122
Tctei mtices mlled.da 3
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Trustee

Mtc Date: ObiObjZliifO

Of?:

2

Pege : 1

Erirkson, Bryce N. 5272 Itrstelim Ro&,
PO BOX 155,
F r e m , ifb 83123
Bcsqtey, V I I L i m a,
$107 Ueot Bixth A v e m ,
C h q m e , W BZOCiZ
Bass., UiLliasn Hurray
P.0, Box 2b";&ik, Littletort, CB 80163

DISGE4RCED, CLOSED

G.S. Bankuptcy Court
District o f Wyoming (Cheyenne)
Bankruptcy Petition #: 99-21500
Date filed. 12103,"1999
Date Terminalcd:
02i26i300~
Date Discharged:

..lssig~zcdto Peter 1. h4crc'if'f
Ctzapter 13
\'oiur~tary
Asset

083Oi2006

Debtor
Bryce H.. Ericrkson
5272 Stateilnc Road
PO Box 155
Freedom. %Y63 1 39

represented by Bryce 8,
Erickson
5272 Stateline Road
PO Box 155
Freedom, V
v
T 83120
TBMliZiXTED: 05/22/2000

67
Judith S ~ v e t y
Slitrely & Derncrs PC

dba
E Flying 3 Ranch and Farm

1660 Lincoln Street, Suite
2230
Denver, €33 80264
303-860-7724

-

Ken Mecarhey
TheLaw Offices of Ken
McCmney, P.C.
P.O. Box 1364
Cheyenne, IVY 82003
307-635-0555
Fax : 307-635-0555
Email:
b~@cyrepgacl. c o n
M'ifKam D. Bagley
1 107
Sixth .hii.i-eaue
Cheyenne, R T 820iii

307-634-0446
Fm : 307-537-7445
Email: wdbagley@ll~reporter.corn

l'rr~sfee
FViiSSittm 3%.Bass
Chapter 2 2 Slsidiizg Tmsece
P,O. Box 5 00035
DenrFer,CO 80250

303-353-4006
1
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Objection R y Creditor First Security Bank To [ i 6-I] Motion lo Extend
Time To Eie Chapter 12 Plan by Bryce H. Enciison [chj
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1 Extend Time To file Chapter 12 Plan by Bryce H. Enckson ; Last Day to
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i Notice Pursuant to Local Ba3hptcy Rule 2002-1 RE: [I 6-11 Motion To

Ai
O i i 3 112000
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J

By Wiiliani D. Bagley for Debtor Bryce H.
Enckson Of Monthly Repsrt for 1~2000and 2/2000. [ch]
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Motion By Debtor Bryce H. Enckson To Extend Time To file Chapter
- i
1 12 Plan . [&I
---"

1

I
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Cer~ificatzteOf Senrice By William D. Badey for Debtor Bryce W.
Ericksan Of December 1999 Monthly Report.jch]
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Order Granting [!2-11 Application To Employ Wiliiain D. Bagley by
I Bryce
H.Enchson . With Certificate of Mading. [cb]
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02'15 '2000

I

1

Order Regardilig Compliance Witli Rules Re: [4-I] Application To
Employ Wiiliain D. Bagley by Bryce H. Eiickson : Compliance Due
12/28/99 . [chi

1 Bagley . [chi (Entered: 2 2i3011999)
I

i

'1110312000

1

1 pplication By Debtor Bryce H. EI~;IC~IOII
To Employ iViili8in D.
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Mot~onBy Creditor First Securrty Bank For Relief Fmm Stay [chj
Filrng Fee Pbid in Full RE:L2.1- 2 j Mctan For Relref From Stay by First
Security Bark [ Pfliilg Fee $ 75.00Receipt # 633 551 jch]
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i First Security Bag& Scheduled For 10:30 5/16/00 a s
Courtroom, 2 120 Capitol Avenue, 8th Floor, Cheye

1
24

i

1

&

1

i

Notice o f Hearing Re: [ 16-1'j Motion To Extend Time To file Chzpter 112
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A4F"pLicationBy Debtor Bryce H,Erickson To Employ
Accountmt . [ch]
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Order Regsirding Complimce IVith Rules Re: [26-31 Application To
Employ Edwzrd L.Nelson Realty by Bryce K.Erinnckson ; Con2pfimce
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11 Application
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Relief From Stay by First Security Bank . [ch]
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Certificate Of Scn-ice By 'filliam D. Hagiey for Debtor Bryce i.
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Order Grmtiiig j44-11 Motion To Continue He&uing Re: [20-I]Motion
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I
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1i

51 T l e c t i o r z By Creditor Internal Revenue Service To Coniimaticin of
- 1
1 [36-I] Chapter I2 Plan . [ch] (Entered: 05~4/2C)OCi)

i
i
95'26i2006

I,

Order Requiring Coinpli=ce RE: j39-I] Motion Fur ReliaCFroln Stay
by Bryce H. Eri~kson. With Ccnifisate o f Mailing. [lk]

I Order Scheduling Hearlng RE: j? I-: ] Motion For Relief From Stay by
/ First Security Bank Scheduled Far 2 :30 5/24/00at Bankmptcy
I Courtroom, 8th Floor, 2120 Capitol Avenue. Cheyenne, my.
[ik]

$f-f

I

05/04/2000

1

Order Granting 126-ij Appiicatien To h p l o y Edward L.Nelson Realty 1
I
by Bryce W . Erickson . With Certificate ofla;iing. [ch]

I
I
i

1
Hearkg Held Re: [%-I] Motion To Dismiss Case by First Security
Bank, [21- 13 Mot~onFor Relief From Stay by First Security Ba&, Court
took both matters "under advisement." [aoj (Entered: 05,'25/2000)

/

By Creditor First Security Bank TOCo~~fir~xatiiion
of [36-I j
52 aa7Jec"~osn
; Chapter 72 Plan . [ch]

I

53 , Gbjection
I

r

Creditor State i;f fJjyorr,ing Farm Laan Board To
Ca~~firrxation
of [36-I]Chapter 12 Plan . [ aj~

54 ii Order Vacating Pexiag RE: Corafim;ition oSChap'cer 112 Plan IV'itb
ii Certificate o f Mailing. [ch]

1

[13-"1 Order for Debtor in Possession to Retain
.
.
A

1

-!

3

1I

60
-

i1

i;

/

--

iI

--

8

I

06.108;'2000;
I
i

---

Certificde Of Service By William D.Bagley for Debtor Bryce H.
Erickson Of MonthJy Fkar~cialReport for 512000 . [ ~ h ]

Status Repart and Request by Tmstee William Murray Bass to Hold (he
1 Filing of a Plm of Reorganrzation in this Case in Abeyance Until
October 15.2000 . [chi

i

I1

64
-

1

1

Notice Pwsumt to Local B
icy Rule 2602-1 RE: [60-ij Motion to
,
Hold h e Filing of a Plan of Reorgmizaiion in this Case in Abeyance
Until October t 5, 2000 by JVillim Mlrrray Bass; Last Day to File
i
Objections: 8/10!00 [Ic] (Entered: 07ii 8/2000)
i
I

1

3

1

----Y

i

62 Status Report filed by Trustee Uriiiiam M
---.-&L -

i

63 I Motion By Trilstec Williail~hlmrj, Bass for Debtor to Obtain New
Counsel . and To Compel Debtor to file an h e i i d e d Plan o f
Reorganization [ao]
-

j

i

1

,"

. . . I - - - -

- - - _ )_/l*
&&& - &A

,,,.

,'

-.-

I

i

-'---'+

1I Plan
Order Suggesting Debtor Obtain
Counsel and File an Amended
of Reorganization RE: [63-I] Motion for Debtor to Obtain New

63
-

3

?Jew

J

Counsel and [63-21 Motion To Compel Debtor to fife an Amer~cBeJPlan
i of Riisorg%~zation
by iViiiim R.1un-y Bass . Mrith Certificate ofMailing,

I

1

1

i

J

I

/
!1E3!2000

1

i
--e---s.".-*

r, 11:28/2000
'-

"'

'
-

I

[.s]

I

Update Deadlme; hmended Chapter 12 Plan Due on 12!15100. See order
eod 10:19/00[nil

i

5j

Disclosure of Conpasation By Aticrney t a r Debtor Iil :he Amount of S
) 185.00per bow. [cb] (Entered: I 1'39111009)
:

1

--

w

,

---

1

1

I
1

I

--

iipplication By Debtor Bryce Ii. Erickaon To Employ Judith SMvely

I

1

-

*

-

-

-

-

7-i
\ and Ken McCadney . [ch] (Entered: I Ii29/2000)

7
d
d

i

I
t

11/29/2000 ,

4

a , CrrtiBcate O f Setvice By Ken McCmney O f [64-1j Veniied Statment

,
I
1

68

A

1

\ hlotion By Ken McCartney for Dcb;or Bryce H. Erickson for Sliivciy &

i

I,
I

1

j

i

27
i

1

I
i

i

-

12.'?0/2000

I

I
i

12/21/2000
I

1

1
I

Cel-tificate Of Senrice By Ken McCartney for Debtor Bryce H.Enckson
01-'[71-I1 -Motion for Shfvely & Demos, P.C. To Appear Pro Hac Vice
i
by Ken M c C m e y . [ch]
i

i

i

I Pro Hac Vice by Ken M c C ~ n e y. With Certificate oEMaiiing. [ch]

1

1 Affidavit RE:[71-I] Motion for Shively 6 Deinos, P.C.To Appe;ir Pro
-

i1

1

1

74

r Hac \'ice by Ken McCdney [ch]

i

75
-

1

1

Cchficate Of Senice By Iudirh Shiveiy for Debtor Bryce H.Enckson
Of 174-11 Affidavit . [chj

!

7
7
'

,

Demos, P.C. To Appear Pro Hac Vice . [&I

73 / Order Granting [71-1j Motion for Shiveiy 81 Demos, F.C. To Appear

1
13'2i:'?000 i

1

1

I
i

~

i

t

r--- 1211'112000

Order Granting [6h-I j r\pplication To Employ Ken McCmmey by iir)rce
Eriekson With hCle&Lficate s f Mailing. [&J

i

i

I

1

1

12,'OI Q,OL.O

12:10/2030

i

-_-___-A

--hi) I Order Regarding Compiimcc With Rulcs Re: [66-I]Application To
i Employ Judith Shively by Bryce H.Erjcksoa ; Cornpiimce Due
1 121'25/00, [ch]

P

1

1

i and 166-11Application To Employ Judith Shivel! and Ken hlcCvrrney
1 by Bryce W. E~ckssn. [ch]

1
i
L
4
i t
l2iOIi2000

"---.-

I

1 2 0 1~2010:

76

12,'2"1'2000 j

"'7

I

i

-

,

,

1
I
AI

I

-,

i

Mobon by Debtor Bryce 3.Enckson To Confim [70-11Amended Pian

1

Eotice Pursuant to Locat BxLbprey Xule 2002-1 RE:j76-11PJTotion To
Confilm [70-1; Amended Plan by Bryce FI. B-ckwn : Last Day to File
! Objections: I/IS;OI [ch]

I

1

i

,

12'2li2000

.

/

H e a r i ~ gRe: [76-11Motion To C o o h [TO-I]Amended Plan by Brjrn-c
I H. Eriekson ; Confirmatian Searing Set For 8:362! 1/31 dc Telephone
i Gcsnkrence [chj

78

,

t

I

i

I

1

Ce~$ltifi~ate
Of Service Sy Judith Skvreiyfor Debtcr Hvce H.Erickson

:
1

ra--------i 04/02!2081

iI

e H, Erickscsa To can^ [88-11 Amended Plan

i

I

i

i

I

/

1i

85115/200!

1

1

05/15/2001

1

1 Minute Entry Order Denying [88-11 Amended Plan.13!m amendmends i
1 required for confirnation: I / 3-year period to sell m s t include any

96

1

i

1

I
3

i

I

1

1
I

iI
0 30
I

06!04/2(1C1

L
P
P

E

1
I

Nillute Entry IRE: [S&-2 1 Amended PIm. Confimsriun of t h s plan
denied. [ao]

I

auction proposal, 21 after 3 years, all secured creditors may proceed wrth 1
real remedies, 31 State interest m s t be paid as acerued and mounts
stated clearly. amount, when, etc., 41 attorney kes - 58Ci[l?] submitted to
ity to objection, 51 acreage and lo~atlctnto be sold
court with oppo
must be clearly set forth. Ten days to file amended plan. if csnfimed,
i
t
con5rmation order on all
debtor uriil be reqadrred to senreplan
I
creditors. wttb Certificate of Mailing. [ao]
I
I

#

1

1 jx Thrd PP+l"iendedj36-ll Chapter 12 Pim [ch]

I

98 i Order Granting Motion to Co~ifinn[97- I] h~endildsdPlan . [ch]
t

--

,

,

-

---

74

,~

~

,

I
I

t

i

06~84i200
1

Order Requiring that Notice be Given Xe: [Y 8- 1j Order Coniini~ing
Chapter f 2 Pln Notice Due: 6ilZiOI [chi

1

Ceitificate Of Smrice By Judith Shiveiy for Debtor Bryce H. Enckson
I Of f47-11 AhnendedPlan,[%-I 1 Order Chapter 12 Ptn . [ch]

1I

,

I

1

06/20/2001

I

i

i

i

!

s

I

1

I1

M~ticeof Change of Address Filed by % y i i l iM,
~ Bass . (Deputy Clerk,
ao) (Entered: 05;06/2002)

05302/2003

1
I

F:nal Appi~cationfor Coapensa"lion for Judith Sbivetyl Attiirnej.
Period: to, Fee: % f 1798.63, Expex~ses:3. Filed by Judith Shkvely. (degh,
) (Entered: 0710232002)

I

1I

1

d
i

Cover Sheet for -4;lpplicationfor Profess-local compensation Filed by
1
Judrth Shively attorney i"9r Bryce K.Erickcorz (related elacunner~tis)~).i
(dcgh, ) (Entered: 071'02i2002)
4
t

I

Notice Pursuant to LBR 1002-1 Kc. Fiiicl @piicanonfoi. Ccf?zpenraiior:
for Juditfz $:hive& Atromey Filed by Bryce H.Erickscjn (related
document(s)m). OSjections due by 7126,2003. jdc&, ) (Enteered:
E
/
07/02/2002)

1

j

I

1

Affidavit Ke:First md Final Application to Pay compensation, Notice
ancf cover sheet Filed by hdith Skxively attorney for Bryce H. EIZckson
(related d o c u m e n l ( s ) ~ ,
PJ-3). (dcgh, ) (Entered: 07102i2002)

m.

I
I

:

07!01/2002

1/ byAffidavit
Re: Application ibr attorney fees, notice
cover sheet Filed
Judith Shively attorney far Bryce H. Enckson (related

106

0711512002 I1

--

t

,

102,;031.(dcgb, ) (Entered: 0?!112/2002)

i document(s)m,

i
f

1

and

1
I

#

I

I

I

i Affidavit of Alias Service Filed by Bryce H. Erickson (related

- 107

1

i

/

i

I_LCw--

documei~tjs)104. 05,106,102. 103). (dccs, ) (Entered: 0'711 6/2002)

-

--h e n d e d Notice Pursuant to LBR 2002-1 Re: Firtal d~ppiieatSonfo~
Com9ensationfor Judith Shtiiely, Filed by Bryce H. Erickson (related
docrtmez%t(s)~),
Objections due by 8,82002. (dces, ) (Entered:
07/16/2002)

1
I
I

i
a

.,-&I_-

I

I
I_----

I
I

09iO3/2902

,-.- -,

"
I

i1

110

I

Order Granting Application For Co~npenrstion(Re!ated Doc 5 m>hs j
Judith SSELively, Fee awarded: S1 1798.13, Expenses aivardsd:$ Signed on 1
:
!
8 94%32. (dcao, )
1I
i--d--&d,--i
l_

'

Y

I

.

.

"

.

-

I

~

~

&

_V---_

----L-A--

1 Objection to Claim i"2 IRS $3 Carl H B.ichcn. 94 Bonn.i-iile C g u n . ~

1

1

~

I

i

i

i

I

#

/

i

I

1

I

I

09ii?3/20&"2

1

I

09/04.'3002

-

,

-*-,-

-

'

i
i

-,
1

I

Objection,Respansc Dzadliile Updated (related d o c u m e n t j s ) ~Debtor's
Objectioa to Claimsj. Objections due Sy IOib:2QU2."ciio. )
i

i

1

1 1

09!13/20Q2 j

(i0/25/20021
L

1

i
I

1

i

1

09/29/2002

f O/92;,12002f

I

I
;1
i

1

i

'
1

Ordcr Regacting G ~ m p ~ i x Mrltlil
~ c e Rules re: Application for
Compensation (related d a c u m e r . l ( s ~ ~Compiimce
/.
due by
1 10/15/2002. (dcns, j

---/

:

i;i 1 YNC Certificate of h4niiii1g. Scivicc Dale 09/29/02. (Related DOCd 114)

I

1 (Admill.) (Entered: 03130/2002]

i

I

i

(dens, ) (Entered: 09/26/2002)

i

i

1

i li ppligation &r Campenaat~onforPrc-Peiibiirr and Post-Pefiriun (loits
i and Atrurneysf Fees for James R.Belcher. Creditor's Attorney, Pel-nod:
' to, Fee: $22043.80,
Expenses: $ i693 9 3 . Filed by J m e s R.Bsicber.

89/27/2002 V 114

II

I

I I L k ~ e n d e Affidavit
d
of Sewlce Fiied by Bryce 6-B. Edckssil (related
d o c m e ~ ~ t @ ) [Im
). , (dcgh9)

I

I

a

j

j

1

a

1
I

( Anended Notice Pursuact to LRR 3002-1Re:0hjca.m ;o Claims Filed 1
j by Bryce M. Erickson (related docment(s)m]. 0"ngectionsdue by
1 10:'7;2002. (dcao: )
i

I

i

~

Implemenf, 8.5Ac'ti~nAvotorSports, &7' Anrhkiony Finch el al, #8 Firsl
I Sect(r5:~
Bank, ##Y New Hoti'and Credit Co, G l O Lificotn Counp FS.4
) Qfikiice, Y i i K e l j e l ~ t r aE~teljlrises.
i~
I ~ c#,I d , Wyoming Oljice ofstate
I
i Land & Investrraenrs, $ I S Jf~ashingtonGtOun~
Bank $16 Kcndail
I
; Jerzh<ns, P I 7Kath-yEpiclaon, # J 9 First Securi& Bank; w~ithNotice of
; Erne to 0bjec1;EDFO: Y D/I,"Oll Filed by Bryce I-I. E~ckson.[dcao, 1

1

I

~

I

I

Notice Pursuant to LBR 2002-1 Re:App
I - - i1 Pre-Petition
and Post-Petitinn Cosrs Filed by Urciis Fargo Bank
1 16

I

L

1

I

Wyoming, N.A. (rekited dosument(s)m). Objectior~sdue by
i r 011 sizooz. (dc&,

I

1

i

I

i

t

i

JI

-*----

*
-

i

i

Order Regarding Coinpiia~ceWirh Rules Satisfied P.c: App!isaiiun Ccr
; Compensatbn (related d o c u m e n t ( s ) ~ )(related
.
docu~nent(sju),
i (deb: )
I

101072002

;
I
I

I

101 i 9/?002

i

i

I
I

I

II:
1i

1

I

I

Response toObjsction to Claim ?2 RS,Piled by Inte=ai Revenue
Service (relsted d o c u m e n t ( s ) ~ )(dccs,
.
)
Order Scheduling Hcanng on Debtor's Objectirn ts Clriil o f IRS and

1 creditor's response thereto, (related document(s)U, E l . Hearing

i

I

1
I

i

3 / 2 2

i

42/043X00

2

Order Gmting Motion Re:Debtor's Motion fcir Eale Filing, (rlcjm,

I

i130 i Motion for Late Filiilg ofMotiunfor Approvab oj-Stipulatim Resoti~ll~lg

;
I
I

i

1
1

1

!

i
1
I

I

l2iOSI2002

1

I
1
1

Object 040 116/01)Filed by Bryce H.Enckson, idcns, ) Modified on
1216'2002 to correct Idfo date [dcic, ).

?,

5 32 1 h";tlosr_for Order E;L.tabilshingAllo~vedClaims Filed by Bryce H

1

1I

12!04/2002

I

j

I

1

I
i

Filed by Bpce H, Er^ll&scan. (dzns, )

1

I

i

' 12/04/2002

i,

I Motionfor- Approval ofSt@uiahonResohdng Debtor's Objeaion :o
1 Alio14nnce of Claim qfinfrmniRevenue Ssmice wrrh Notice qflinre to

i

I

I

i

1 Debhrk Objpction to -Alloillance ofeliiim qfhternsr! Revenue &mice
1

12/04':002

i
I

I

1

Ertckson. (dms, )

,

I33 1 Certificde of Service Filed by 3ip-c Fi. Encksoii (Pmposcd Order on

-

1 Wells Fmgo $a& 14Tyrr;mkeNA's Request for t"iliorsi"ance o f Pre-

!

1I petit~onm~dPost-petition Costs rind Attorney's Pees and the Debtor's
i Objection Thereto), (dcns, ) Correct aBachent(s) added csn 12/5/2002

I

I

1
!

(dclc, 1.

i

I

!

Ccrmetfve Ents",; (related d o c u r a ~ e n t ( s ) ~(dslc,
).
)

--

-.

- - - ,

,

.,

,

,

.'&--Ji
I

. Senrace Date 12/05/if2. (Related DOG
## J29)1

1

I

12;OQ12002 iIt
12 'I7 '2002 i
i

i
i

Corrective Entry (related d3cume:1t(s)u). (ddc, 1
Supplemental Application for Ceopnpensation Pre--petition and Posti pedfion and Costs for J m e s R.Belcher, Albmey, Period: to, Fee:
i
1 $22843-00, Expenses: $16573.93. Filed by James R.Befcher. ( d e b , )

1

I
1

!
I

Objediion Ceadlinc Updated re: Suppinne~~tal
Application hi
1 Conapensatio3 Pre-pe"Liliom ar~d
Past-petition m d Costs for J m e s R.
1 Bef cher, Attorney, Pexiod: to, Fee: $22043.00, Expenses: S t 693.543.
Filed by James R.Beicher (related docuiueilt(a)m). Objections due b y
1 32,'30/2002.
(ciegh?)

1

1
I

,
I

l

i
,

Joint Objection to ,";mended and Supplemental i i ~ p i i c i l t ifC
~Sir ~
I
Compensation Pre-petition a i d Post-petition and Costs Filed by W ~ l l i a , 1~
Id.Bass .Bryce EI. Enckson (related doc;lement(s)m). (dcns, )
I

---

"..-..---

---

--.-'

Joint OQ~-lectioi~
to Supplemental Application for Gompensat~onPrepetition
Post-petition znd Costs Filed by Bryce H.Erickson (related

i

I

i

!
1

1
i
151 / Motion fir ReSeae of Modgage to Secwe Payment of Prumlsscr~Note
I
to Sirius LC Filed by Bryce R.Erickson . ( L 4 ~ a c h e n t sX: 1
1
i

"JoposediTJnslped Order) (dccs, ) (Entered: 07/22/2003)

2

i 52

Order on Mudun for Release of Mortgage (Related Doc
I:$"

-

I

(dccs, j
-

/
I

-

1! Date 07/24/03,(Related Doc # - 1 s ) (Admin.) (Entered: 07/35E003)

1

153 BNC Certificate of Mailing - PDF Document. No. ofNoticcs: 5. Senrice
-

iI

I

Resistace to Motion (related d o c u ~ a e n t ( s )Motion
:~
For Release of
Mcangage). Filed by Sirius LC. (dcjm, )

1
1

I

1

8

i)8~01/=1903
1
i

a

i
I

I

-

i

i

09.03,'2003

i

I

Order Vacating Order on Motion for Releasc: o f Modgage (related
d o c u m e n t ( s ) : ~Order on Generic Motion). Hearing on Motion
Resistance to be heid by Telephone Conference on h p s t 13, 3003 at
9:00 a.m. (dcjm, )
--"

,

---

&-&

I
#

I
i
i

4

1 BNC Ccutificate of Mailing - PDF Docuilient No. ofNotices: 6. Service

156

I

j

-!

t

t

1

'

157 i/ Hcdnny Heid: Minute Order Denying Motion for Release oC54aiiyage
-

'5fi

1

(related d o c u r n e n t ( s ) : ~Generic Motion). (dcao, )

1/

BNC Certiecate of Mailing - PDF Docummt. N o of Notice: 5. Service
(Admin.) (Entered: OSi1?/20(i3)
Date 08/16/03. (Related Doc -k!

I

1
1

j

i

/
/

Application for Compensation for Ken McCmtncy , Debtor's Attorney,
Period: 11/27/2000 to 8/14/2003, Fee: $8 13.50, Expenses: $2 1.50. .
Filed by Ken McCar*;ney . LBR 2002 Ci'ujediun Deadline: !@I 5i2003.
(Attachments: 81ProposediCinsigncd Order) (dccs. ) (Entered:

I

;

i

i osir siaoos)

I

i

I

J6J 1 Order Crmting ;-applicationFor Cornpensstion (Related Doc k

I
I

1 6 1912003
[-

I

-...---

1
~

1?9/21320Q4
i
1
I

1

-

i

1

-

i

i
j

i

I

!

1 BXC Cehficete of Mailing - PDF Document. No, of Notices: 5.Serfice ,
1 Date 2 0119'03. (Related Doc if m')(Admin.)
i
.
i
!
162 ! Objection to Clam with Notice of ?"me to Object. Filed 71~.Brjce H.
161

1
~

m)for

Ken McCamq, Fee awarded: $813 .SO,Expenses awarded:$3: .iO
(dc&, 1

-

"

1

- - . - - p i i - - - - d , - -

.

Erickson Objections due by 10116'2001.
(dcdl. ) Addiiio~al
attachent(s) added on 9/2@/2004(dcdi, ).

I

I

i'?ryan1) S ~ ~ i tGsq.
k , - ISB Kc.441 1
B.J. Dnsec~il.Esq. - ISB No.7019
!a@C;&%TH,
SMITE1 & LASSQCBL~TES,PLEC
P 0 Box 50731
4:4 Shoup .A\wen~e
ilia110 Fails, Xciahil 83405
i elcpt~one: (2081 524-073
1

2068 A! 13 Ri"l 3

T

(208)529-3: 66

;dci"ax.

?-HEDISTRICT COiilRT OF THE SIXTH JVDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
ST?\TE OF IDAHO, IX Ah33 FOR THE GC)I2W?'U OF CAIUBOL'
SiRI'C'S LC,a 'ix~yomingLinzrted
L i i b i i i i ~C O ~ F ~ I ~ .

Plaintiff>

J
i
)

Case No, GV-04-284

!

vs

) O B a C T I O N TO ALLeBbiEWG

\3'lEkEAk%BAGLEY TO TESTIFY AS
1 EXPERT AND MOTION 'TO
CONTINUE TMAL SETTING
)

13RI-CE 1-1. ERICRSOLZ'. -4XD ASY PERSON
CiA1Mli"i'G L3-DER B'rT OR TIlROUGH
BRUCE II*ENCKSON rn AND TO TRE
RE 4L PROPEiiTY DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS:

i

1
1
i

d'ilRfB0L.J GOLKTY. IDAHO:

I

J

TOM SSRXP 5 SOUTH. RmGE 46 E.B M.,
Pr'
SLCTIOF 27: LOTS 1 ,&YD 2, X I '2.
:<I471 14,EXCEPT TI-IEEFROM TIRE S
,*;El '4?<tikr\i 7'4S"J4Ii.4,

1
\

1
i

OBOTCTX$BN10 ALLOWING MTLLaCAbZ BAGLEY "IT3TESTIFY A S EXPERT AND
_WOTZON'TO CBNTPNUE TRIAL SETTING - 1
F 1CLIES.i;TS1BDSi745\\Pieadmgs04&
Obj Expert Monos Contmuc d:~c

COR'IES NOW defendar~t,Bryce 11. Encksors iLEncksua"r.h> and ~I-~rough
i a ~ scvtti:sel of
i e ~ o r d ,B.J. Driscoil, Esq., of rise fir111 c)f McGW+Til, Sh4ITX1 & ASSOCLAiTES,

PLLC,and

j'urcttant to Idaho Rules i?f Ciml Pmcedwe 'ltXbi(4). 20!e)(l,1. axid 37,ant:the Order for 'I'rral, PreTi.,tf

Sci~edule,and Prte-TriaI tlo~~ferinnce
filed in rhls case 0~1,4tlgust9,2!&7. objects to the couii
**

ailowmg il'rll:a:n Sagley ("Baglcy ) to test& at trra! as an expert for the plaiugtrff.
This Objectinn a d h4n;ion i s made

011

Lt!i;: grol;ncjs and for the reasuns that tile coun

111d1c;;ted at tile hearing Iield on June 6,2008 tliat it would ailiow Bagley lo testif) at rriaJ as a1cxpe:?

cr en ttzougil 111splaiiziiff r"ai2ecl to disclose Bagiej as an expert witness i : ~"tie plaintiffs d l s c o i r e l ~
i-i

responses and failscli to rdet~iilnqhim as an expert witness in its trial w k ~ ~ e1st.
s s >pecjiicalIy, the

piaiztiff fiiileci to provide '?be sisbstalce of arzy iipini311, or other testrmer;~that tile expert 1s
expeetecl to grve at trial of this cmse" arid the ""specificfacts hnb data or1 M hich such i)pi~:io~~s
are
based" as Erickson requested iti discot~ery.i Tfis plaimir%f&iJedto ""disclose in w~iting"Bagley as a11
expeit witness "'togetlrer with a summary of "lye testimoizy" Bagley intends to offer. ,See Qsder for

Trial. Pre-'Trial Schedule, and Pre-Trial C'oi~ferzncefiled in tkis case on Akdgust9, 2007.

In Idaho. a court's failure to exclude expert tssrimonj that itwas not properly disclosed a1d that
pre-jud~cesthe oppasisg party constitutes arr abuse of diserecrcz;.. GtlZ7ak I' ,?a,?., 137 Icld~o243,347
(Ct.App. 2002). fhe Clark court explained as follcws:

[Flailure to meet the requirerrie~~ts
of R d e 25 ""vpis"caI@"results in exclusion
iiltile proffered evidence. The potential forprejuclice lo the opposlng party fr3m tile
a&~~ission
o f elkisnee that was :lot discrliosed in drscovery isparticular& ncrcr'e wirh
respect to expert testinzony. for as the cowt naied ir! ii"au7nzcr,-"[eKfective eross-

m the Res2onse to Dzrendant erycs E.-:c~son'sFrrsi Set of I n t e r r o ~ ~ t o r ~raeSlrrus
s
LC
Reqsests for P r o d ~ c t ~ oofa 9ocu11zents &ached as Exh~iilb:?".2" "iorhe Affidavit of "u 9il)risco" !axed iclq 9,
2008. 211eady cn file with the coun.
See ir~terrogamnNo. 2

alcl

OBJECTION TO ALL0\%3KG S,%'ILLlA4MBAGLEU TO TESTIFY AS EXPERT

MOTION TO CONTZNUE T N A L SETTIKG - 2
F CLIEXTS\BDS 7452 P!eadmgs\048 Obj Expert Mcitmn Coi~tmbedoc

AND

excrntr'raation CIJ-un e-xptlrt ~ v i tess
n requires i~~ltdvalzce
prepamtion, 'kid "effective
rebztfric~;l
requires adva~tcebsnnwbedge rfllize Cine offesnti~jeofg.
ofthe ofher side.'"
i d iciiclng itacJr?wr

Ford 5i4iloior ('it , I70 Idaho 86, 89 (1 991 1) (emphasis added).

The Radifser court expiairaed as foflova s:

1-ii s f ~ ~ a d a n e nthat
t ~ lopportusliry be had far full cross-exminatio~~,
m d this
cdn~aotbe dn~reproper!) in n ~ a i ~eases
y
without resort to prenizii Jiscoueq-.
parhicu1a1-1~.
when expen uatnesses are invcrlved . . . Before an attorney can even
hope i-o d:al on ~ross-i.xa~~~~itaation
wit21 ar;unfavorable expert opinion be [or s i ~ e j
inus: iiati: solne idea o f the bases of that opinion and the data relied upon. If an
.~tkorneq..IS required to awart examination at uial lo get this information, he [or she]
often .tviil have too little tirncr to recogt~izeand expose vulnerable spots in thc
testiln0:lv

Sta11.L.x:~. 455.485 (1962)): see td,>rj;l;i;l?$:11'~~ v i)2n0-~~asi
Corp , 123 Ida110 205.217-2.1 8 (1933)

rpsting that 1.it.C.P. 26ie)il) obligates cour~selto s t ~ p l e m ediscovery
~~t
responses, par-ticblarly the

0:le of tile main i s s ~ e scil trial in this case will be Baglep's rnalpractie:: in representing
Eniicsoi~despite concurrent coi~flistsof interest and by faiiirag to represeat Ericicson nit11 the

re~uisitestzndard of care in b a ~ ~ u p t c qBetern~ination
.
of ~ i ;~~alpraclice
~ e
issue requires expert

tesiirnony. Based on the plaintiffs failure to suppienle~rtits discovery responses re~xCIngits
ir?rte~~eiorz
lo call Bagtey as an expert witnesses. I.R.C.P. 26(e)(i i.a r ~ dits failure to disclose Bagley
and ' i s opinioi-asin the plalntrff s trra! vi7itnessd~scl~sures
zs required by the order f i r T:-lal, Pre-

7rial Schedu1.c. 531d i3re-TrialCordzrerlce., Ericksort will be prejudiced Ltt trial if Bagley is i?lJovvedto
:cs".fj as a:ilex~-el"ibecause Enc:,son has beer1 pxei tnted fZ.3111 ilisci;?v~ri,~g
the opinions Bagley :nay

OBJECTION TO RLLOMIYG
SAGLEY TO TESTIFY A S EXPERT AND
~PO"PICPK
TO CONTINVE TRIAL SETTIKG - 3
F ~CL:En'TS sSDS\7d5iiPleadrngs~0S8
0b; ExpeT,.h4otion Contmua 2oc

offer a 1 4 1;"iebasis ifiir those opinions. Erickson ixiiil be prevented from effee-tir.eEycmss-exzumiiling

-i:agicy and rebutttng his "ies"ii;;loi:y at trial.
Furtl~er~.
Er~cksonmoves this c o x t prsuanx to Xdahi~Rule of Civil Procedure U e i ( 3 ) fr?r
C(PR",;IIU~~"~'PC~
of tile

trlai m tELsmiitter until such time 3s the plall~riffcozqiies wit11 Ruic C6 a ~ d

tl~iclti.scs'FSapiey a\ ail eslpcrt, 11;s 0;3iiiiou;s, aild tile facts rehed upon to firvar rizose opinlo~~s,
2nd
~:i:cr! Erlc,\so~rhas m opportncrnlty to depase Bagis> regardmg hrs expert npin~ons 3x1s Lw:~o~i
:s

made or, rhe grour~il~
and for the reasons Ilia: Errcksorr mill slifli3r

S U ~ L I Z prtq',id~ce
~ ~ I ~
~f nor

per;-rct~eAio discovilir Efagiey-s opinions and examins Bag1e.v regardrx~gthose opin:nns 2s part of

EIIGLS~JII~S
prepibra~ionfor ~rikl.
This 3bajecti;c

315d

hriotion is based or1 i l Objectiii;?
~ ~
and -Motion, the ;3ia:ntifCs tVltness

D:sc!osure dated \Gay 2 , 2938, and the Response to Defendant Brqce Erickso.il"s First Set o f
;i~re~-ror;atiir:es
lo S~riusLC and Requests for P;odui;trnn of Doc.umerils aziaciied as Exhibit '-A"'to

the Affidr~itoof
B.5. Driscoif dated May 9,2008, already cn file with the eour;. md the court ~ C C O I ~ S
mcI fiiz herein.

Errcicson requests oral argument.

DliTFD this

,/aday of Jonc. 2008.

; j / ~ i r n r : i e ~fsi r i:c5e;;E=nt
Bryce W. Erickson
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

/

ria) of Jmz. 1008,Icaused n true and
1 iiEItL,BL. CERTIFY that on t h i s
cirriccl cop) ~ i;i:c
. foregoii~gO B J E C T ~TO
O ~ALLOWING m ILLIAZ~BAGLEY
TESTLFY AS GXPERT AND MOTION TO CONTINUE TRIAL SETTING to be servzd.
bg pIacmg the S ~ Z I ;in
. ~ a sealed envelope and depositing it irz the Vx~rtedStates 3faii. postage
prepaid. .,I
k~z~zil:
.
dcii\lsl-y, facsimile traismissrorr or overnight dei:trery, addressed to the
4 1%
.
1 i i i i O \ %l Ug .

-

1

A. L3r~i~n
Larsi~n.Csq.
i-2ltor net La.,%

[

15";ourh

j ]
[ ]

2'" Ave.

OX 9369
P ~ C ~ L CIdaho
~ I O , 83395-6369

it.4)

LieS.34zil

FAX
Hand Delivery
Overnighr. Deliver>

Fax. T4 - tQ b -7~ 6 0 3

OBJECTfOS K
' O 4LLBR7ifSG %ELLTAM BAGLEY TO TESTIFY A S EXPERT lL"iiI)
3ICPTION TO CONTINUE TRIAL, SETTISG - 5
F \CLlZYt:TS,3DS 7453 P!eadmgs\O48 Gbj E>-pert.AMoi~on
Contmire doc

i-flyail D. Smith, Esq. - XSB No. 441 1
B..I. Driscol!, Esq. - ISB KO.702 0
klcG1&4TH, SLMITEI& ASSOCPA'FES, PLkC

P.t?.Box 50731
d 14 Shoup Ave~iuc
lJaI?*i3
Fails, li-id~o33405
1eiepbone: (268) 524-6731
'l eieictx: (205)529-3166

? ?

Attorneys for Defeildili~~
Bi-;ice H, Ericiisolz

ISTEE DlS I'PJCT COCRT OF'TEE SIXTH CCSCBZICIAL DISTRICT OF M E
STATE OF IDAHO, IT< AND FOR THE 60LXTY OF CARIBOU

Slli'iIGS LC.a Wjrorning L;miteJ
"i1abi1ir-yCornpan-, .
Piai~~xiff.

i
i

)
)

Case Vo. CV-04-284

1

>
>

vs.

BRYCE ti[.EItXGI<S3N, PL.;"h:D
PERSOX
1
CLAiMIh-G LXDER BY OR THROUGH
1
BR'I'CE El. ERICKSOX r;l-AiiD TO THE
)
REAL PROPERTY OESCKBED AS FOLLOM;S: :
C!&33OtT

GOtATTY,IDAHO:

1
1
I

TOFVNSEfi-P5 SOUTH, PANGE 46 E.B.M.,
SECTION 27: LOTS 5, AhrD 2, N1/2
K.;-V4/3, EXCEPT THEEFROhif THE S 4
K.;E1/4 N'l?' !iNW; 13..

\

1

1
,l

Defendants.

1
i

4PFIDAVfT OF
BeJ. DRISCOEL

ST ATE OF TUAI ICI

1 ss.
Co~il;:~' sf 230:11scvrilc

B

J. Di<ISCOLt, being first duly sworn on oil~j?,deposes md says:

r 11

I a11oilir of the attorneys for 'tile defendant m the h o v e - r e f

( 21

i mdce thrs afficra~it based ori in? own persc311al ii~zowiedge,

3

O:I February 38,ZOCIP; 1 served the plaintiffs cciunse!. Bruce I.~~Tso;I,~ a t notice
k

~malier.

of: t3kiilg i h depo~ition
~
o f WI1;iam Bagiej, the plai~ztiff's owner, for Apr:li I 1. 3008.

(4)

On 2v<vlarch26.2W8, I rzce~veda call from Vr. L ~ ~ S O I-Ii:
I I . called to reschedlL:e

Baglej's dc"posiiic?*~.
Xie explair~edtixt B~agIejccatacled i ~ i m
m b asked to rescired~liehis
C~EI;JC"SI~'OI~
bezar:se Bzgley had confirsed the date of the depasition md, upon receiving rile
deposition norice. realized he laad a "'very import.mt meeting'" JIP had to attend 011 April 11. 2008.

(5)

I agredtto resel~eduieBagley's deposition for April 25,2308.and ser;t our a11

xnended Oeposrrion nuttce confirmi~gthe clzmge.

6

On .\ap~il30,2008-i spoke rs h:r. Lason about hand delivering our trial mItrAess

2u;i-l exhibit: lists clad expert: rej3or"lo him athie May 2, 20638 pretrial corderenee illstead of
maiilng those same doculnents to hi121 on the hfay 1.2008 deadline because this wcj-iiid save both
parires the delay mcl cast of naailicg. Mr. Larson agreed eo exchange the docirmer~tsat the

(7)

cxkibits a d

-bit

thz pretr-is! cr;nferc:~cs

hfay 2. 3008.ii~epanies excl~aa~ged
their trizi

:mess lists and R1r. Larsor~reccIi.cd a copy of Shiveiy's expert report.

- G F ~ 4 ' t 7 1OF
T B, J. DHSCOLL - 1
F ~CLIEXTS3DS'"453\i"leadings~li52
AE.Ei.lii doc

DATED i i i i s

/ 9ddy o f iuns.2008

7-/--

Notzry Pubilc for d+o 1
ilcsidi~~g
at id&ai&d&o
M> Commission Expires: 04il I'i l

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
day of Sul~e,2008,l caused a true x ~ d
I FIEREBY CERTIFY that on ",his
correct copy o f !he foregoir~gAFFIDAWT OF B.J. DMSCOLL to be served, by placing the
same in a sealed eamt-elqe and depositi~~g
it in the United States Mail, postage ;llrepa~d.or h a d
delivery, facsimile transmission or oberniylzt delivery, addressed to the follo\nring:
Bruce Larson, Esq.
ABLE tPxT$ PC
Horizon Plaza Ste 225
i?~
0.
Box 6369
155 S.?"! -Avenue
PucateIlo, Idaho 83205-6368
Fax: 378-7602
1%.

i

j U.S.P\.lail
/FAX
[ f Hand Detiiresy
[ j
Overnight Delivery

$2

+
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Brtan D. Smith, Esy. - ISB No. 441 1
B,J. Driscoll, Esq. - ISB No. 7010
M c C U T R , SMITH & ASSOCIATES, PLLC
13. 0. Box 5073 1
414 Shoup Ave~iue
Iddio Falls, Idaho 83405
Telepliane: (208) 524-073 1
Telefax: (208)529-4166

~ O O Bj d ~17 i;li 2 53

Attor-iieys Ihr Defendant
Bryce 2-i. Erickson

IN TFIE DISTRICT GOLIRT' OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TI-IE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF C , W B O U
SIRItJS LC, a Wyoming Limited
Liability Corapaiy,
Plaintiif,

1
1
1
)

1

Case No. CV-04-284

j CLOSING BRIEF
)

vs.

BRYCE H. ERICKSON, AXD ANY PERSON
)
CLAIMmG T_INDER BY OR TE-IROUGFI
1
BRYCE 13. ERXGKSON IN AND TO THE
1
E A L PROPERTY DESCRTBED AS FOLLOWS: )
CARIBOU COUNTY, ID4HO:

1
1
1

TObWSHIP 5 SOUTH, RANGE 46 E.B.M.,
SECTION 27: LOTS 1 AND 2, El12
NWli4, EXCEPT THEEFROM THE S %
XE114 NW 54 KW1/4,
Defendants.
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1
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1
1
1

1.

RAG1,EU CANNOT =COVER ON THE PROMISSORY NOTE AND
SECIJFC1'TY AGREEMENT BECAUSE TME 'TUNSAGTION IS
PKO-wLAWFT_TLAND
VOID CWDER WSOMXNG LAW.
111 1999, %'yomirig followed l&?yonningRule of Professional Conduct 1.S(a) that

Xiule 1.8. Conflict of interest: prohibited transactions
(a) A lawyer shall not enter into a business transactio~iwith a a l i e ~or
~t
lurowingly !:acquire ari otvnerstGp, possessory, security or other pecui~iaryi~lteres~
a d ~ e r s eto a cIie~itunless:

tl-re tra~~saction
and tenns or1 which the lawyer acquires the
(1)
interest are fair atid reasol~ableto the client and are hfly disclosed arrd
trrtrisinitted ill writing to the client in a marmer wfiich can be reasonably
uriderstood by the client;

(2) ale client is given a reasor~ableoppor-tunityto seek the
counsel in the trarisactiol~;and
advise of ilidepende~~t
(3)

the client cotlsents in witing thereto.

The "m~iting"requiremer~tof % W C 1.8 iiiust be a writing separate from any
rvritings i~lvolvediri the tra~rsactionitself. See I17 re Eslnte qfBral.r)n, 930 A.2d 249, 253
(D.C. 2007) (holding tliat cfient's '"merely sigiiirig the listing ageement'. was insufficie~zt
to sfiow client's infonned consent in writing); In re Stephens, 35 1 N.E.2d 1256: 1258
(fnd. 2006) (holding that fee agreeiilent signed "without separate rn~rittenconsent froin the
client" violated professional rule 1.8); Lawyer Disc@linary Board v. Barber, 566 S.E.2d
245, 25 1 (MT.Va.2002) (holding that client's signature on a check was insufficierit to

satisfy the requiremerits of rule requiring client's informed consent in writing); and

,'Clatter qfCha~@os:153 B.R. 131, 136.137 (I3arkr.E.D. h4ich. 1993) (disagreed wit11 01.1
otl-rer grounds Sii other cases) (holding that lawyer "failed in krs affirmative obligation" lo

CLOSING BRIEF - Page 2
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obtain clie11t"s coilse~iti~na xniriting "separate &on1 m y ofthe papers c'i'idcn~ingthe
bansaction itself ').
Here, Bagley testified that 11e did not comply wit11 Rule 1.8 beca~~se
it did not
apply to this case. Bagley testified that be did not co~lsiderthe security agreement

bad verse'^^ Bryce. According to Bagley, Rule 1.8ia)applies only where the interest is
"'adverse." Bryce does not ur~derstmdBagley's claim that the security interest it1 his
property is not "adverse." 11is axiomatic that my security interest in Bryce's real
property Bagley got tl~roughSirius rlecessarily decreased I3ryce.s i~~terest
in his teal
property. Bryce submits that Bagley's illcreased ir-rterest in Bryce's property at the
expense of decreasing Bryce's il~terestin Bryce's real property is by definitioll "'adverse."

Mor-eol~er,Bagley lnisreads Rule I .8(a) to require a11 "0xa7nership," ""possessory,"
or "security" interest to be "'adverse" before the rule will apply. But this is 11ot tlne case.
Rule 1,8(a) addresses "oxlilership illterests," "possessory interests,'""'security i~iterests."
or '-otlteryecurtiagl, i~tterestsnrlverse to n clierzt." Rule 1.%a) necessarily assurrtes that
all "ownersfiip interests," "possessory interests," and '"security interests*'that a lawyer
gets it1 fiis client's property are adverse to the client. Not to limit its applicatiox~to just
these necessarily adverse interests, Rule 1.&(a)coritains a ""ctcch all pixase"' to cover ail

otlterpecurzinry i~llerestsadverse to a clierzt. This "catch all pivase" is obviously
designed to head off some creatively tl-ririking l a y e r trying to avoid the requirelnertts of
Rule 1.S(a) who says that his pecuniary interest may be adverse, but it is neither an
"ou~~lersltip
interest," -'"possessoryinterest." nor a ""security ir~terest."Therefore, the
'"catcln all phrase" is necessary to encompass nkl otlzer pecuniary irzlerests nherse to (2

CLOSING BRIEF - Page 3
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clie~ztbesides just il~fierentlyadverse "ommership interests,'"""pssessory interests," and

""security illterests."
G i ~ e iBagley's
i
posi~iolithat Rule 1.8(a) does 11otapply, it is not surprising that
Bagley admilted that he did not fitlly disclose the terms on wkcli Bagley tlxougli Sirius
wotlld acquire his security iiiterest baismi~tedin writit~gto Bryce in m y fasliion let alor~e
in a 1xialmer that B r ~ c ecould reaso~iablyu~ide~starid.
The only tvritten conserit Bagley

could point to for colnpliaiice trnder Rule 1.@,a)is the h4arriage Senlemer~tAgreenient

the divorce lawyers prqared and that Bryce signed oil September 14, 1999.' However,
Bagley adrnitted that tlie Marriage Settlement Agreement contains none of the teri~isof
the tra~~saction
and specifically does not even identify the property in which Bagley
would claim a security interest tlxougli Sirius. Bryce submits that he caxiot consent
"hereto," (i.e., to the security interest .ih~Iioseterms Baglep was required to fully disclose
and tra~is~mit
to Bryce i11bvriting). given that Bagley did not comply with Rule I .S(a)(l).
The importzlce of Rule 1.8(a) is that by its express terms it renders the security
agreemela and transaction ill this case a "prohibited transaction." Bryce subiiiits that
'prohibited" means Viiyomix~glaw precluded Bagley from taking a security interest in
Bryce's propel-ty tlrrroug1-r Sirius. Bagley could not enter the transaction in tliis case
because wider Wyoming law applicable to Bagley the transactio~iwas "rullawful." In
%Tyomi~lg,as in most states, an uralawful transaction is void. Tnkal'zashi
v. Pepper Tank
& Ccitzlrueting Co., 131 P.2d 339, 354-355 (Wyo. 1942); Flecht v. Acme

Coal Co..113 P.

788,790 (Wyo. 191 1). Accordingly, the security agreement and transaction Bagley seeks
to eriforcc tl~rortghSirius are "'prohibited," kunla&ul," and *-void.'-

CLOSING BRIEF - Page 4
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11.

V;IUOMmG LAW PILLOIJJS BRYCE TO M 1 S E TEIE AFFIMATIVE
DkFENSE OF SETOFF TO BAGLEY'S UrRONGFtJL CONDUCT.
In %i~yomirig,
""rcoupment, which by defi~iitionarises out of the tra~sact~o~ial

strbject of the suit, when used only to defeat the claim sued upon is not bmed by a
iirnitatioti period if tile main action is timely. . . . The p~zrposeof limitatiori provisions is
to bar actior-is a~zdnot suppl-ess or deny matters of defense, and the gel~eralr~rieis
litnitations are not appIicable to defenses but apply only where affirraative relief is
sought." Har.r~keye-See.Ins. CO.V . Apodaca, 524 P.2d 874,879 (Vdyo. 1974). Miyo~iiiiig
co~trtsuse tlie terrz~s""stoff - and "recoupmerzt" interchangeably. id. Sec tzlso

Rzq:penlhnl v. State, 847 P.2d 1316 (Wyo. 1993) (\nilrere BTyomirigS~~preme
Court
pcrinitted a party to rely on its setoff defense even tfiougli the govermiieizt clairned tliat
tlie setoff was precluded by the govermae~it'ssovereigi~irnmunity.i
Courts have applied the setoff defense after the statue of limitations has run in tlie
context of professional malpractice claims. See Monustru v. D 'Amore, 676 N.E.2d 132,
139 (01zio.,4pp. 1996) (stating tliat even if the statute of limitations bas expired 011 the
defenda~it'sLegal malpractice counterclaim, tl~eclaim is relevant as a defense to the
attorl~ey'sclainl for fees as a setoff or recoupment): Willoughby v. Bowda and Fields,
Chartered, 643 So.2d 1098 (Fla.App. 1994) (holding that even if clierzt's counterclai~n
against a"ctomey for malpractice were time barred the malpractice claim could ~ionetheiess
be asserted as setoff or recoupment against attorney's claim far fees); and Cooper 1.
Xeaves, 365 So.2d 670 (Afa. 1978) (holdiilg that aitllough patient's time barred

znalpractice claim barred as a counterclaim. such claim was not barred as recorrpmenr).

CLOSING BRIEF - Page 5
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Here, Bagley tlirough Sirius seeks to recover unpaid attorney? fees. Altl-tough
Bryce's malpractice claims are time barred, Bryce may nonefieless assert his clairns as a
setoff deferlsc to reduce any amounts ke may owe

Ili.

DAGLEY K4S NOT PROVE3 THAT THE $78,668.57 FOR ATTORNEY'S
FEES HE CWRGED FOR THE CHAPTER I1 PROCEEDINGS 1S
REASONABLE.
117 Wyoining,

''k] lawyer shall not make an agreement for. cliargc, or collect

~ ~ ~ x e a s o tfee
~ ~or
~ banl eunreasonable ;UII~OUIXfor expenses." 'GVyo. K, Prof Conduct I .S.

In I d d ~ uthe
, law is identical. See I.R.P.C. 1.5. Thus, whether under M'yorning law or
Idaho law. Bagley cannot ""charge, or collect an ulveasonable fee." Id
The bwden rests on Bagley, not Bryce, to show the reasonable~iessof liis
ztttorney's fees. See -nii(ondu~v. Robert J. Aizderson, P. C., 77 P.3d 855, 857 (Colo.hpp.
Golo. 2003j (citing li'estaternent (T2zird) ofLaw Governing Lawyers Section 42 clmt. c

(2000) (tile lawyer has the burden in a suit by the client for refund of a fee)); Bowex v
Suzuki ,'1ilotor Co., Ltd., 217 F.S~lpp.2d610 (D.'\iirgin Islands 2002) ("After the fiduciary
relatiolzsl-zipis established, the attorney has the burden of establishing the seasonableness
and faillless of fees"); Climuco, Seminutore, Delligutti & Holtenbaztgh v. Carter, 653

N.E. 2d 1245, 1251 (O1sio.App. 1995) ("[I]11 action for attorney fees the burden of
proving that tlie tirz-te was fairly and properly used and the burden of showing tl-te
reasorsableness of work hours devoted to the case rest on the attorney"); McKenzie
Consi. Inc. v. hllaj.nnrd, 758 F.2d 97 (D.Virgin Islalids 1985) (the burden of proof is 011
the attorney to prove the reasonableness 01his fees even if the client is the plaintiff siri~ig
to recover fees atready paid): Matier ofkdarine. 264 N.W. 2d 785, 287 (Wis. 1978)
("'Gel-zerally.in disputes in~olvingthe reasonableness of attortiey's fees. the burden of
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proof is upon tlie attorney to prove their reasonableness"); and Rock v. Bcrllozi, 205 S.E.2d
540, 541 @.C.App. 1974) (The burden of proof is up011 the attorney to show the
and the fairness of the coii~act,not upon the clietit to show tile contrary").
rcasoitable~~ess

Here, Bagley cflarged Bryce $28,668.57 for his services he rendered in the
Cl~apter11 case. Althougl~Bagley has no billings to identify the services he perfo~xied
(he ca~motLlnd them), the court can deterniine the mount be charged as follows: First,
Bryce paid Bagley $5,000 at the outset of the representation in October 1998.' Second,
Bagley does have billings that start Jtrrze 3. 1999 tliat show a previous balance of

$23,668.57."ince

the court dismissed the Chapter 11 on May 11, 1999, the smz of the

initial retai~lerand the previous balance in the amount of $28,668.57 appears to be tlie
a~i~ourtt
Bagley cliarged fur his services in the Chapter 11.
The court knows full well that the b d a u p t c y court disniissed Bryce's Chapter 11
case fir failure to p r ~ s e c u t e .NO
~ plan was ever even close to getting confirmed. The

plan and disclostxe statemeizt were not filed timely, No reports were filed accortr~ttir~g
for
use of tile cash collateral. The reports were not filed timely. Reports that were filed
omitted the majority of information needed to acliieve reorganization, sucli as balance
sheets and prefit and Loss statements. The fees were paid late to the U.S. Trustee. Bagley
engaged in little to 110 contact with the creditors. Eve11 Bagley agrees that there was no
apparent progress from what he initially filed with the cour?, but Bagley ciairlls "we were
worlci~agor? it.'"

'

' Bagley Depo., 2 I :15-20.
' EIIG~SOII
Exhibit C-17 1,
4

Erickson Exhibit A-87.
"agley Depo., 172:18-21.
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Accordbigly, the ba~~kruptcy
court dismissed Bry ce3s Chapter 1 1 proceedings
u11der U.S. Code Section I f 12(b) far cause that included (1) inability to ezectuate a plan;

(2) urireasonable delay by the debtor ~v%iehis prejudicial to creditors: (3) failure to
prosecute a plan under Section 1 121 within tlie time fixed by statute; m d (4) failure to
pay clua~%erty
fees. Bagley even agrees that dismissal u.as wasranted under these

provisions hccaase these are thlngs that should have been i f ~ i l e . " ~ i e ~ accepts
respo~~sibility
for not having gotten these tilings done.'
Clealy, Bryce should not have to pay Bagley for his failure to prosecute the
Chapter I I case properly. Bagley admits that the only value his services provided to
Bryce was (1) ohtailling the automatic stay; and (2) -'time to work wit11

for the automatic stay, Bagley adrnits he could have filed the b

creditor^."^

As

ptcy and obtained Q e

antornatic stay for Less ilia11 $1,000 in attorney's fees.9 This means that Bagley cllarged
Bryce $27.668.57 for attorney's fees for "time" to work with creditors. However, the
ttx1t11 is that tlie automatic stay prorrided "time" to work with creditors. not a ~ q ~ h i i ~ g
Bagley did after the autornatic stay was entered.

If Bagley did anphing to get additional "time" after the automatic stay was
entered. he just delayed tlie entry of tile dismissal. Delaying tlie entry of the dismissal
conferred ria value or1 Bryce because this just caused him to have to refile as a Chapter 12
where lse ultitnately got a plan successfulIy cor~firmed.Its this regard, Bagley shorrld
have converted the Chapter f 1 to a Cfiapter 12 just 13 days after he filed the Ghaprer 11.
See I 1 U.S.C. Section 111"Cd).

Bagley testified that be would have initially filed this

'Bagley Depo., 176:3-13.
'
8

Bagley Depo., 178:14-16.
Ragley Depo., 191:21-23; 195:6-11.
Bagiey Depo., 3721-23.

CLOSING BRIEF - Page 8
F \CLIENTS\BDS\7453\Pkadlngs\O55
CLOSING ISRlEF ditc

case as a Cf~apter12 ifit had been available because Chrtpter 12 is less cozxplicated and

xiore debtor fiiendly than a CI-rapter I I where Bxycc is a farmerirancher.

10

But Bagley

never co~isideredcoriverting tlie Gfiapter 1I to a CIiapter 12 until after the CCtiapter 1 I u7as
dismissed." h fact, Bagley never evert krrleur that the Ctlapter 11 could have been

to a Chapter 12.
cowe~-teC/
Judith Shively testified that she took over Brycc's Chapter 12 case after the
ba~dir~ptcy
court dischaged Bagley. Ms. Shively was able to get tlze Chapter 12 pla~
aj3proved, and Bryce successfitlly eolnpleted the plan. Bryce uf fimately received a
Chapter 13 dischage order. Tllis proves that if Bagiey had convel-ted to a Chapter 12 and
perfortlled cvmpeteritly, fie too could have gotten a Gfiapter 12 plan approved, Bryce
could have successfully completed the plan, and Bryce ultiinately could have received a
discharge order. As it turns out. Bagley did not convert to a Chapter 12, but instead was
responsible for the Chapter 11 getting dismissed, In the end, Bagfey charged Bryce
$27,668.57 for a "'no value Chapter 11 dismissal" xYjr)enhe should have got-ten a valuable
Cliapter 12 confirmation just like Judith Sl-rivety. il. Chapter 12 conkmation would have
gotten Bryce the "time" Bagley claims he got Bryce but ~rithouthaving to incur the
expeiise of doing it twice as occurred in this case.
Bagley has not met IGs burden to prove that his attorney's fees of $28,668.57 for
the Chapter 1 I proceedings are reasonable. Specifically, Bagley has never testified that

$28,668.57 is a reaso~lablemount for attorney's fees for the work he performed in the
Chapter I1 proceedings. Bagley has not identified the work he perforined in the Chapter
11 proceedings. Bagley has ~zoattorney biiiirzgs to document what services he performed
10

Bagley Depo., 7:f)-16;41:20-422
Depo., 475-8.
12
Ragley Depo.. 42:12-24.
: ' Bagley
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the C'llapter 11 proceedings.13 I3agley can provide no iternkutiorz or show ~ I i ahe
t

actually cllargcd h r the work in tlic Chqter I I r)oceedings. l 4 Ragley can provide no
accowzeil-zg or brenktlawrz for what he charged to arrive at the total figure of

$25,668.57." Bagley simply cannot Locate his billings to justi& his attor~~ey's
fees for
the Cfzapter 11 proceedings and has made no effort to recreate tfle work he performed for

his sertices. 16
A4ri*llfio~lgl-r
Bagley cllarged Bryce for all tlie work Bagley per-formed iri the Cliapter
1 I proceedings,

'

Bagiey admits that he did not perforn~some of his work "efficiently"' as

is the case wl~ereBagley filed multiple u~~successful
perfunctory applications just to
retain professiorials.1S Bagley furtlier admits that it would not be reasotzable for hini to
charge Bryce for the successive applications to retain

But Bagley did

charge for ail tlie successi\'e applications fie filed in obtaining the orders to appoint

Bagley also charged $165 per ho~rrwhen the barkuptcy court approved hi111 for

only $140 per hour. Bagley's charged Rrj.ce $165 per hour for the work he performed in
the Cliapter 11 proceedings." Yet, Rag!ey's application for ernplojr~~~ent
and the court
order allowed 01-11y $130 per liour." Bagley well fled a verified statement tlmt '.p~~rsuant
to rete~~tion
agreement.' ~ 4 t Bryce
h
he was cbargillg $140 per how.'"herefore,

" Bagley Depo., 69: 1 9-24.

14

Bagley Depo., 70:15-19.
Bagiey Depo., 70:ZO-25.
i6
Bag!ey Depo., 69:8-11.
17
Bagley Depo., 146:20-22.
iE
Bagley Depo., 14321-22.
19
Baglep Depo., 146:15-19.
20
Bagley Depo., 141:8-11.
21
Bagley Depo., 22:24-23:s;37:2 1-223.
Esickso~~
Exhibit
~s
A-25 and A-36.
Erickson's Exhibit A-33.
15

"
"
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Bryce

is elititled to a credit of $25 per I~ourfor all. thc hours Bagley Iias charged for se~liPces

perfornled in the Chapter 11 proceedings. Stated diEerently, Bagley c a i charge only
$140 per hour for any hour Lze pro\.es was reasonable in tlie Chapter I 1 proceedings.

Bagley also testified at trial tliat because of problems he encomtered retailling the
accouratant that 11e personally filed the accou~~tiiig
reports. 'The tinited States Trustee's
Status Repol? dated April 19, 1999 refers to the March nio~lthlyfi~laiciillreport and states
that '"tlll-re debtor states on the report &at Mr. Bagley is owed $7,000 in fees over the
relrtifter."" 'Tliis means that t l ~ o u g bMarch, Bagley's attors~ey'sfees, according to the

finalcia1 report that Bagfey prepared, were $12,000 far the senices be performed in the
Chapter I 1 proceedings. (The $7,000 in the Mxch report plus the origitlal$5,000
retai11er.j Yet. by May I 1, 1999 (the date the court dismissed Bryce's Cllapter I I
proceeding), tlie total aeorney's fees lie cliaxged for tile services he performed in the
Chapter 11 proceedings was $28,668.57. This means that for the month of April 1999
and for I 1 days ill May 1999, Bagley charged Bryce $17,668.57 for services, A review
of the Chapter I 1 banitruptcy file shours that Bagley did precious little during this tirile.

More i~i~partant,
Bagley provided no evidence at trial to carry his burden that $17.668.57
ibr attorney's fees was reasonable for my services he perforlined between April a i d May

11. 1999.
111the end, Bagley Iias not carried his burden to establish that his attoixey's fees

of $28.668."; iiicuired iii the Chapter 11 proceedings are reasonable. According1y, this
court must find ihat Bagley through Sirius is not entitled to any attorney's fees tluougfi
h4ay 11. 1999.

" 4Ecksorr Exhibit A-83, 9.3.

(Emphasis added.)
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SAGLEY'S C
G
O
W
F
L
f
C
T
l
PrEPESENTTNC; BRUCE IN THE CHAPTER 12 BEGAN AS E A a U AS
JUNE 3. 1999.

- obviously liad a conaicl of interest that prevented hi111&om represerzting
Bagley
Bryce in the Cfiapter 13. The ba&suptcy cou1-t dismissed Bagley relying on I I U.S.C.
S e c t i o ~327.
~ Tlie order dismissing Bagley states, "'Pwrsuant to I 1 U.S.C. Sectioll327. the
trustee Illlay, with the court approval, emplay an attorney that does not hold or represeiit
an interest adverse to tile estate and who is disi~~terested.""The court further relied on
1 1 U.S.C. Section 101j13).'9~be court continued, "Under Section 101(141, the Code

clefil~esa disinterested person as one tl~atis not a

The court found '*fC.fr.

Bagley is a cl-editor."" The court then dismissed Bagley from furlher representation.
Bryce subinits that this creditor co~iflicttlrat preveltted Bagley ii-om reprcsentil~g
Bagley iri the Chapter 12 prevenkd him fro111 even filing the Chapter 12 or fro111
performing work necessary to prepare the Cfiapter 12 for filing. If a client's attorney tias
a c o ~ d i cin
t representing a client after the 5Iir1g of a Chapter 12 because the al-tor~leyis a
creditor representing the client on creditor-related work out issues. tIie attorney I-ras the
conflict at the time the attor~~ey
beconles tlie clierit7screditor representi~igtlie client on
creditor-related work out issues, not at the time the petition is filed. LI other words, the
attorney's cor~flictarises from his creditor status, not from him filing the petition. The
filing of the petition merely makes the conflict open and obvious.

D- 156-15'7.
Erickson Exhibit D-156-157.
- ' Erickson Exhihibit 0156-157.
Sickson Exhibit D-156-157.

" Ericicson Exbibit
17

"
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111this regard, Baglcy agrees that he actually had a conflict as a creditor in
representing Bryce iri the Cl~apter12 b&or.e Bryce signed the psomiss~rynote." This is
i~nportmtI'CCBIISC
tlx Chapter 12 was filed oil December 3, 1999," and Bryce signed the

.
promissory llote on November 13, 1999." Tlius. by Haglcy's own testimony, the Chapta

12 coilflict actually arose before fiIis~gthe Chapter 12 and even before Novelnber 13,
1939. The Chapter 12 conflict arose when Bagley became Bryce's creditor while

represellling Bryce in creditor-related work out issues. 111fact; Bagley agrees that lie had
a conflict -for filing the Chapter 12 petition as early as June 28, 1999 because he defrliitely

was one of Bryce's creditors at that tii~~e.~"fnactuality, Bagiey's conflict started as early
as dui~e3, 1999 because Bagley admits that by that time he was '"repxing and
orga~~izing
to file the Chapter 12 petition.'*33
Not 0121y did Bagley have a11 actual conflict as of June 3, 1999 tliat prevented hi111
from preparing and organizing to file the Chapter 12 petition, but Bagley was also
required to disclose to Bryce that 11e worrld have a eo~iffict representing Bryce in a
Chapter 12. Bryce could then decide whether to keep Bagley as counsel lmowi11g that

Bagley would get disqualified after filing the Chapter 12 petition. Bryce testified that
Bagley never disclosed his Chapter 12 conflict, and Bagley presented no evidence to
cor~ttradictBryce's testisliony on this isstre. 111fact, Bagley admits that he did not disclose
the co~~flict
to Bryce belitre he filed the Chapter 12 because he did not even see it.'4
Bryce also testified that he would not hasre used Bagley as his attorney to file the Chapter
12 if Bagley had disclosed to him the corzflict that Bagley would have in the Chapter 12.
29

Bagley Depo., Depo., 54: 12-17.
Erickson Exhibit D-20.
3' Bagiey's Exhibit I .
32
Bagley Depo., 8123-82:5.
33
Bagleq Depo., XO:22-8 1: I .
34
Bagley Depo., X8:7-14.
30

CLOSING BRIEF - Page 13
1: \CLlENTSiBDS\7453\Pleacimgs\0SjCLOSING BRIEF doc

If Bagley had disclosed his conflict, Bryce would not have used Bagley, and Ragleg
would not be elltitfed to any aeomey's fees for preparation of the Chilpter 12 petitior-r.
Tlzis is innpodalt because alhough Bagley is not seekii~gto recover tfrrough Sirius for Iis
attorney" fees fix represeliting Bryce after filing the Chapter 12, the prolnissory note
incltrdes attorney's fees for Bagley's pre-petition Chapter 12 work that he can~lotrecover.
As a matter of lam-, Bagley cannot charge Bryce ablurriey's fees for time periods
that Ire is performing services wider a conflict of interest." Thereibrc. Bagicy iras the
burden to establisli ary attorney's fees he cliarged after the dismissal of the Chapter 11
were both rettsoriable (as explained above) and not incurred under a conflict of interest.
1-Iorvevcr-Bagley has testified that be cainot quantif:~ the ti~liehe spent prepaing and
ol.ganiring to file the Chapter 12 petition.36 Iii fact, Bagley cannot differentiate between
tlic time lie speiit preparing the Cliapter 12 petition and other things that ire was doing.j7
TI-tere-Fore,Bagley camrot satisfy his burden to prove that any of the attorney's lees he
cl-iarged after the disnzissal of the Cfiapter 11 peti'ciotl were reasotlable and not ix~curred
under a co~iflictof interest.

V.

BAGLEU HAD ,4 CONFLICT OF INTEREST AS A GENERAL CREDITOR
TFfAT BEGAN UPON DISMISSAL OF THE CHAPTER 1 I.
Iihile Bagley represented Bryce ill tile Chapter 1I proceedings, Bagley was one

of Bryce's creditors. Bagley did not have a co~rflictduring tile pendency of the Chapter
11 because Bagley's agorrrey's fees were subject to cou1-t approval. Howe~rer,once the
Chapter 1 1 was dismissed. Bagley became a general creditor. Once he becanie a general

35

See p. I0 of Brief in Support; of Motiori for Sut-ptinaryJudgment dated May 9. 2008. alreadl on file w ~ i h
the court.
36
Dagiey Depo.. X0:22-8 1:6.
j i Bagley Depo., 81 :7-14.
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creditor, l-ie had a conflict llnat preverited l-ilm from represellling Bryce in con~~ectiori
wirl-1
the creditor ciaitns that arose against Bryce once the autoniatic stay in the Chapter 1 1 tvns

lilted. After all, Bagley could not be expected to negotiate with himself to work out
pzymerlt of Bryce's debt. This conflict is sepxate and apart from &e conflict o f
preparing

and organizing to iile a Chapter 12 petition that Bagley could nor file or

represent Bryce in after it was fjled.
Bagley has failed in his btlrderi to establish that ariy of the aaorney's fees he
incurred afier the disn~issalof the Chapter 1I petition were incurred for something other
tlix~creditor-related work out issues wlletl~errelated to the Chapter 12 or riot.

Accordingly, Bagley cannot recover any attorney's fees incurred after the Chapter I I
peritio~~
was dislnissed s ~ h i l che had a conilicr of intere~t.~"

VI.

BACLEY ELZD ilNOTHER CONFLICT OF mTERESCI'THAT BEGAN
BEFORE DECEMBER 14,1999 AND GONTNUED UNTIL OCTOBER 12,
1999.
Bagley prepared and filed a motion fbr Katlnleeli Erickson while represerlting

Bryce and wlnile the Ericl~sonswere going through a divorce." The motion soligilt to add
ICatll~leenas a codebtor.'"<atlileen

signed the motion on December 14, 1998.~'

Following his u~lsuccessf~~l
motion, Bagley filed a separate Chapter I1 petition as cou~nsel
for Kathleell while Bagley still represented Bryce and while the Ericltsoas' divorce was
still

Both Bryce and Kathleen weue represented by separate cotu~selin their

divorce acriol-i. Barley represenred Kathleen at least as late as September 27. I 999.43
38

See p. I0 of Brief ia Support of Motio1-t for Sumnary Judgment dated May 9, 2008, already on file will1
tile court.
39 EI.~C~SOII
Exhibit A-35.
Ericlcson Exkkibit A-35.
4' Erickson Exhibit A-35.
42
Ericlison Exhibit B-2.
Erickson Exhibit C-55.

''

"
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Bryce subnlits that just as one aeorney could not represe~~t
both Katlileea a~d.
Bryce in their divorce, Bagley could not represelll: both Kathleen m d Bryce ill two
Cl~apler1 I proceedings addressing propcfiy issues ~ l l ~ eboth
r e Katfnleeti and Bryce were
dividing up tlieir property in the divorce. The fact that Katbleen and Bryce were
represe~ltedby separate coui~seldoes not resolve the conflict because Bagley was
connicteil on tl-horn he could take marclitling orders from: Katl~leen'scounsel or Bryce's
counsel? Bryce subrnits that Bagley co~rldrepresent Qem both at the same time only if
Ratl~Ieenarid Bryce agreed on how to di\.ide their property. In this case, that agreemelit
did not come until ICatkieen signed the Marital Settlelnent Agreement on October 17.

1999. Thus. Bagley had a conflict of interest in represe~~tirmg
both Bryce and Iilatlzleel~
that stated before December 14, 1998 and continued wilil October 12, 1999.
111this case, Bryce testified that be wanted to retain as 1nuc1i of t11e farm and ra~icii
as possible tvliereas Kathleen wanted to cash out. This testimony mused m y potential

cordlict Bagley had to an actual conflict. And Bagley offered no testimony to rebut
Bryce's testimony. In fact, Bagley admitted on cross examinatiori that from day one
there was an issue in the divorce court that Bryce wanted to retain possession of the
fart~iingor ralching operations whereas Kathy did not want to do that, and this is fairly
typicaI.44
Bagley's conduct in representing Rryce and Katl~Xeenwhile the parties were
~ o i n gtlxough a contested divorce constit~~tes
a conflict of iz~terest,Bagley courld no

G

more represent both divorcing parties in bankr~ptcythan lie could represent both
divorcing parties in tlse divorce itself. Both divorce and b
44

Bagley Depo., 172-18:l.
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ptcy involve the divisioil

aitd distribufiion of p r o p e e beblecn the parties and their creditors. The undisp~~ted

evidence at trid proves that Bryce and Kathleen ne~essarityand in fact had adverse

s
by their pending divorce,
ir~tterests.Despite the c o d i c t bet~ieenthe p a ~ i e evidenced
Baplej represented them both,
As ct result of Bagley3 representing both Bryce and K~thfeenin b a k t ~ p t i - ywhile
their divorce was pending, as a matter of law Bagley c m o t recover his aeori~ey'sCees

ct~asgedfrom December 13, 1998 t l ~ o u g hOctober 12. 1999, the period that the col~fiict
exi~ted.~'

1 .

BACLEY' S PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE CAUSED BRYCE DAMAGES.
Judith Shively testified that if Bagley had converted to a Chapter 12 Bagley

would not have needed to file any b

t c j y d l j o n for Katl-tleer~.Bagley charged

Bryce $830 for the cost of filing Iier Chapter 1 1. Judith Shively testified Bagiey's failure
to corivert li.o~iia Chapter 1 1 to a Cliapter 12 was conduct falling below the staridad of
care. Accordi~~gly,
Bryce iricurrrd $830 in damages.

hi addition, Juditli Sl~ivelytestified that Bryce paid $9,750 iri afionley's fees that
First Sec~~rity
Balds charged Bryce for its attorney's fees and costs in the Chapter 11.
Juditfi Sliively testified that Bryce also paid First National Bad< $8,500 for tfie work that
bank did in co~vrectionwith tlie failed CIiapter 1 I proceedirigs. Judith Shively testified
that Bagley's failure to prosecute Bryce's Chapter I 1 restilting in dis~lnissalwas conduct
falling below the sta~idardof care. According'iy, Bryce i~icurredmotl~er$18.250 in

45

See p. I0 of Brief in Support of Motion for Sumn~aryJudgment dated May 9. 2008. already on file with
the csult.
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VlIf,

-WES
BRYCE A CREDIT 0E-$3,000 BECAUSE HE HAD -4
CONFLICT OF XNTEWST THAT PWGLUDED HIS WPESENTING
BRYCE W E CH
.The law is clear that a lawyer eair~otrecover aaorney's fees for services rendered

wl~ilcthe attost-tey lias a co~ifiictof interest. One court, explained,

""

[tlhe refatiorzship of

attosrley and cliezlt is an extremely delicate and fiduciary one . . . . [Clourts jealouslq. hold
[the attorr~ey]to tile utmost good faith in the discliarge of his duty.' Misconduct in
violation of a statute or acts against public policy, or in breach of an aeolxey's liciuciay
v Logan. 656
cluty to his client, rnay support a complcte forfeiture of fees." Cr.a%~ford

S.tV.Zd 360,364 (Term. 1983) (quotation and citation omitted); Gal PcxkDeliverit; inc. v
UkZlcd Parcel Sewice, Ivlc., 52 Cal.App.4ti1 1, 14 (1997) (stating the general rule in

corxflict of irzterest cases that ~v11e1-ean attorney violates Iiis or her ethical duties to a
client, the attorney is not elititled to a fee for his or her services); In re Spanjer Bros ,
Irzc., 191 B.R. 738 jBlutcp.N.D.Il1. 1996) (if a debtor's attonley does not satisfy t11e

disinterestedlzess requiremei~ts,then the banlcruptcy court must deny attorl~eykfees for
the period that the conflict existed).
Wyomilig has aclulowledged the widely accepted rule that an attorney
representing a client under a col-tflictof interest cannot recover attorney's fees during the
period of time the conflict existed. See Sinzpson Performaace Products, fr?c. v. Robert I.1:

Norrz, P.C., 92 P.3d 283,287 (Wyo. 2004) (recognizing the widely accepted rule t11at
forfeiture of attorney's fees iticurred while the lawyer has a conflict of interest is
appropriate)
Moreoi.er. "a client need not prove actual damages in order to obtain forr'eiture of

an attorney's fee for the attorney's breach of fiduciary duty to the client." Burrorv 1.
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rlrce, 997 S.W.Zd 229, 240 (Tx. 1999); J-runk- 11 Bloom, 634 F.Zd 1245 ( 10th.Cir. 1980)

(where a11 attorney represents clie~~ts
with actual existing co~iflictsof interest, the
attorns~r'scompensation may be withheld even ~rllererto damages are sl~ouin).
filere, Bagley has admitted in testimony both at trial and in deposition that Bryce
46

paid Iiizi1$3,000 in cn~mectionwith Bagley's representing Bryce in the Chapter 7 2 case.
it is also urndisputed that tlse b d ~ x p t c tcourt
entered an order dismissi~lgBagley

because as the owner of Sirius lie mas oile of Bryce's creditors and therefore had a
conflict that preveilted him from representing Bryce in the Chapter I? case.47
According1y. Bagley callnot recover atlort1ey.s fees during tlne Cliapter 12 because of his
collflict of interest md therefore owes Bryce a $3,000 credit against any s~rnlsBryce may
owe him tlxough Sirius.
IX.

CONCLUSION,
Bagley tlxougl~Sirius ca~motrecoper 011 the promissory note and security

ngreetn~entbecause it is sprohibited trarssaction.
Wyomitlg law allows Bryce to assert a claim for setoff as a defense even tl~o~rgli
against Bagley.
the statute of limitations has run because Bryce is not seeking a judgnne~~t
Bagley has the burdell to establish that h-is attorney's fees are reasonable. Bagley
has not proven that $28,668 are in fact reasol~abieattorney's fees for the services he
provided in the C11apter I 1 proceedings.
As Bryce's creditor, Bagley clearly had a conflict of interest that prevented him
from representing Bryce in the Chapter 12. Bagley's creditor conflict of ir~terestthat

40

Bagley Depo., 88:25-39:s; Erickson's Exhibit C-58

" Esicksoll Exhibit D- 156-157.
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prevented him fro112 representing Brjce in the C11ap"cr 12 began as early as June 3, 1999
because Uagley then stwed to prepare and orgarizs Bryce's Chapter 12 for filing.

Sepitrate a ~ apart:
d &om Bagley's creditor conflict that prevented him &urn

preparing and organizing the Cfiapter 12 for filing, Bagley had a conflict of interest as a
general creditor that begar-i upon dis~~iissal
o f the Chapter I 1 beca-crse lie charged Bryce ro

reprcsel?.fiBryce in com~ectionwith creditor claims wl~ileBagley himself was a creditor.
Bngley liad a~iotherconflict of i~~terest
that began before December 14, 1999

wtieiz Bagley represented both Bryce and KatNeeri in b a ~ h p t c ywhile they were in a
divorce with separate attorrreys and that conflict colitinued until October 12, 1999 wlien
Bryce and ICatllteen settled their property disputes.
Bryce lzas a daxnage claim against Bagley that he could seek a judgrne~itfor (but
that can only be set oEagaitist any sums owed Bagley) in tlie total arnomt of $19,080 as
follows:
Filing i'ee
Chapter 12 payment
First Security Bank Fees
First Natiolial Bank
'Total:

$830
$3,000
$9,750
$8,500
$19,080

Accordingly, for aI1 the reasons set forth above. Bryce respectfully recjt~eststhat
the court enter judgment

011 Bagley's

claims though Sirius' complaint in the amoulrt of

zero.

RESPECTIVELY SUBMITTED this

day of July. 2008.

McCKil'I'H, SMITH &: ASSOCIATES, PLLC

ttorney for Bryce Ericksoli
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CERTIRICATE OF SERVICE
day of July, 2008, I eitused a me
I HEREBY CERTIFY tinat: on this
md correct copy of the foregoing CLOSING BNEF to be served, by placing the smie
in a scaled envelope and depositing it in the United States Mail, postage prepaid. or 11ai1d
delivery, facsimile transxnission or overnight delivery, addressed to the followir~g:
A. Brt~ceLarson. Esq.
Attorney at Law
1 55 South ?"?~ve.
P.O. Box 6369
Pocatsllo; Idaho 83305-6369
Fax: 473-7602
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S. Mail
FAX
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
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--

Bryan DD.Siiuth, Esq. - 1SB No. 441 1
B. J. Driscoil, Esq. - fSB NO.7010
R~CGKATH,
SMITH tk ASSOCIATES. YLLC
P. 0.
Box 50731
4 14 Shoup Avenue
Idaho Falls, Idabo 83405
Telephone: (208) 524-0731
Telefn: (208) 529-4166
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Attorneys for Defendaint.
Bryce H. Erickson

rr;i TEE DISTRICT COURT OF

SETH fUDIGm

STATE OF fD,WO, IN AND FOR

S LC, a Wyoming Limited
Liability Con~pany,

OF

ComTY OF CARLBou
)

1
\

Plaintiff,
VS.

1
)

Case No. CV-04-283

)
)

DEFENDANT'S CLOSING
mPLYBREEF

)
BRYCE H. EKTCKSON, AND ANY PERSON
1
C L A M m G UNDER BY OK TEROUGH
1
BRYCE E-t. ERICKSON LN
TO
REAL PROPERTY DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS: )

1
CARXEOU COt%TU, IDAGIO:

)

TOV\iNSHP 5 SOUTH, Rlr,hJ'GE 46 E.B.M.,
SECTION 27: LOTS I AND 2, N112
m i 1 4 , EXCEPT T ~ K E F R O M
TKE s YZ
NE1I4 NW ?4 RVII4.

1
1
)

1
1

Defendants.
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I.
"&Anattorney's freedom to con&act with a client is sub-iectto the constrants of
ethical considerations.'" Petit-Clair v. N ~ ~ S O782
F LA.2d
,
960, 962 (N.J. Super. 20611;
citations omitted. "Any transaction between an attorney and client is 'subject to close
scrutiny."Vd. at 962; citations onsitted. ""'An attorney in his relations with a client is
bound to the highest degree of fidelity and good faith. The strongest influences of public

policy require strict adherence to such a role of conduct."' Id, at 962-963; citations
ornitted, "Consequently, an otbemise enforceable agreement between an attorney and
client is invalid 'if it runs afoul of ethical rules governing that relationship.'" Id. at 963;
citations omitted. See ulsa kizlbe?i/5Uf'\4il~enue, L.L. C. IJ. Stewar-d, 153 P.3d 186 (Wash.

3,007){"'Attorney fee agreements that violate applicable rvles of professional conduct are
against public policy and unenforceable").
Accordingly, an attorney fee transaction in which the attorney secures payment
with a pronlissory note and a security interest that violates Rule of Professional Conduct
1.S(a) is void md unenforceable. 1.%111eY/50"~verzue,
L.L. C. v. Siclr,ar.d,supm, 153 P.3d
at 186 (holding that lawyer's note and deed of tmst securing payment of past attorney's
fees are void and unenforceable unless lawyer stringently complies with Rule 1.8(aj; and
Petit-Clail~..Nelso~z,supra. 782 A.2d at 960 (holding that note and mortgage securing

attorney's fees were invalid where the lawyer failed to comply with Rule 1.S(a)),
.

TEE A m O R W Y BEARS
BURDEN OF PROVIPJG FAR-SS,
EQUEY, AND COMPLIANCE Wl'CH RULE 1.8(a,.
'"[A]n attomey-client transaction i prima facie fraudulent..'. ~ n i l e ~ / 5 0Avenue.
'"

L.L.C. v. Steward, supra, 153 P.3d at 190;citations omitted. See also P & hl Enter. 1.:
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&furrat.,680 A.2d 790, (N.J. App. Div+1996) (holding that a ""trmsaction between a
lawyer and client i s presumptively invalici"')).Consequently, '""the

burden of establishing

hirness and equity of tke transactions rests upon the attoxmey."' Peril-Clair v. Nelsorz,

sup~zz,781A.2d at 962-963; cilatioas omitted.
Specifically, "Djhe burden of protying cornpiiar-tcewith Rule of Professiond

Contiuct 1.S rests with the lawyer." ~aliej(50" hwenuc, L.L. C v. Srewjard, supt.ai i53
P.3d at 190. .'[A] lawyer must prove strict compliance with the safeguasds of Rule of

Professional Conduct I .%a); full disclosure, opportunity to consult outside counsel, and
consent must be proved by the coamsunications between the attorney and the client," id.
at t 90. ""The disclosure which accompanies an ilttorney-client transaction must be
co~nplete.Attorneys, to defend their actions, must prove they complied with the
'stringent requirements imposed upon an attorney dealing with his or her client."" Id.
A lawyer seeking to prove compliance with Rule 1.8(a) does not meet his burden
nhere involvement of independent counsel is not meaningiixl. "The burden is upon the

lawyer to demonstrate that a real and meaningful oppor~unityto seek independent counsel
was afforded to the client." lialleY/50'"Avenue, L.L. C. v. Stewad, supra, 153 P.3d at 191.
"Tbe opportunity to seek independent advice must be real and meaningful, It is not
enougl~that at some moment in time an opportunity existed no matter how brief or
fleeting that opporzunity might have been." id. at 190.

at.

RLrLE 1.8iAI APPLES TO ALL SECTIREY INERESTSAND TO AYY
PECUNL4RY fiTERESTADVERSE TO .A CLENT.
By its express terms, Rule 1.8ja) applies to all '%securityinterests" a lawyer

knowingly acquires in his client's property. Although the "adverse" requirement of Rille
1.8(a) applies only to "other pecunixy interests," case law holds that a mortgage on a
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client's property given to the lawyer as sccurity is "kclearlL;' a security tnterest adverse to
the client. Pptli-Clr~irV. hi'e1~01z.S ~

J ~ ~782
L L A.2d
,

at 963. See also In Re: Ta?ilnr, 741

fu' E.2d 1339 (hd. 3001) (holding that a note and security interest in favor of an attorney

in his client's residence to secure the payment of attor~iey'sfees is "an interest in the
client's pproperc) adverse to the client"); and Itz r-e DougEass. 859 A.2d 1069 (D.G. 2004)
(hcrldmg that a note that requires the client to pay money to a lawwyer is quite naturdly

understood as an interest ""adverse" to the interests of the client)

IV, RULE X .8 APPLES TO ALL BUSmESS W N S A C T I O N S (NOT JLTST
SECURRY mTERESTS), AND A BUSLNESS TRANSACTION n'J'CLtTDES A
LAWI%R TAKLNG A NOTE AND SECURTPY m E E S T TO SECURE
P A m E K r OF PAST An0RIVEY.S FEES.
By its express terms, Rule 1.8(a) also applies to all -%businesstr*ansachai-ts"
betwecrz a lawyer and his client. In this regard, a lawyer who takes a security interest in
his client's real property to secure p a p e n t on a note for payment of past attorney's fees

engages in a "business transaction" with the client that invokes the protections of Rule
1.8(a). ~ullc?~i50'"
Avenue, L.L. C. v. St~rval-d,
supra, 151 P.3d at 186. Such ;ul
agreelnent is not a fee agreement between a lawyer and client but in reality an agreemer~t
between a creditor and debtor that rises to a "business transaction" within the meaning of
Rule I.S(ai. Id.

In 1999, Wyoming followed Wyoming Rule of Profcssiond Conduct l.&(a)that
read as folows:
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Rule 3.8. Conflict-of interest: prohibited trarrsaetions
(a) h labvyer. shall not enter into a business transaction with a client or
knowingly acquire an o~rnersh~p,
possessory, security or other pecunizy interesr
adverse to a client unless:

the transaction and terns on wflich the lawyer acquires the
(I)
interest are fair and reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed and
transmitted in writing to the client in a mmner which can be reasonably
understood by the client.:
the client is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the
(2)
advise of independent counsel in the transaction; and
(3)

the client consents in writing thereto.

At trial. Bagley testified that be did not comply with Rule 1.8(a) because he said

his note and mor-tgage were not "aailverse." However, as explGned above, a mortgage on
a client's property to secure the payment of fees is '"clearly" adverse. Petit-Clair v.

Nelsarz, ~upr-a,7811.A.2d at 963. Even jrtst a note payable to the attorney is "quite

naturillly understood" to be an interest "adverse" to the iriterests of the client. Ir7, Re:
Dauglass, sldpra, 859 A.2d at 1082. There is just no question that a note and security
interest in lcavor of an attorney in his client's residence to secure the payment of
attorney's fees is "an interest in the client's property adverse to the client" In Re:
Taylor, sccpru, 74 1 N.E.2d at 1242. Moreover, the note and mortgage Bagley obtained

from Erickson through Sirius was a "business &ansaction" within the meaning of Rule

1.8Caj. See ~alle~y/_~li~"A~ienue,
L.L.C. v. Steward, supr.a. 153 P.3d at 186. i?rccordingly,
Bagley was required to cornply with Rule 1.8(a) and in fact bears the burden of proof at
trial that he did comply with Rule 1.8(a). However. as set forth below. did not comply
with the requirements of Rule 1.8(aj.
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1,

The transaction and terms on which Bagley acquired his interest are nut

fair and reasonhle to Erickson. The Real Estate R'Io~gageErickson signed mortgaged
!72.35acres 10 13agley. This property is hlowri as the 'Desr Creek Propefly'bwith a
stated value on Decen~ber9, 1998 of $Ci88,000%d a stated value on Becen~ber3, 1999
of $603,00~).'The bankmptcy documents stlow only two secured creditors other than the

Sirius note on the Deer Greek P r o p e ~ yat the time Bagley filed the Chapter 12 on
December 3 , 1999.~One creditor was First Security Bank uihose secured claizn in the
Deer Crcek Property was $1 15,000, and the other creditor was lr\iryomingFasm Loan

Board whose secured claim in the Deer Creek Pfoperly was $70.000.' Using the i o ~ ~ e r
$602.000 value for the Deer Creek Property, Bagley obtained at least $417,000 of

unencumbered collateral to secure a note in the amount of $29,173.38.
TI-repicture of Bagley3 over secured position is far worse considering the reality

of the situation. Ln this regard, Erickson had assigned a $97,000 receivable to First
Security Bank ufbo was applying the $97.000 receivable to pay off its $1 15,000 claim."
Giving credit for this $97.000 receivable increases Bagley's over secured position to

$5 14,000 on the $29,173.38 note. Even worse, the total value of Erickson's real property
mias $1.3 million in which First Security Bank and Wyoming F m Loan Board d s o held
security for their $1 15.000 and $70.000 claims r e ~ ~ e c d v eThis
l ~ . means
~
that once First
Security Bank and MTyoming Farm. Loan Board were paid from the other properties sold

in the Chapter 12, Eagley would be the lone remaining secured creditor with security

See Ragley Exhrbrt 2

' See Errchson Exhtb~tPI-27
See EricE.son Exhblt D-30

' See Erickson E x h ~ b D-36
~t
"ee Errckson Exiubrt D-36
See Enckson Exhbit D-32 and 35
See Enckson E x l b ~D-30
t
and 36.
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valued at $602,000 for his $29,173.38 rrote thus m&ng Bagley over secured hy as much
as $572,000.And, in fact, Baglcy adnnits in his closing brief that "[rilo other party with a
pi-iority greater than the Plaintiff has claimed an interest in the real propen!. that is the
st~b~ject
to this

action""

-ti\fee agcernent between a Lawyer and a client, revised after the relationship has
becn eslabIrshed on terms more &rrorable to the laviryer than originally agreed upon may

be void or vo~clableunless the attorney shows that the contract was fair and reasonable,

free from ~rndue~nfluence,and made after a fair and full disclosure of the facts on which
it is predicated." ~ h l i e ~ / 5 0Aveizldc,
"'
L.L. C

I.

Stenfar-d,siipm, 153 P.3d at 18 9 A

mortgage to secure a note for past attorney's fees has been found to be unfair and
unreasonable where it expands a clicnt's liability far beyond the terms the lawyer and
client originally agreed to. Petif-Clair r.. ,nietsorz, supra, 782 A.2d at 960 (finding that
i~ldependcntcounsel may have convinced the client not to execute the mortgage securing

a note for past attorney's fees where the original debt was owed by corporations, not
individual clients personally).
Here, the original agreement with Bagley was that Erickson was to pay him $140
per hour plus costs. The original agreement did not include any terms for security. The
origi~ialagreement certainly did not include giving Bagley a security interest over
securing Bagiey between $417,000 and $572.000. ittny independent lawyer not wanting
to c o r n i t malpractice would have advised Erickson not to pledge his entire 172 acre

farm with a net equity tia2ue between $417,000 arid $272.008 to secure Bagley's
$29.173.28 note. Erickson submits that such an over secured position heavily in favor of
Bagley is ne~therfair nor reasonable to Eriekson.
See Bagiey's Closing Brief p., 3.
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I;.

Bagley did not -Fully disclose the transaction and terms in writing to

Erickson at dl lei alone in a rnallner Ericksnn could reasonably understand. The only

dosurnents that contain the transaction md ierrns are the note and mortgage Er~ckson
signed. Bagley was unable to identify any sepzate writing fully disclosing the
cransactron and the tezms to Erickson that he could then consent to as Rule 1.8(a)
requlrcs. Ir? re Eslale yfBrowrt, 930 A.2d 249, 253 (U.C. 2007);XFZ re SrepFzerzs, 851
N . E . 2 cl256. 1258 (hd.2006); Lntr~er.Discipliaar~yBoard v. Burl7er. 566 S.E.2d 245,
251 (%l.Va. 200111; and fitter ofCf.tal3"oos, 183 B.R. 131, 136-137 (Bankr.E.D. h'iich.
1994).

3.

Bagley did not give Erickson a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice

sf independent counsel. These was no evidence at trial that Bagley gave Eriekson a

reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent counsel. As explkned above.
Ragley hears the bm-den of proving his compliance with Rule 18(a). iiuliev/5dhAvenue,

L.L.C. .il. Sfentar-d,smpr.a, 153 P.3d at 186. Although Bagiey testified that Erickson had a
dlr~orcelawyer who included the debt to Bagley in the Marriage Settlenient Agree~xnt,
there was no evidence that Erickson ever had the opportunity to seek the advice of the
divorce lawyer with regard to the transaction. In fact, the Decree of Divorce was entered
on October 19, 1999.~But Erickson signed the promissory note and mortgage on

'" Therefore. by the time Erickson signed the promissory nore and

Novenlber 13, 1999.

mortgage. the divorce case was concluded. Bagley failed in his burden to present any
evadence that the prorrrissory note and mortgage were even in existence during the

divorce for Ericksorr's divorce attorney to review to provide advice on.

lo

See Bagley Exhibit 6.
See BagIey Exhibits 1 and 2
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Eriekson did not consent m writing to the terms of the trmsacrion. 77ne

only written consent Bagley could point

m is the Mmiage Settlement Agreement the

liivorcc lawyers prepared and that Bryce signed on September 13. 199'1." Kowc~es,
Nagley admits that the Mxriagc Settlement hgree~x~ent
contains none of the terms of the

transact1011 and specifically does not even identifj, the property in which Bagley would
claim a secunty interest "Ihrotxph Sirius. Given these facts. Bagley cannot rxteet his burden
of proving "strict con~pliar~ce
with the safeguards o f Rule of Professional Condx~et

1.&i
a)." lfciliev~5!)'"Aveiluc, L.L. C.

ij.

S i ~ ~ l i l rsupra,
d.
153 P.3d at I 90.

Moreover, Erickson submits that Erickson's simply affixing his name to tlie
hilarriage Settlement Agreemeni that references the debt to Bagley is not "ijiformed
consent" just as r-rrerely srgnirtg 3 listing agreement is insufficient to show a client's
z,
930 h.3d at 249) and merely
"~nforniedconsent" in ~ ~ r i t i n(112
g I-e E.stare o f B r o ~ ~ rsupra.

signing a check is insufficient to show a clierxt's "'inkrmed consent" in writing. Lawyer

Discipliiz~ryBoard

VI.

Barber., supru. 566 S.E.2d at 245.

is.

ERICMSON WAS FOUND TiVO GASES THAT HAVE ADDRESSED THE
VERY ISSUE P W S E N E D HERE AhTD BOTH HOLD THAT A N O E AND
SECURJTY A LPIWYER OBTAZNS I
DVIOLATION OF RLJLE 1.8 ARE NOT
ENFORCEABLE.
,4t least two COUI?~ have held that a note and secuiity agreement to secure payment

of attor~~ey's
fees cor-tsijtute a ""business utra~isaction"a d or "security interest" subjecting the
lawyer to the mandatory prinkions of Rule 1.8(ai. In ~ a l l c ~ / 5 0Averzue,
"'
L.L. C. tl. Sfewar-t,
suprPa,153 P.3d at 180, the Supreme Court oSMrashington retiewed a secured transaction

between a firm

its client. 'The firm required the client to sign a promissory note and

deed of trust as: security for past attorney's fees. At the time they entered the agreement. the
*,

" See Bagley Exhibit 3.
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clicnt owed the firm $1 60,000.W. After the client dehulted, the fim sought to foreclose on
the deed of mst. In its defense, the client agued tS_lli;l the semrity ageement was
unenforceabfcbecause the attorney obtained i t in violatron of Rule 1.8ia). The trral court
and court of appeals ruled that the dleged violalion of Rule 1.8(a) did not render the security

agreement unenforceable. However, The Supreme Court of %Tashington reversed both thc
trial court and court of appeals, reaoning as foltows:

The deed of trust [i.e., the security a g e e m n t ] at issue in this case
has the character of a busirzess lrarrsactio~zbetweerz a kaw$m arzd its
elierzt. Though described as a fee a p e m e n t by the Erm, it was, in fact,
relevant to a sigfzificarzfexish'lzg debt. . . . The relationshp was rzot nzerelj
atlorfzey-clittlzt;it was also credifar-debtor. . . . [Ift was in reality m
agreement between a creditor and a debtor. Furthermore, the fee ageenneni
entailed tlze corzveyarzce oJla securig irzteresf irz llze clierzt's propem, a
tr-arzsactiorz absent safeguards specifically pmhihited by RPC 1.814.
Finall), we note the Firm advised its ow11client on a method of paying the
debt owed to it--a rrzet-lzad a disirzterested altorrzey might rzaf have
erzeouraged.

(Emphasis added.)
Concluding that "the note and deed of trust was more Like a business transaction than
a fee agreement," the lialley court applied the mandatov requirements of Rule 1.8(a).
knportantly, the Iklley court never questioned whether the security interest was "adverse."
Rathes, the court focused on the "character" of the security agreement and the "ereditordebtor" I-elationskipbetween the pasties concluding that the lawyer had entered into a
"'business trmsactc&on'"requiring compliance with Rule 1&a).

Ln Pelif-Glail-v. filson. sup!-a. 782 A.2d at 960 (N.J. 2001). the Pjew Jersey
appellate caurt held that a lawyer's mortgage on the client's residence constituted a securi~y
interest under Rule 1.8(a). The court explained, "'"[A]nattorney's freedom to contract with
a client is subject to the constraints of ethcal considerations' and the Supreme Coua's
supenision." id.at 962. The Petit-Clnir court continued, '"[Aln attorney in his relations
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with a client is bound to the highest degrec of fidelity m d good faith. The strongest
iniruences of public policy require strict adherence to such a role of conduct. Consequentl>r,
an olher#ise enfc~rceabfeagreement between an attorney and client 1s invalid 'if it mns afoul

of e t h c d rules governing that relationsEp. "' I;% at 963 (quolalions onitted]. In concluding
that tine lawyer-had violated Ruje 1.8ia), the coux-t noted, "By its very terns, [Rule 1.8(a)] is
nlandator-y'" unless a lawyer follows the provisions of Ruie 1.8ia~.Ici. at 963. Based on
these obsex~adons,the court held, 'Xere, it is clear that defendants' mortgage on their
personal rcs~dencegiven to plintiff [attorney] was a 'security . . . interest adverse to [the
defendants] . . .'" Id. Because the lawyer could not prove compliance with Rule 1 .%a). the
court heid that the note and security agr.eement were unenforceable.
The Valley and Petii-Clazr cases are strikingly similar to this case. Just like thrs

case, both Valley and Petit-Clair involve a11 atrorne?'~obtaining a promissoq note and a
mofigagc/=/dcedof tsust from their clients as vehicles to secure the palnlent of past attorney's
fees. Just like this case, both Valley and Petit-Clatr involve the Issue of whether the
attorney could foreclose on their respective clients' real property. Just like this case, the
lawyers it1 both Valley asld Petit-Clair did not comply with the requirements of Rule I.?,(&.
Just as the couvts m both Valley and Petit-Clair*hold that the pronnissor?; notes and mortgage
and deed of trust constituted a "business transaetiodsecurity interest" within the meaning of
Ruie 1.8:a). this court should rule that Bagley's note and mortgage he obtained through
Skius constltitte a "'business trulsactionisecuriQ interest" within the meaning of Rule 1.$(a).

And just as the courts in both Valley md Petit-C'ktir.hold that the attorneys' f'arlur-eto

conlply uith Rule 1.8!a) rendered the promissow notes and mortgage and deed of m s t
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tn~altlidand unenforceable, this court too should rule that Bagiey's failure to comply waih
Rufc 1.8(a,1renders the prorrnissory note and moagage invalid and unenforcerible.

Vfl'

R BY WAY OF HIS O

W SLaMARY J U D G m K OR

OPPOSmG BAGLEY3 S U - M M U JUDGmNT.
Bagley raises many legal issues the p;trties have already responded to m their cross
judgment. Rather than recite all the legal authority Erickson has

L
W

;tiready proa~idedthe court, Eiickson will simply identi@ the issue, provide a s u m a r y
response, and refer the court: to Erickson's briefing that already addresses the issue.
Bagley claims be is not a party to the action and therefore has nor had a full

1.

and fair opportnniy to litigate issues. Bagley further claim the court has no jurisdiction
over ivln thereby deprivrng him of due process including a jury trial. Bagley's ar-gument

misses the point that Erikson has not sued Bagley, and Erickson seeks no affirmative reLief
against Bagley. Certainly, due process would require personal jurisdiction over Bagley if
El-ickson sought some affirmative relief (like a judgment) against Bagley. But Erickson is
awase of no law that be c m ~ oassert
t
an aff~mativedefense unless the court has person&
jurisdiction over Bagley, who. by the way, appeared at trial and testified in kis own behalf,
u ~ b oappeared for deposition, and who responded to interrogatories, etc.. Therefore, it is
disingenuous for Bagley to e l a h that he has not had a full and fair opportunity to litigate
issues." Finally, Bagley is not entitled to a jury trial in this equitable foreclosure action that
he caused Sirius to file.

In fact. Erickson sought a jury trial early on in the case and Bagiey

tbough Sirius objected.

-.7

Bagley clain~sthat the Idaho Supreme Court has already ruled (therefore

making it the Iaw of the case) that adequate considerahon exists for the promissory note.
12

Errcksun's Brief

In

Opposiuon to Bagley's Mot~onfor Summary Judgment. p. 4.
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This is simply a distortion of the Supreme Court's holding. The Supreme Court held that

consideration need nor come from Sirius but that S m u could "borrow" or "rely" on
consideration from Bagley Jibe Supreme Court: speci5cally remmded the case for this
court to test the adequacy and sufficiency of the consideration that Bagley "loaned"' to
Sirius. This court 1s well aware of the ""footnote" the Supreme Court inserted in its opinion
that references this very issue.'"

3.

Bagley claims that "the B m h p t c y court directed the Debtaddefendant to

file an adversay proceeding to avoid the lien of the moagage."

l4

Bagley's a ~ u r n e nis
t

that this "'direct~ve"operates with res j u d i c a i ~effect
~
to bar E~icksonfrom raising his
defenses in the present case because Erichson did not file an adversary proceeding.
Ho~lever,Bagley's argunient ignores the facts and reality of the case. Erickson objected
to Bagley's lien. The court overruled the ob-jeetion stating "if mortgage lien is a
preference, the debtor must file an adversary if he wants to avoid the lien."I5 This
language does "direct" Erickson "to file an adversary proceeding to avoid the lien of the
mortgage." Also. the court's ruling does not resolve the substantive issue on its merits
and is not a -'final judgment"; therefore, it cannot have any res judicata effect.16
Moreover, before Erickson's time to file an adversary complaint had even run
(before the court entered the discharge order), Bagley filed this case in Caribou County.
Aware of this action pending in Caribou County, and as part of the discharge order, the
bankruptcy court specifically ordered that Erichson is discharged from all debts except
"the Sirius claim with a latvsuit pending In the District Court of the Sixth Judicial Distrlict

Er~rksun'sBrtef ;n Opposrt~onto Bagley's Moiron for S u m a r y Judgment, pp 3-4.

I3
14

Bagley's Closing Argument, p., 16.

'' Bagiey's Exhlb~t18.

'%rickson's Brlef rn Op2osrQonLO Bagiey's Motlon for Summary Judgment. pp. 5-6.
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of tile State of Idaho, in and for the County of 6uibou."" "7 other words, the b a n h ~ p t c y

cottrr recognized the jurisdiction of tbls court to resolve the Issues in this case and
spccific~~ll~
made provision in ~ t order
s
thus m&ng this case the equivalent of an

adbersxy proceeding. If the bankruptcy court beliesed Bagley" argument, then the
banhuptcy cowl would have ruled that this cclurt does 1s without jurlsdictiun because
Erickson had not filed an adversary proceeding: instead, the b a n h p t c y court ruled that
this court is to declde the very issues it 1s litigating.

18

Bagiey seems to claim that an adversary proceeding -Falls within a 'nankrtrptcy
cottrt's "core" jurisdiction and therefore falls w~thinthe b a n b ~ p r c ycourt's "exclus~ve''
jurisdiction. I-Xowever. "core" jurisdiction is not "exclusive"' jurisdiction as Bagley
suggests. See, e.g., Nol~kinsis.PEav~thsul'ai-ion Co.. 349 B.R. 805 (N.B.Gal.2006).
-'Bankruptcy judges nzuy hear and determine all cases under title I 1 and all core
proceedrngs arising under title 1I." 28 U.S.C. 157jb); emphasis added. Under the
express language of the statate, the banhuptcy court's "core" jurisdiction is
discx-etioniu-y,not "exclusive." Therefore. the bmhuptcy court was correct when it
ordered that Erickson's discharge order is subject to this action that the bankruptcy court
specificdrlly referenced as the fomm to decide the issues challenging the validity of the
note and mortgage.
4.

Bagley's claim that the rx~lesof res judicata and/or judicial estoppel bas

Erickson's litigating Bagiey's wrongful conduct is misguided. Bagley claims Er~ckson
never disclosed kis malpractice claim against Bagley in the b x h p t c y court groceeding:
therefore, Erickson cannot raise it now in this proceeding. Bagley is wrong on at least two

i7

Errckson's Exhibrt "F."

'' Enckson's Bnef ~nOppos~tronto &agle)'s

Motion for Summary Juogment, pp., 5-6.
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levels. first, E~lcksondid object to Bagley's note and rnorlgage &clangthe court to review

Bag1ey.s fees he claims be mcuned in the Chapter 11. Olhem1ise. the b
never livould have specificdly included the outcome of thts case zn ~ t discbxse
s
order.
Thex-efc)re,Erlckson did JiscIose by way of objection I-us challenge to the S~riusnote and
mortgage. Second, Ericksun is not anenriptin:: to assert an affirmative c I m aga~nstBagley
to recover soxnerhing from Bagley. Enckson ts rdising Bagiey's malpractice as an
affimlative defense ar~dset off to the claim at issue here. Bagiey bas cited n3 law that a

defertdant cannot raise a clam of set off ~fthat defendant did not first iist the clam1 as an

asset m the defendant's prior hanhptcy. For these reaqons, the law of I - ejl~dicata
~
andior
judrcrd estoppel Bagley relies on does not apply.

5.

Baglea seems to suggest that Erickson c~mnotraise Bagley's wrongful

conduct 111conncctioa v\lith its set off defense against the Sirius note. However, the Idaho
Suprenie Court's opimon did not rule that consideration from Bagley to Srriils was not
subject to chaljenge. In fact, the Idaho Supreme Court held that "'while Erickson received
consideration far the note [Bagley's services]. we do not opine as to the adequacy of the
consideration.'Tks statement together with the Supreme Cour-t's remand for thrs court to
conslder Erickson's affirniative defenses opens the door to Ericlcson's challenging the
adequacy or sufficiency of the consideration for the note, i.e., the adequacy or sufficiency of
Bagley' s sen lees.19
Obviously, Erickson nxst be allowed to challenge Bagley's services; otheuu~ise,any
de~iousind~vldudcould provide no consideration for a note or any contract (perhaps even
eggaging :n fraud) and avoid legal consequences (like defenses to the contract) amply by
shrewdly conduct~ngthe transaction through legal entities. For example, m rhis case,
Errckson's Reply Brlef ~n Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, pp.. 3-4.
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Bagley breached his f i d u c i q duty when he ttid not cornply with Rule I.& a). Bagley

st~ouldnot be able to insulate hl~xselffrom the legal effects of his wrongkl conduct simply
by using hrs fiduclcq status to causc Erickson to sign a p r o ~ s s o r ynote with Sirius i a
Iir~liitedliability conipmy that Bagley owns) rather then with Bagley persondly.

6.

Bagley ciainns that Er~cksonhas agreed that plaindff has proven its case as to

the "vahdity of the note and morrgage.772%s

i s not true. Elickson stipulated at trial that

Baglet wins this case unless one of Erickson's affimative defenses applies. Stated
differently, Eriekson agrees that he signed the note, 17ie agrees to the mount of the note, he
agrees he bas paid n o t ~ n gon the note, etc. In other words, Erickson agrees that Bagley has

proven h i s case but that his case is subject to Erickson's affmative defenses. This
stipulatjon is not lfie same as Bagley's characterization that Erickson stipulates as to tile
"validity of tfie note and mortgage."

.

CONCLUSION.
For af1 the reasons stated above and in Erickson's Closing Brief and tlis Reply

Brief, Erickson respectfully requests that this court find the note and mortgage
unenfo~eable.

RtSPECTRELY S U B M m D this

/ dzy of August. 2008
Bryan D. Smith
Attorney for Bryce Erickson

LLI

aaglej's Closing Argument. p.. 9.
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I BEREBY CERTFU that on this
day of August. 2008,T caused a true
and correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANT'S CLOSING m P L Y BmEF to be
served. by placlrzg the same in a sealed envelope and depositing it in the United States
Marl, postage prepaid, or hand delivery, facsimile transmission or-overnight delwery,
addressed to the foliowmg:
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A. Bruce Larsan, Esq.
Attorney lit Law
15"Foouth z~~Ave.
P.O. Box 6309
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Bryan D. Smith
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1
1

PlaintifX;

1

1
1
1

1%.

BRYCE i-I. ERICKSON. AND ANY
PERSON CLAlMTNG BY OR THROUGH )
BRYCE ERIKSON If\l AND TO TRE
1
WAL PROPERTY DESCHBED AS
1
FOLLOW";
)

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
MEMORAiWUM DECISION
AIND O W E R

CLZRX130U COUNTY, IDAHO:

1

T07YvnTSHIP5 SOUTH, RANGE 46 E.B.M. )
SECTIOfu': 27,LOTS I AND 2,N "/2 NW 54 )
EXCEPT THEEFROM THE S ?4 NE 54 )
NW %NNW %,
1
Defendas~ts.
1

THE MATTER BEPORE THE COURT:
This case comes before the Court on Plaintifrs complaint to foreclose on property
Located within Caribou County. This Court's prior decision in this matter was affirmed in

part and vacated in part and remanded from the Idaho Supreme Court saying
consideration was given for the note (although the Supreme Court declined to answer
v,ihether it was adequate), and the case was remanded as to the issue of the affirmative
defenses of the Defendant. Defendant argues the property should not be deemed as
Plaintias because the transaction transferring the property to Mr. BagIey was prohibited,
unlawfu1, and void under Wyoming law. Defendant argues that he ma). raise the setoff
defense as to Mr. Bagley's wrorigfiil conduct. Furthermore Defendant contends that

Fhdings of Fact and Conclusions of
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PlaintiE l~asfailed to prove the m o u n t Mr. Bagicy charged Defendant was reasonable
and his conflict of interest in representing both Defendant and his wife ixz a b

despite a pendit~gdivorce prevented chargeable representation of Defendant,
In response, Plaintiff argues that the property was properly transfened to him as
consideraion for legal work perfor~nedon bel-talf of D e f e n d a ~and then the properly was
properly transfened to them. PLaintiflf argues they have conclusively proven their case

and the claims and defenses raised by Defendant are inapplicable here because they are
based on Mr. Bagiey's conduct whicli was not at issue here or fails on the grounds of res
judicata. PIaitltiff further argues no conflict existed because Defendant and his wife had
sepasate counsel representing them in the divorce proceedings, both parties had the same
goals in the bankruptcy proceedings, and the representation of Defendad was not adverse
to 11im.

This Court agrees with Plaintiff and finds that the property in question is subject
to foreclosure and Defendant is obligated to pay the full m o u n t of the note plus interest
and attor~iey'sfees as provided in the note and mortgage.

FINDINGS OF FACT:
I . The Plaintiff Sirius LC is a Wyoming limited liability company and at ail material
times pertinent to tbis action has been in good standing with the state of
Wyoming.
2. Mr. Baglsy is not a nasned party to tbis action.

3. At all times relevant to this action William Bagley and his wife are the sole

owners of Sirius, LC.
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4. At all times relevant to this action, Mr. Bagley is an aBomey licensed to practice
law in %Tyo~ning.

5. 'I'hc Defendant Bryce H. E r i ~ k s owas
~ i a resident of Stillwater, Oklahoma on the
date this action was filed and at various times pertinent to this action the
Defendant Bryce H. Erickson has been a resident of the state of Mryoming.

6. XR October 1998, Mr. Erickson was dirrorcing his wife, Kathleen Erickson.
7. Mr. Erickson began an attorney client relationstlip with Mr. Bagley in Wyoming
in October of 1998, procuring his sewices for representation in b a h u p t c y
proceedings.

8. Mr. Erickson first retained Mr. Bagiey to represent him in a Chapter 1 1
barikruptcy.

9. Mr. Erickson again approached Mr. Bagley and requested representation for a
Chapter 12 bankruptcy proceeding.

10. Mr. BagIey agreed to represent Mr. Erickson provided he sign a promissoy note
payable to Sirius LC in the amount of $29,173.38 to be secured by a mo&gage on
real property owned by Erickson in Caribou County, Idaho.
1 1. Mr. Bagley asserted $29.173.3 8 was the amount of overdue Iegal fees Mr.
Ericlcson owed for his services in the Chapter 1 1 proceedings.

12. Mr. Erickson did not retain independent counsel as to whether he should sign the
note however he did have his divorce attorney review the fees.

13. That on or about November 13, 1999 Mr. Erickson, while residing ixi rhe state of
Wyorning, executed and delivered to the Plaintiff a ""Pomissorgi Note" payable to
Sirius,

provided. '"[flor value received, the undersigned Bryce H. Erickson
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promises to pay to SIHUS LC ... the sum of Twenty Nine Thousand One
Hundred Seventy Three Dollass aid Thirty Eight Cents ($29, 173.38j bearing

109.6 interest due arid payable on June 1,2001"'
14. Irzterest is calculated through September 30, 2008 as: $33,173 3 8 x .f 0 =
$2,917.34 i~iterestper year i365 = 7.9927 per day. $2,917.34 x 8 (eight years
1 liZ31'1999 through 11/12/2007) = $23,338.72. $7.9927 x 349 days (1 1/13/2008
through 09/30,'2008) = $2,789.45. Total interest accrued through 9/30/2008 =
$26,128.17.
Z 5. On or about November 13, 1999 tile D e f e n d a ~Bryce H. Erickson executed and

delivered to the Plaintiff a ""Real Estate Mortgage" securing the note with real
property located in Caribou County. Idaho which i s more paflicularly described
as: Towrlship 5 South, Range 46EBM, Section 27: Lots 1 and 2, N1/2NW1/4
except therefrom the S 1I4NE 1i4NW 1l4NW 114.

16. Thereafter, Mr. Bagley did file a Chapter 2Qroceeding on behalf ofiliifr. Ericltson
in Wyoming.

17. Tlie note became due and payable on June 1,200 1.
18. Defendant has not paid the amounts due and owing oil the note.

19. The note and mortgage provide that the Defendant "agrees to pay all expenses of
collection including a reaso~abteattorney-s fee".

20. The P1ailzti-f-i."
filed a Co~npltrintforfireclosure on September 3: 2004 and also
recorded a i'biotice cfLis Pendens in Caribou County on September 7, 2004.
Recorded as Instrument Number 171823.
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2 1. No other party with a higher priority or security interest in the described property

Iias claimed title or an interest to the properly involved in this action.

32. There are real propeey taxes accruing on the real property for the year 2008
together with real property taxes, penalties and interest which have not been paid
from prior years.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
1. This action was brougfit to foreclose a mortgage on real property located in
Caribou County, Idaho, the Court therefore has jurisdiction over this action under
the provisions of Idaho Code section 6- 10 1 et seq. and other applicable provisions
of Idalzo Code.

2. Venue is proper in Caribou County, Idaho pursuant to Idaho Code section 540113) wl~ichprovides that actions for the foreclosure of real property shall be
brought in the couxity in whicli the real property is located.
3. No conflict of interest existed i11 Mr. Bagley representing both Mr. Erickson and

his wife in the bankruptcy proceeding despite their pending divorce.
4. Judith SXiively though qualified as an expert witness, is also an interested witness
as she represented Defendant and therefore is not an independent expert. The
Court will weigh her testimony accordingly. See IRE 702, 703 and LTaitedStates
v. Greenwood. 796 F.2d 49 ( 4 ' k i r . 1986).

5. The note is valid with a principal balance of $29,173.38 together with interest
accruing tl~sreonfrom November 13, 1399 at the rate of 10% per amurn until the
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date of jtidgment herein with interest accrriing thereafter at the statutory interest
rate for judg~nentsin the m~outstof 10% per an~ium.

6. Interest which has accnted on the note through September 30,3008 i s equal to the
sum of$26,128.17 and will continue to accrue in the alnoutlt of $7.9927 per day
until the date of judgme~itand will continue to accrue thereafter at the rate of 10%

per m u m until paid.

7. The rnortgage is a valid lien upon the real property described above.
8. Judgment is entered providing that the mortgage is hereby foreclosed and the

proper?y encrmbered thereby sold at a foreclosure sale in the malxier by
applicable law, with the proceeds thereof applied on the judgment. attorney's fees
arid costs, and sue11 additional amounts as Plaintiff can prove was advanced -for
taxes and other items as may constitute liens against the property together with
insurarice and repairs necessasy to prevent impairment of the security, together
with interest tilereon fkorn the date of the advancement.

9. PlaintifPs lien as evidenced by the mortgage is forever foreclosed.
LO. As to the claims raised the Court finds the following:
a. Urhether the consideration given for the promissory note is adequate?
This Court believes that the legal work perfonned in behalf of Mr.
Erickson is adepate to support the promissory note executed to Mr. Bagley.
This conciusion is supported by the facts showing that Mr. Bagley did
perform legal work on behalf of Mr. Eriekson. Mr. Bagley filed the Cha;?ter
Z 1 on behalf of Mr. Eriekson. This entailed meeting with the client,

conducting an inverltory of assets. and filing scores of documents with the
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bankruptcy court. JDef,'s exhibit A) Mr. Erickson voluntarily signed the
promissov tiole w i ~ o uduress
t
or coercion. (Erickson Bep. 25 :10-25,26:1-4)

He did nut meet the burden of' proving the note was signed under duress or
coercion. Pittard v. Great takes Avialiorz, 156 P3d. 964, TVYSC 05-320042407 12007)- Goodr~arzv. Lofhrop, I43 Idalio 622, (2006) (citing) Enjgires

Refineries v. Jones, 69 Idaho 335,339 (1949). Mr, Erickson had the ability to
seek illdependent advice as to owhher he should sign thc note or not. EIe did
not elaim that the amount was excessive at that time, but rather to the contrary
""At that time I trusted h4r. Bagiey 100 percent." (Erickson Dep. 25: 10-25,

76:1-4). He did have indepe~~dent
counsel review tlie fees in the divorce
property settlemerzt agreement he entered into with his wife where he assuri~ed
a l the debt responsibility for the legal charges. h4r. Erickson has not filed a
con~pfaintwith the Wyorning Bar Association in regards to the legal charges.

Mr. Erickson did file a motion in his chapter 12 bankntptcy case which
challenged the prornissorq. note and the security of the mortgage. That motion
was denied. Mr. Erickson failed to take the opportunity to file an adverse
action against Mr. Bagley in Badsdptcy Court where jurisdiction is proper for
sucfi claims as raised by Mr. Erickson's affirmative defenses. See 28 U.S.C. 5

157. Also IB re S'udiarnwk, 163. F3d 925. 330-32 (5'" Cir. 1999).
In short, Mr. Erickson has never properly challenged the promissory note
nor the securing mortgage in accordance with the rules of procedure. Nosv that

the statute of limitations has lapsed where jrvisdiction is proper to brillg
malpractice claims, this backdoos attempt at such has been Sled. The C o ~ r t
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feels that the consideration is adequate and Defendant coi~sentedto the
adequacy thereof in signing tile note and not properly making any chdlenges

to the adequacy prior to this action.
b. Whether the affirmatirre defenses a s s e & e a D e f e n d a i t make the
?

The Court will not recognize affirmative defenses which ase not properly
brought before it against parties in interest within a reasonable time. See 1RCP
17(a). In this case h1Ir. Bagley has not been named a party to this action which
has been pending now for nearly four years. The Supreme Court brought

home the fact that Sirius is a party to this action and not a third party
beneficiary. As Sirius is a separate legal entity from Mr. Bagley this Court is
obligated to consider only those defenses applicable to the parties named in
the action.

Defendar-tts have not claimed that the corporate veil sl~ouldbe pierced in
this case. It is irnplied that because Sirius is a closely held corporation owned
by Mr. Bagley and his wife that the affirmative defenses involving Mr. Bagley

should be construed against Sirius. It is not enough to show a close
relationship between the corporation and the individual, there must also be
proved harm or a likelihood of h m . Baker v. Kulciyk, 1 12 Idaho 4t 7. (Idaho
App. 1987). Here, there is no evidence that the corporation was formed
~~rithout
adequate initial capita1 or created to evaded honest obligations. There
has been no evidence presented thaeirius is an alter ego of the Bagieys and
therehre there are no grounds on u"i.,ich to pierce the veil of the legal entity of
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Sirius. There is no evidence presented that harm would result in this case
because the note was supported by adequate cctnsideration. Therefore the
affirniative defenses irivoltring Mr, Bagley's conduct, ~rhetberurongful or
not, are not applicable here. Had the Defendant impleaded Mr. Bagley his

actions could be properly considered. It is weti settled Law in Idaho that a

cross-cornplail is restricted to matters which are related to or depend upon
the contract or transaction upon which the main case is founded. or affect the
property to which the action relates. Hulfier v Porier, I O Idaho 72, (Idaho
t 9041, C.L T Carp. v. Elliott, 66 Idaho 384, (Xdd~o19451, See afso; Beco

Ctirp. v. Roberts & Sons Const. C'o.,Jnc., 1 14 Idafio 704, (Idaho 1988).
Defendar~tfails to raise any valid defense to Sirius' ownership of the note as a
result of Sirius' tvrongful conduct. Therefore the Court must find ownership
rigkfully belonging to Sirius.

In the alternative, this Court feels that the defenses raised by Defendant do
not negate the Plair~tifFsrights to enforce the note and the underlying
mortgage security due to a lack of evidence.

6.

m7bethera conflict of interest existed as to Mr. Banlev's re~resentingboth
Mr. and Mrs. Erickson?
Dekndant claims a conflict of interest in representing both Defendant and
uptcy despite a pending divorce prevented chargeable

representation of Defendant. These defenses fail 3s Mr. and Mrs. Erickson
were still married when the Chapter 1 1 work was performed. Both of them
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agreed to the representation by Mr. Bagley because .they shared a common
goal, and each had independent legal counsel representing them in the divorce

proceedings. Therefore there W

no conflict.

~ S

d,

Initially tile burden of proof does lie on the anorney as to the reasonableness

of his fees Jarrtzan v. Hale, 122 Idaho 952, (Idaho App. 1992) Once this has
been s h o w ~the
i ~ burden of proving that the fees shouId not be paid lies with
the party clairnilig the affirmative defense thereto. nonzas v. Arkoash
Produce, I m , 137 Idaho 352, (Idaho 2002). Mr. Erickson claims that because

Mr. Bagley cannot produce an itemized billing statemeld reflecting the
specifics of the legal charges they are not reasonable. Defendant aIso claims
that he may raise the setoff defense as to Mr. Bagfey's wrongful conduct.
Elowever. as discussed above, the facts slzow that Mr. Bagley did perform
extensive legal work on behalf of Mr. Erickson by filing the Chapter 1 I . This
elltailed meeting -4th t11e client, conducting an inventow of assets, and filing
scores of documents wit11 the ba&uptcy court. (Def.'s exhibit A) Mr.
Erickson voluntarily signed the promissory note without duress or coercion.
(Ericksoil Dep. 25: 10-25, 26: 1-4) This seems to indicate that Mr. Erickson felt
that the charges were reasonable. He did not claim that the amount was

excessive at that time, but rather to the contrary '"At that time I trusted Mr.
aagley 100 percent." (Erickson Dep. 25: 10-25,26: i -4). He did have
independent counsel review the fees in the proper~jsettlement agre,"merit he

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Liiw Memorandum decision and Order

entered into with his wife where he assumed all rhe debt responsibility for the
legal charges. Mr. Erickson has not filed a complaint with the Uyonning Bar

.Association in regards to the legal charges. Furthermore, Judith Shtrely who
took over the already filed Chapter 12 banhuptcy proceedings charged in
excess of $24,000 .for her legat fees, an mount comparable to those charged
by Mr. Bagley. The fees charged by Mr. Bagiey are reasonable and

Defendant has failed to meet the burden of proof as to any affirmative
defenses regarding the fees.
e. U;hetlier there was a conflict of interest caused by the violation of
?

Del'endant argues the property should not be deemed as Plaintif'rs because
the transactio~ltransferring the property to Mr. Bagley was prohibited,
unlawful, and void under Wyoming law. T1iis defense is negated by the fact
that no ocol~flictof interest existed. As to the assertion that Rule 1.8 was
violated by Mr. Bagley this Court is governed by Idaho law which was not
presented by Defendmts in suppol? of their argment. In fact, the very rule
they cite as violated is a Miyoming rule. Nevertheless, this Court feels that the
rule has not been violated because the note and securing mortgage were
provided as consideration and not as an adverse ownership, possessory,
seetrrity or other pecuniary interest. Were this Court to find othenvise, no
attorney could enter into agreeme~~ts
for payment as they wouid be in conflict

with their clients thereafter.

Findings of Fact and Conctusions of

taw Memorandum decision and Order

CONGLtISXON:
I T 1s HEREBY BmERED, DECMED and ADWDGED that pursuai~tto the

above reasoning, the note represents a valid debt which was properly transferred to

SIRIUS LC. Judgment is therefore entered in favor of the Plaintiff in tbe amount of
$29,173.38 plus interest at the rate of ten percent (1 0%) per annum from November 13,
1999 until the date of rhis judgment
I T IS ALSO ORDERED that interest which has accrued on the note tlxough

September 30, 2008 is equal to the sum of $336,138.17and will continue to accrue in the
arnount of $7.9927 per day until the date ofjudgment and will co~zinueto accrue
tliereafter at the rate of 10% per annum until paid.

IT IS ALSO O W E m D the mortgage is a valid lien upon the real property
described above. Plaintifrs liexi as evidenced by the mortgage is forever foreclosed and
the property ellcu~nberedthereby shall be sold at a foreclosure sale in the nlanner by
applicable law, with the proceeds thereof applied on the judgment, attorney's fees and
costs, and such additionaj amounts as Plaintiff can prove was advanced for taxes and
other items as ma) constitute liens against the property together with insurance and
repairs necessary to prevent impairment of the security, together with interest thebreon
from the dale of the advancement.

Findings of Fact and Conclnsions of
Lzw Mitmorandum decision and Order
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IT IS H E m B V DECWEC) that if any deficiency remains after app1icatior-tof the
proceeds of the sale of the property, that the deficiency may be satisfied from any other

property of Defendant" as allowed by applicable law.
IT IS ALSO O W E m f ) the Plaintiff i s awarded its reasonable attorney fees for the

prosecution of this action in an mount: to be determined in accordance with the
provisions of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.

IT IS FURTHER 8mEME)the Plaintiff is awarded its reasonable costs and
expenses incuned in this action to be deter~ninedin accordance with the provisions of the

Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
I T XS FINALLY ORDERED The Plaintiff is hereby awarded post judgmellt interest,

attorney? fees and costs it incurs in attempting to coIlect its judgment.

Dated this

2Pday of September, 2008

Don L.Harding
District Judge

findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law Memorandum decision and Order
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I hereby certify that on the
day of September, 2008 I served a true copy of the
foregoing document on the a~orney(s)/person(s)listed below by mail with correct postage
thereon or causing the s m e to be band delivered.

Metliod of Service:

Attomey(s)~Terson(s):

Hand Delivered
By U.S. Mail

'4. Bruce Lxson
Attomey at Law
15 5 South Second Avenue
Post O-ffice Box 6369
Pocatello. Idaho 83205-6369
Telephorie: (208) 478-7600
Fxsimile: (208) 478-7602

Fax

Bryan D, Smitli
B.S. Driscoll
h/LcGRATH, MEACEXM, & SMITH,

Wand Delivered
By U.S. Mail

Fax

PLLG
P.O. Box 5073 1
4 14 Shoup Avenue
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405
Tel: (208) 524-0731
F a :(208) 529-4166

Dated:

By:

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
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3

i
w

1

-.

f

>

BRYCE EX, ERLLCECZSON, AND ANY
1
PERSON CLAXMmG BY OR THROUGH
BRYCE EWICSOH LN AND TO TI-=
1
REAL PIZOPERTY DESCRIBED A S
1
FOLLOWS :
1

FmDUVGS OF PACT AND
CONCLUSEOMS OF LAW
MEMI0
UM DECXSTON
AND QRX)ER

1

1

CARIBOU COUNTY, DmO:

'I

TOVVNSKIP5 SOUTI-I,WCJE
46 E.B.M. j
SECTION: 27,LOTS 1 AND 2, N % NW % )
EXCEPT m m F R O h / I THE S 2A HE %
1
NW !4 NW %i,
1

3

Defendmts.
THE MATTER B-EFORXi:TBE COURT;

This onse comes bofore Lkto Court on PIaintiETs oon~plaintlo foreclose on property

located within Caribou County. This Court's prior decision in tl~is
matter w a s nfFimed ia
part and vaontcd in part &rci r~mandodfrom thc Idaho Supreme court saying

consideration was given for t h e note (al*ho~~glr
tl~e
Sixprefne Court d e c k e d to answer

vvliett~arit was adequate), and

oase was rcrnmdcd as to the issue of thc a.ff5rmazive

defenses ofthe Refendmxt. Defendant argues .the prap~rtyshould not

bfti deemed

as

P f a i r ~ t i f sf bocause t t l e tm~xsztctioa
trm~sfesringthe property to h?ir. B a g l ~ ywas prohibited,

unL~p\x,*Ed,and void under Wyoming law. Defendant argues that Ire may raisc thf.. se.toff
defense as to R.Zr. Bagley's s ~ o n g f uconduct.
l
F ~ d e r m s r Defe~~ciartt
e
contends that
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IN THE DISTHCT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTNGT OF THE

SEP 30 Pi4 4: 50

STATE OF XBMO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF C

SIRIUS, a l&7yoxningLimited
Liability Gompmy.

,I
Case Yo. CV-04-284
I

Plaintiff,

.I

1
1
1
1

VS.

BRUCE H. ERXCKSON, .4hTI> ANY
PERSON CLAIMmG BY OR TmOUGH j
BRUCE EEUKSON I
N AND TO THE
1
REAL PROPERTY DESCRIBED AS
'I
FOLLOWS:

SUDGMEKT

1
CARIBOU GOLPJTY, IDAHO:

1

TOWTSHIP5 SOUTH.
GE 46 E.B.M.
SECTION: 27, LOTS 1 il_ND 2,N % NW "/h
EXCEPT THEEFROM THE S % NE %
XMJ % NW %,
Defendmts.

)
)
)

I

1

f
'1

It is hereby ORX)EmD, D E C m E D AND ADJUDGED that based on the
reasoning col~aainedin the Court's Memorar2durn Decision and Order dated September

20,2008, it is hereby O m E E D that judgment is entered in favor of the Plaintiff in the
a~nountof $29.173.38 plus interest at the rate of ten percent (I 0%) per amurn from
November 13. 1999 until the date of this judgment and will continue to accrue thereafter
at the rate of 10% per mnum until paid.

It is also ORCIERED that the Plaintiff may proceed with the foreclosure on the
mortgage dated Xovember 13, 1999. PIaiiztiff s lien as evidenced bq the mortgage is

Judgment

forever hreclosed and the propedy encumbered thereby shall be sold at a foreclosure sale
in the maturer by applicable law, with the proceeds thereof applied on the judgmer~t,

attorney's fees 2nd costs, and such additional amounts as Plaintiff can prove was
advar~cedfor taxes and other items as may constitute liens against the propedy togedner
witlt i~~surance
aiid repairs necessary to prevent irnpaiment of the security. together with

interest thereon from the date of the advancement.
It is liereby D E C E E D that if any deficiency rernaixzs after application of the
proceeds of the sale of the property, that the deficiency may be satisfied from any other

property of Deferidmt? as allowed by applicable law.
It is also D E C E E I ) the Plaintiff is hereby awarded its reasonable attornej?"Les for
the prosecution of this action in an amount to be determined in accordance with the
provisions of the Iddio Rules of Civil Procedure. The Plaintiff is also awarded its
reasoriable costs m d expenses incurred in this action to be determined in accordance with
the provisions of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Fufibermore, the Plaintiff is hereby

awarded post judgment interest, al-torney's fees and costs it incurs in attempting to eoifect
its judgment.

I
9

Dated this 30 day of September, 20%.

Don L.Marding
District Judge

Judgment
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2

I hereby certify that on the
day of September, 2008 I served a true copy of the
foregoing docment on the attorneyjs)iperson!s) listed below by mail with correct postage
d~erectnor causing lfie same to be hand delivered,
Method of Service:

A~o~-ney(s)[Pers~n(s):

E-faid Delivered
By U.S. :\/fail
Fax

A. Bruce Lars011
Attorney at Law

15 5 South Second Avenue
Post Office BOX6369
Pocatello, Idallo 83305-6369
Telephone: (208) 478-7600
Faesir-rzile: (208) 478-7602

Bryan D. Smith
B.5. DriscolI
McGMTW, M E A C I J M , & SMITFI,
PLLC
P.O. Box 50731
4 14 Sfzoup Avenue
Idaho Fails, Idaho 83405
Tel: (208) 523-0731
Fax: (208) 529-4165

Hand Delivered
By U.S. Mail
Fax

Dated:
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SIRIUS, a Wyoming Liruited
Liability Goxi~pax~y,

Plaintif&

CONNECTION

3

3
1
1
1

Case No. CV-04-284

1

.Yr!!3,

1

BRYCE H. EmCKSON, AND ANY
1
PERSON CLAIMmG BY OR TBROUC3E-I 1
BRYCE EMKSON XN AND TO T E E
)
REAL, PROPERTY DESCRLIBEEID A S
FOLLOWS :
f

>

CAMBOU COUNTY, LDAE-IO:

1
)

1
S H E S SOUTH, RANGE 46 E.B.M. )
SECTION: 27, L O T S 1 AND 2, N % NW 'A )
EXCEPT TI-IEWFROM TEE S "/a NE %
)
NW "LTW 54,
1
D658ndmts.

reasonir~gcoidained in t h o GoLu"~'s
S e r ~ z ~ ) r a ~ z d Llfecisio;~
ur~z
and Order datecl September

txrnowi of $29: 173 -38

plus inteerest at the rate o f tcxi percent

((1

0%) per axmum froui

Navell~ber11, 1999 mtfi t l x o date of this judgment a d will continue to accrue ?hereafter
at the rate of 1 OO/o per arm- until paid.

It i s also ORDERED that the Plaintrff may proceed with the forcciostx-eon the
ri~o~-tgage
dated Xovenaber 13, 1999. PIaintiS%slien as cvidencsd b y t h c mortgage is

1

Judgment
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Bryan D. Smith, Esq. - ISB No. 4411
B, J. Driscoll, Esq. --- PSB No. 7010
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AMorneys for Defendm
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STATE OF IDAWO. XN A
N
D FOR

OF'CAmOU

1

SIRES LC, a %'yo
f,iabiliw Company,

1
1
Plau~tiff,

) Case No. CV-04-284

1
\is.

1
NANUPERSOPJ
OR m O U G X Z
BRYCE H. ERXCKSON fiT
nND TO
WA.LPROPERTY D E S C D E D AS

)

1

1
C

)

T O W S m 5 SOUTH, RANGE 46 E.B.M.,
SECTIOX 27: LOTS 1 AND 2, N1/2
NWI/4, EXCEPT
S ?4
NE114 NW % WJVli4,

1
1
1

Deferidmts.

1
1

MOTION FOR
WCONSDlEMTEON, OR mTTEE
FBKmW
amm

C O W $ NO%? defendmt, Bryce H. Ericksorr, by and k o u g h his c o w e l ofrecord Bryan 2).

$mi&, Esq., of the Grn of Sl\illTE, DRISCOliL & ASSOGL&ES, PLLC, and moves this court:
purstlzult to Id& RuIes of Civil Proccdwe 11(a)(2)(f3)and 59(a) for reconsidcratlon of &fie corn's

Findings of Fact m d Conclusions of Law Nemormduzn Decision and Order dared September 30,
2008, mci the conesponding Judgment entered that same dare, on.in the altemadve, for a new trial.
' I b s Motion is made on the pounds and for the remom that the court should reconsider its

hndxngs, conclusions, decision, and order. In the d t c r m ~ v e-;he
, court should gmt a new trial mder
Rule 59(a) for the reafons of f 1) irregPliari~in the proeeedkgs of the court or order of llte court or
abuse of discretion by which bfi.Ericlison was prevented &am having a fair hid; (6) insuBciency of

the evidence to j ustijiji the court's decision and the declsion i s against the law: and (7) sut error in law
occurring at the trial. The facts relied on in st~pportof tile motion under Rde 59(a)(2 j are set fori:Il
more lirffy in the =davit

of Bryan 2).S~"iX1
filed concurrently herewi&. Tlte grounds for a new

trial under R d e 59(a)(t;) and (7) are set forth. as folliows:

The court's decision i s against &e law because fhc considerationrelied on by plaintiff

I.

violated Rule 1.S(aj of the Idaho W e s of Prof'cssiond Conduct a d Rde I. -8(a) of the Wyoming

Rules of Profession& Conduct for P+tiomeysat Law and rendered the promissory note md moagage
prohibited, d

2.

The co~~st:\decision is against the Xaw because the law and evidence showed that

*

Wi!li&m Bagley: f&e plaintiff's prior b w h p ~ c aaorney,
y
charged Mr. Erickson for servicesrendered
in Icgd mslpraciice. Mr, Bagley testified &at hc would have origjndtl:y 5Jed a Chapter 12
proc~edhgd h e could have. The evidence at trial showed as a matter of 1awthat he could have Iiied

b2OTION FOR RECONSfDEUTI43N, OR IN THE ALTEkNATPX, FOR.NEW T
F:\CLIEKTS\;BDS\7453Wieadings\O57
Msdon,Post Tnal.doc
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McGrach Meacham S m i t h

<&B+
m%!
-*<%A

a Chapter 12 proceeciing, but that he did not. Mi. Bagley2 c h g e s for his malprac&ce caaaor serve
as considemtion. for the promissory note md mortgage the p f h ~ E sues upcan.
3.

The court cormnitred an error inlaw at ;rtd by r e h i n g to allow Mr. Erlckson's expert

wimess, Judiflx Sbively, to give her opinion ns to ?he dmages s d e r e d by Mr. E R C ~ C SaOd~the
ursasonabteness of Che aaorney" fee charge t h ~ formed
t
rbe basis for the promissory note md
mortgage. At trial, W. Ekckson" aaorney spec%e&y requested &at the c o w take and report tbe
evidence in full to preserve the issue for appeal, but the court refused to take m d report h e evidence

in violation of ldabo Rule of Evidence 103@).
4.

The evidcnce was i n s ~ c i e nto
t justifjr the court's de~isionthat the attorney's fees

comprisi~~g
the pronzissory note and mortgage were rewonable. U .Bagley provided ;lo itemrzation
for Jtis charges. He did sot attempt to recreate an accomt;ing of his charges. 1-ie admitted &at be did
not perform some of his work eE~ienfilywhere he filed multiple uusuceessful perhetory
applications just to retain professionds, dhougb he charged for each of h s fiiiled attemp%at filing

these routine maners. Mr. Bagley charged M . Erickon $165 per hour when the b

tcy court

approved him to charge only $140 per hour. La a March 1 999 monthly financial report, Mr. Bagley
represented that he was still owed $7,000 over the $5,000 Mr. Erickson Eilready paid, but by May 11,

1999, M. Bagley was c h a r , ~ g h k . Erickson $28,668.57. Chatgmg Mr. Erickson $1'7,668.57 In
April arid May f 999 without any evidence to support ihese charges other than his own testbony &at
rhe charges must be reasonable because he charged &ern is irrs&cient.

short, there was an

insui%iciencyol'the eviden~eat trial to justifjr &e court's decision regarding the rcasonablel~essof
the attorney's fees charged by MI. Bagley tba sewed as the basis for the psornisssrj~nole and

mortgage.

MOTION FOR RECCrPr'SEB)EUTION5ORIN
F:\CLIEtuTS'SSDS;7453\PIeadingsi057
Naotion.Posl Trial.doc
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-4.

The COW'S
reksal to allow Mr. Erickson to arajse the a E m a ~ t l edefense ctf setoff to

the plahhfps eLjtim~IS against the law and an error of law occurring at aid. For the c o w lo allow
the p l a i n ~ gto rely on cons~deration&om a t k d - p ~ Mr.
~ , BagIey, v~vi&outconsidering the

de5ciencies md legaliry of that considemtion creates an unasstlilable "super-considesation": that 11s
contray to Ianv." f i e court r e b e d to consider fie dmages from hiir. Badey's mdpractice as a setoff
to the plajntifPs promissory mte artd mortgage based on W. Bagley3 scoaduct.

6.

*l%cCOW'S
dcc~slon.to selectively and bntedttendly apply Idaho law itnd Wyoming

law PS against &e law.

'7.

The cocati's decis~onis ag&st the law to the exlent it awards the piaintiEfdamages for

atl.omcy9sfees incmcd while the attorney, Mr. Bagley, acted under a conflict of interest in kis
rcprcsentation of Mr. Eriekson. Specifically, k4.r. Baglcy represented both hlr. Erickson and -Mi.
Erickson's wifc in b

tcy while they were divorcing. Moreover, h4i. Bagley became m

unsecwed creditor of -?&. Erickson at'ter the dismissal of Mr. E~ckson'sChapter I. 1 proeeding, but
Mr. Bagley continued to represent (and charge) Mr. Erickson in dealing with Pvlr. Erickson's other
creditors,

The plaintiffs promissory note and moagage are unenforceable to foe exrent h e y are

based on anorney" fees incurred while the attorney operated under a ~onRicto f interest.

Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 7@)(3)(C), Mr. Erickson will f'lle his brief in

support of this motion and notice of hearing with the court w i h t 4 days hereof.
This motion is based on. this Motion, the forthco

Be
,f

in S L C I . Pof
P ~hfofon
~
for

Reconsideration, or in rfie Alternative, for New Trial and the Notice of Hearing, tfie A,fYidavitof

ar?/anD.S m i t h filed concwcnt;ly herewith., md the court records md files herein.

McGrath Meacbam S m i t h
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D A E D this

~ ~ ~ o r rTor
z eDefendmt
~s
Bryce E-l. Erickson

2008,I cawed atrue and
X E E E B Y CERTIFY that on "this
THE:
correct copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR mCONSX.DEK4TION, OR
&TEmhhWX, FOR NEW T K a to be senred, by plachg the same in a sealed envelope
m d depositing it la Ihc United States Mail, postage preg&d, or hand delivery, facsimile
nansmission or ovemi&t delivery, addressed to the fatlowmgg.

L

A, Bruce Larson, Esq.

t 1

Attorney at Ltmr
Horizon Plaza Ste 225
1070 X-liline b a d
Pocalello, Xdaho 8"301-293 5
Fax: 478-7602

[ 1
[ ]

F a
Hand Delivery
OveAght Delivery

'

MOTlOK FOR W68NSXDEMPION, OR
F:!GLIENTS\BDS!,7453\Pleadkgs\O57
Motion.Post Trisl.doc

-

UTEaLYATIVE, FOR hXW TRIAL 5

Bryan D. Srtiith, Esq. - IS13 No. 441 1

2008 M I 28 Pfl 12 22

B.J. Uriscoll, Esq, - ISB No. 7010
SMITH, DNSCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLG

P. 0.Box 50731
4 1 4 Sboup Avenue
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405
Telepiione: 1208) 534-0731
Telefrur: (208)529-4 166
Attorneys for Defendant

Ericksoii H. Erickson

XX THE BISTNCT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRfCT OF TI 11:
STATE OF IUAI40, lfii AND FOR THE COUSTY OF CARTBOLJ
SIRIUS LC, a Wyomirtg 1,imited
Liability Company.

1
1

Plaintiff.

)

1
1

VS.

ERlCKSON H. ERICKSON, AND ANY PERSON )
GLAXMnTCW D E R BY OR THROUGH
ENCKSON H. EHCKSON IN AND TO THE
REAL PROPERTY DESCMBED AS FOLLOWS: )
CARfBOU COLNTY, IDAHO:

TO%NSHIP 5 SOUTH, RANGE 46 E.B.M..
SECTTON 27: LOTS 1 AND 2, Nl/2
NW 1I.I. EXCEPT TWEREFROh9 THE S 3
4
X E I ~ 'NW
. ~ % xw~iil-,
Defendmrs.
---

Case No. CV-04-284

BMEF IN SUPPORT OF MOrl'lOIb'
FOR WCONSZDEmTIBtu', OR IN
TEE: ALTEmATIEVE, FOR P.U'E%PT
TRIAL

1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR REGBNSIDEIIATION, OR lK THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR NEW
TRIAL - 1
F.\CLlEliTS\BDS!7453!Pleadtags\059Brief in Support of Post Trial Motion.doc

'I'his case was tried to the court on July 30,2008.Tlne court entered its decision awarding the
piaintifi(.'Sirins'-) all the relief requested. Defeiidmt, Hlycr Erickson. ("Erickson") Files this brief in
support of his motion for rccvnsiderarion or, in the jrpernative. for new trial.
11.

CHlt0NOLt)lGV 044'EVENTS.
Since the tirne the court entered its decision, a new judge has assumed responsibility i'or

this case. Erickson will provide a ch-rcjnology of events for the co~rrt'squick review. This
choilnlqy of events is nut intended to cover all the evidence. But it does illustrate s u ~ l i eof the
more important facts in the case.

DATE

EVEXT

I OM1998

Erickson and his wife, Kathleen, were going "rough a divorce.
Erickson was referred to Uiillim Bagley ('"agley") to file
bankruptcy and stay foreclosure on the f m i l y farm. Bagley began
his represer?-tat.ionof Erickson.

'

101811998

Bagfey filed a petition fbr Chapter t I b a b p t c y for Erickson in
the Wyoming B a n h p t c y Court.'
Erickson paid Bagley a $5,000 retainer to represent him in the
Chapter 11.3

'

1012 lil998

The United States Congress reer~actedChapter 12 of the
Icy Code retroxtivc to October 1, 1998.4

12/14/1998

Bagley prepared and later filed an unsuccesskl motion on bel~alfof
Erickson's wife, Kathleen, while their divorce was pending, to join

See BagIey Depo., 624-7:3; 17: 19-10.
"ee Enckson Exhlbit ,4-I.
See Bagley Depo., 13:25-14:5; 20:25-2 1.6.
See I I U.S.C Chapter 12 Legislative history and c o m e n t s .
BRIEF I N SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR E-tECONSU)ERATLrSPi, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR S E W
TRIAL - 2
F:\CLIENTSBDS\7453Wleadings\O59
Brief in Support of Post Trial Motion.doc

her as a codebtor m the C'hapter i I ~ a s e . " a ~ 1 ~nirw represented
Erickson and Kathleen.

2/19/1999

Bagley files a Chapter 12 petilion f i r Erickson's wife, Kathleen.
while their divorce is still pending."

5/11/1999

tcy Count enters an order dismissing
The Wyoming B
Bagley's Chapter I I GFited for Erickson for failure to effectuate a
plan after giving Bagley a 10 day oppodunity to cure the
prrob~mjs).7

Bagley agrees that he was not complying with 11 U.S.C. Section 1 1 12(61
to prosecute a plan within the time period fixed by statute8
Baglep accepts a part of the responsibifity for the inability to effectuate a
plan as of Mar-ch 17;1999.9
Bagley has no explanation why lie could not get a b
confirmed in a case that was not complicated.''

61311999

After dismissal of the Chapter 11, Bagley resumes representing and
billing Erickson.

8/1!1 999

Bagley bills Eriekson $1,237.50 for services from June 3, 1999,
though July 30, 1999.'~

9,411 999

Bagley bills Erickson $660.00 for sen-ices from August 2, 1999,
through September 2, 1999. l 3

911 1/i 993

Bagley is charging Erickson for working on a Chapter 12
bankruptcy petition yet to be filed.14

"

b e e Erickson Exhibit B-I.
See pp. 2-3 of Exhibit "&'to the Affidavit of Judith A. Shively filed concurrently herewith.
7
See Erickson Exhibits A-69, '4-74 and A-87.
E
See Bagley Depo., 180: 13-18.
S
See Bagiey Depo., i 79: 18-180:G.
See Bagley Depo., 197:3-7.
I ' See billings Erom 'l"'iliiam Bagley to Bryce Erickson identified in Erickson Exhibits C-51 and C-52.
I' See billings fom William Bagley to Bryce Erickson identified in Erickson Exhibits C-5 1 and 6-52.
'3 See billings from William Bagley to Bryce Eriekson identified in Erickson Exhibits C-53 and C-54.
' 4 See billings from William Bagley to Bryce Erickso~~,
a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "BB"
to the Affidavit of
B. J. DriscolI filed concurrently herewith.
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''

9/30!1999

Bagley bills Erickson $2, t 28.50 for scn~icesfrom September 7,
1999, through September 28, 1999.''

11/1"999

Bagley bills Erickson $429.00 for services from October 6; 1999,
through October 27, 1999.16

1 111211 999

Since dismissal of the Chapter I 1 case, Bagley has biljed Encksor~
an additional $4,323 .57.17

I 1,'13!f 999

Bagley has Erickson sign a promissoq note and modgage prepared
by Bagiey payable to Sirius, LC, a company owned exclusively by
Bagley md his wife, to secure payment of Bagley's attorney's fees
from October 8. 1998 to November 13, 1999.l 8
In addition to signing the promissory note, Erickson pays Bagley
an extra $3.000?'
Bagley did nut fully disclose in writing to Erickson the tra~ssactio:l
and terms on whicls Bagfey acquired rfie security interest in a
writing separate and apart from the note and mortgage. Moreover,
Erickson never colssented in writing (in response to Bagley's full
disclosure) to the trmsaction and terms before signing the note axid
mortgage.

15

12/3/1999

Bagley files a petition for Chapter 12 b a ~ h p t c yfor Erickson in
the Wyoming Ba&uptcy Court and lists the debt on the
promissory note to Sirius fur Bag1ey.s prior attorney's fees.'"

6/6/2000

The Bankruptcy Court disqualifies Bagley from representing
Erickson in the Chapter 12 bankruptcy, concluding that "courisel
[to a Chapter 12 debtor] cannot hold an interest adverse to the
[banknxptcy] estate," 'Mr. Bagley is a creditor," and "The security
interest in estate property [i.e.. the promissory note and rnortgage
in this case] could possibly be a prefereririal t ~ l s f i e r . " ~ '

See bllI~l~gs
from Urrlham Bagley to Bryce Enckson identified m Erickson Exhrbrts (2-55 and C-56
See blllrngs iLom Wtlltam Bagiey to Bryce Erlc~sonident~fieciIn Erickson Exh~brtC-57
' 7 See bJLlngs f i o n ~Wr!ham Bagiey to Br--ceEnckso1-i ~dent~fied
In Ertchson Exhzblts (2-51 through C-57
is
See S~rlusExhibits I and 2
9
See btll~ngsfiofnWlfiian Bagiey to Bryce Er~cksonidentified m Errcksor, E~hrbrtC-58, s-e also Bagley Depo ,
SX 25-89.5
" See Errckscl~lEXhlblts D-20 and D-36
See Ertckson Exh~bitD-56
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''

111.

8/28/2006

Hugiey's attorney-client relationship with Erickson ends.22

12120117000

Erickson retains Judilh Shively as new counsel irs the Chapter 12
t3~kruPt~y,23

6i4/209 1

Erickson's Chapter I2 bdllhruptcy plan is coniir~~led'"

8/20/2006

Erickson receives a discharge fi.orn banlicrqtcy after completion of
the Cillapter 12 plan.25

LEGAL STPrNDAmS.
Under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59ia)l. a new trial may be granted for an irregulariy in

the proceedings, ir~cludi~ag
m y order of tile court or abuse of discretion, by which a party was
prevented fro111 having a fair trial. Under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)6, a new trial may be
granted for insufficiency of the evidence to justify the decision or if the decision is against the law.
Under Ida110 Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)7, a new trial may be granted for an error in law occurring
at the trial. Under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 1 l(a)(2)(B), a party can move the cou1-t to

reconsider any interlocrttory order of the trial court at any time within 14 days after the entry of the
final judgment.
IV.

THE COURT'S DECISION IS ACAIII\IST THE LAW BECAUSE THE COVRT'S
DECISION DOES NOT ALLOW ERICKSON TO RAISE ANY DEFENSES N O L V Z N G
BAGLEY'S WRONGFUL CONDUCT.
This case can be broken down into two parrs: Sirius I and Sirius Il. Sirius I occurred when

the trial court sua ;dponte granted surnmarq; judgment in favor of Sirius, and Ericksoli subseque~itly

succcssiitl1-y appealed. Sirius 17refers to all proceedings after the Supreme Court decided Sirius LC'
-7

See Pfaindfrs Answer to Interrogatory Xo. 7, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "A" to the Affidavit of B. J.
Driscoil dated May 9, 2008 and filed with the court.
23
See docket 73 in Erickson's Chapter 12 bankruptcy identified in Erickson's Exhibit D-8.
24 See docket 98 in Erickson's Chapter 12 identified in the record as Erickson's Exhibit D-10.
-"
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I ~ E~-i-isk~son,
.
I44 Idaho

3 8 (2007). In Sirius I, the trial court held that even though Sirius provided no

consideration for the promissory note. Sirius could "borrow" consideration from the legal services
that Bagley perfornled for Erickson. The trial court also ruled that Erickson had not produced any

evidence to satisfy its burden of shotving any issue of material fact on its claimed deferzses agaillst
Sirius. The ;rial court *alsodenied Erickson's motion to coxnpef to get discot?eq from S i r r ~ ~
tos
establist~its defenses. On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court heId that the senricesBagley perforr~zed
could serve as corzsideration for the Sirius note. Thus, the Suprerne Court held that Sirius could in

fact "borrow" ~o~zsideration
from Bagley. The Supreme Court then held that the triat court abused its
discretion in granting sumniary judgment (by improperly placing the burden on tbe defendant) and in
den3 ing Ericksoii the requested disco~ery.The Supreme Court remmded the matter for f~u-ther
handling that ir~cludedErickson's getting the requested discover?; and the triat court's determilling
whether the 'borrowed" consideration was "adequate" in light of Erickson's affirmative defenses,

which included "'set off" for Bagley 's malpractice.
The trial court in Sirius 11has held that ""the

affimative defenses invofviiig Mr. Bagley's

coilduct. whether '~wongfuior not, are not applicable here."26 In other words, the triai court has held
that it ivould not consider whether Bagley charged Erickson ~ o n g f i t l l yfor Bagley's services. This
is tanta~~~ount
to a conclusion that the triai court would not consider the "adeqtlacy" of the
coclsideratiirn for the Sirius note. This conclusion is contrary to footnote nunher two wl~erethe
Supreme Cou1-t said: "111 one of his affirnnative defenses, Erickson alleges that there was "inadequate
and insuficient consideration' to support the agreements.

"' ee

we hold that Erickson received

Erickson Exhibit F
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consideration f i r the note, we do not opine as to the adequacy of the consideration" and the Sutpr-erne
Court's holdirzg that "We vacate the district cousi's grant of summa7 judgment with respect lo

Ericksox-i's remaining affinxative defenses and the denial of his motion to compel. The case is
rernmdcd iisr h9-tl1er proceedings on those issues." Sirills LC v. Ericksor?,supra, 144 Idaho 42 and
44. The Supreme Court h e w t&dt Erieksors claijned Bagley had c o ~ m i t t e dmalpractice and that
Erickson c1aimed tiis legal services were insufficient for consideration to support the firius note.
X
f rile Suprelne Court had really thought as a matter of Law (like the trial court ibulld here)

that the sufficiency o f Bagley's senriees \%erenot '"pplicable," then the Supreme COT& would r~ot
have retnmded the case to conduct discovery on those senices and to test the adequacy of those
serc ices. Illstead. the Suprerl-ieCowct would have simply ruled as a matter of law that Ericksort was
lzct entitled to any discovery on Bhtgley's services because those sewices are legally irrelevant. In
other words, if the Supreme Court's decision is to have any meaning at all, then the trial court's
holding that ii3agley.s sersices are "not applicable here" is against the "Iaw of the case.*'
A4oreover, for the trial court to allow Sirius to rely on consideration horn a third-paw
(Bagley) witliout considering the deficiencies and legality of that consideration creates an
unassail&le '%super-consideration." Just think of the implications. A crafty lawyer could avoid the
cansequsr-icesof his o m negligence by alvirays having his client execute apromissor3; ~ioteto a third
party entity the I a ~ y e awns.
r
Then after the two year malpractice statute of limita~ionsperiod has

--

passed, the third party entit3 could sue tile client for payment. The client could not fife ~oilnter

ciairn because the third party entity provided no services; the client could not file a third party

'"ee Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law R4ernorancTum Decislon And Order, p., 9.
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coriiplaiilt against the lawyer because the statute of limitations bad nm;and the clieiit could iiot roise
the la\hiver7s negligence as a set off becsllrse the lawyer, not the third party, provided !he

consideration. This would m ~ o u nto
t "super-consideration'" that would open the door to fraud and
abuse (the kind that has happened berej.
.

THE COURT" DECISION IS AGAmST THE LAU7BEC'4LJSE THE TMYS$LCTIOK
IS li?lENFORGE,4BLE UNDER M'UOMIPJG RULE OF PROFESSIONAL COTu'DUCT

'"An attorney's freedom to contract with a client is subject to the constraints of ethical
considerations."'" Petit-Clair v. ,Velsa~z,782 A.2d 960, 962 (N.J. Super. 2001); citations omitted.
"'Any trailsaction bet~ieenan attorney and client is 'subject to close scrutiny."' id. at 9622;
citations oxnitted. "'An attorney in his relatioils wit11 a client: is bound to the highest degree of
fidelily and good faith. The strongest infiuences of public policy require strict adherence to stt~fi
a role of conduct."" Id. at 962-963: citations omitted. "Consequently, an otherwise e~iforceable
~ i client is invalid 'if it m s afoul of ethical rules gover~iirigthat
agreernerit bctiveeti an a ~ o r n eand
0'~
L.L. C. v. Sfcri~ar.d,153
relationship."' H.at 963; citations omitted. See nlsn ~ / h 1 1 ~ / 5,4vcnuc,
P.3d 186 (Wash. 2007) ('Xttorney fee agreements that violate applicable mles of professional

conduct are against public policy and uiletiforceable").

In 1999, Wyoming followed IVjroming Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8(a) that read as
follows:
Rule 1-8. Conflict of interest: prohibited: transactions
(a) A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client or knowingly
accpire an ovlinership, possessory, security or other pecuniary interest adverse to a client
unless :
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the trat~sactionand terns on which the Lauiyer acquires the interest
are fair md reasonable to the client and are .fully disclosed and transmitted in
ivriting to the client in a marmer which can be reasonably understood by the client:

(1)

the client is given a reasonable opporturzity to seek the advise of
(2)
illdependent counsel in the transaction; and

(3)

the client consents in w~itingthereto.

An attorney fee trmsaction in whictl the attorney secures payment with a prornissorq. note

arid a security interest that viofates Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8(a) is void and
unenforceable. kiieYl5~l"Avenue, L.L. C, v. Steward, supra. 353 P.3d at 1 86 (holding that
Ia\%?~er"s
note and deed of trust securing payment of past attorney's fees are void and
unenforceable unless la~qrrerstrirtge~ztlycomplies with Rule 1.8(a); and Pelit-Clul'r v. L3jelsan,
supra, 782 A.2d at 960 (holding that note and mortgage securing attorney's fees were invalid
where the lawyer failed to comply with Rule 1.8(a)j.
The furtl~erimportatlce of Rule 1.8(a) is that by its elrplress terms a Lamyer's failure to
ihllow RuIe I ,8(a) renders the transaction a '"prohibited transaction." Erickson submits that
"'proliibited" by law means "'untawfuf." 111Uryorni~?g,as in most states, an unlaw-ful tralzsaction is
void. Ti.ck~~izasl.ii
v. Pepper Tmzk & Contr-ucting Co., 131 P.2d 339; 354-355 (W-yo. 1942): EIecISlt
I> Acme

Coal Co . 113 P. 758. 790 (Wyo. 1911). Accordingly, the security agreerxent and

trzsaction Bagley seeks to enforce through Sirius are ""prohibited," "unlawEu1,'kand "void"
because Bagley did not comply wirb the provisions c?f Rule 1.8(a). Eriekson will address iti
detail the issues that relate to this purely legal defense and wilt specifically address where the
trial court er-red on this issue.
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.''[AJn attorney-client transaction is prima facie ii.auduient.'" ~oilej~\50'~
.Ive,rue. L L il
1..

S'le~vnvd,szqra, 153 P.3d at 190; citatiolls omitted. See also P cli- ikf E ~ t e r .I' h4tlrraj1, 680

A.2d 790, (N.1, App. Uiv. l 936) (holding that a "transaction between a lauyer and client i s

presumptively inva!id"l. Conseque~atly,"""the

burden of establishing fairness and equity of the

tra~lsactionsrests upon the attorney."' Petif-Ctair#v, hretson, supra. 782 A.2d at 962-963:
citations omitted,
Specifically, "D]he burden of proving compliance with Rule of Professional C o n d ~ ~1.8
ct
rests wit11 the Ia~ayer." 1,llaliej1/50"Avenue, L.L. C. v. Sle~~crrQ
supra, T 53 P.3d at 190. '"[.4]
lawyer must prove strict compliance with the sal'eguards of Rule of Professional Conduct l.s(a);
fuIL disclosure, opportunity to consult outside counsel, and conset~tmust be proved by the
com~nutiicatio~is
between the attorney and the client." Icl. at 190. 'The disclosure which
acconlpa~~ies
an attorney-client transaction must be complete. Attorneys, to defend their actions,
must prove they complied with the 'stringent requirements imposed upon an attorney dealing
with his or her client. "' Id.
A tavcyer seeking to prove compliance with Rule 1.8(a) does not meet his burden where

involveinent of independent counsel is not meaninghl. "'The burden is upon the l a y e r to
beino~zstra~e
that a real and meaningful opportunity TO seek independent counsel was afforded to
the client." t7alleY/50'"A~)enue,L.L. C. v. Sfeward, supra, 153 P.3d at 19 1. ""The opportunity to

It is not enough that at some moment in
seek independent advice must be real and mea~~ingful.
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rime an opponunity existed no ~ a i t ehow
r brief or fleeting that opportunity might have been."

id,at 190.

By its express terms. Rule 1.S/a) qpiies to all "security interests" a lawyer ia~owingiy
acquires in his clicnt's pmperty. The ..ad~rerse'"requiremem applies only to "other pecuniaq~
interests.'"TEzis

must be so because all securiy interests are necessarily ""adverse" lo the person

whose property is subject LO the secilrit). interest. Although the "'adverse" requirement of Rule

I .X(l?j applies only to ''other p e w i a y interests," case

holds that a mortgage on a client's

property given to the lawyer as secuiq is "clearly" a security inerest adverse to tile client. Petit-

CIair 11 j"\ielsarz, supru, 782 A.2d at 963. See also Ivr re Taylor, 741 N.E.2d 1239 jl~zd.200 1)
(holding that a note and security interest in favor of an aiwrney in his client's residence to secure
the payment of attorney's fecs is ""an interest in the client's property adverse to the client"); and
In re Dotlglass, 859 A.2d 1069 (D.G. 2004) (holding that a note hat requires the client to pap

motley tn a Iav\yer is quite natwaIly understood as an interest "adverse" to the interests of the
client).

C.

Rule 1.8(al Applies To All Business Transactions m o t Just Security Interests),
And A Business Transaction Includes A Laivver's Taking A Note A12d Security
Interest To Secure Payment Of Past Attorney" Fees.

By its express terms, Rule 1.8(a) also applies to all '%~csi~ess
fmnsncfinns" between a

lawyer and his client. In lhis regard, a l a ~ y e\vho
r takes a security inxerest in his client's real

property to secure p a j i n ~ e on
~ ~at note for payment ofpnsf attorneyasfees engages iiz a "business
transaction" uritir the client that im-okes the protections of Rule 1.8(a). ~ a i l ~ / 5 0.4ventie,
"
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 'VdBTIOIG FOR RECOKSIDERrlTION, OR IN THE ALTEXWATIVE, FOR XEW
TRLiZt - t l
F \CLIENTS\BDS!7453\PleadingsiOS9 B:!ef m Support of Post Trial h4o:ioa.doc

L I, C v 'i'lewar.4 stlprn, 153 P.3d at 196. Such an agreenient is not a fee agreement betsvsen a
lawyer and client but in reality an agreement between a creditor and debtor that rises to a

"buusir-iess transaclion" wi"i~inthe meming of Rule 1.@a). id. Here, the note and mortgage

const~ttiiea '"business transaction" in addition to being a "security interest."
D.
At trial. Bagley testified that he did not cotnply with Rule 1 .%a) because he said his nnle
and mortgage were not ""adverse." However, as explained above. a mortgage on a cliexrl's
property to secure the payment of fees is 'ccciarly"'adverse. Petif-Clair11. Neiison. supra, 782
A.26 at 963. Even just a note payable to the attorney is "quite naturally understood" lo be an

interest --adversento the interests of the client. l~re Douglass, supra,859 A.2d at 1082. There
is just no questiorz that a note and security interest in favor of an attorney in his client's residence
to secure the payr~lentof attorney's fees is "an interest in the client's property adverse to the
clicrtt" h2 re Tqdlor.,szcpru, 741 N.E.2d at 1242. Moreover, tl-renote and mortgage Bagley
obtained from Eri~ksonthrough Sirius was a "business transaction" within the meaning of Ruie

I .& a). See ~ ' u t i e j ) i j @
A V~C ~ U C , L.L. C. 1.. S t c w d . supra, 153 P.3d at 186. Accordingly, Bagtey
was required to comply with Rule I .8(a) and in fact bears the burden of proof at trial that he did
comply with Rule 1.8(a). However, as set forth below, Bagley did not con~plywith the

requiverns~ztsof Rule 1.%a).
1.

The transaction and terms OM which Bagley acquired his interest are not fair and

reasonable to Erickson. The RRe Estate Mortgage Erickson signed mortgaged 173.35 acres ro
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~ a ~ i e This
~ . 'propen).
~
is hnown as the "Deer Creek I'roprfly" with a stated value on Dcccmbcr

9. 1998 of $688.000'~and a stared value on December 1, i009 of $602,000.'~ The banh-ruptcy
docunlents show only two secured creditors other than the Sirius note on the Deer Creek Property
at the tiiilc Ragiey filed the Chapter 12 on December 3, 1999.'' One creditor was First Security
Sank whose secured claim in the Beer Creek P r o p e q was $1 15,000. and the other creditor was

Wyoming Farm Loan Board whose secured ciaim in the Deer Creek Property was $70.000."
Using the lower $602,000 value -for the Deer Creek Property, Bagfey obtained at least $4 17.000
of unencumbered coIIatera1 to secure a note in the an~ountof $29,173.38.

The picture of BagIey7sover secured positio~lis far worse considering the reality of the
situation. In this regard. Erickson had assigned a $97,000 receivable to First Security Badi tvho
was applying the $97,000 receivable to pay off its 91 15.000 claim." Giving credit for this
$97,000 receivable increases Bagley's over secured position to $514,000 on the $29,173.38 note.
Even worse, the total value of Ericksorl's real properv was $1.3 million in which First Security

Bank and Wyoming Farm Loan Board also held security for their $1 15,000 and $70,000 claims
respectively." This means that once First Security Dank and Wyoming Farm Loan Board were
paid from the other properties sold in the Chapter 12, Bagley wouId be the !one remaining

secured creditor with security valued at $602.000 for his $29,173.3 8 note thus making Bagley
over secured by as much as $572,000. And, in fact, Bagley admits in his closing brief that '..[n]o
27

See Srrlus Exhib~t3.
See Ericksol~Exhibrt A-27.
"See Erickson Exhibit 0-30
30
See Erlckson Exh;firtitD-36.
3' See Erickson i-lxtxib~tD-36
32
See Ei'lchson E x h ~ b ~D-32
t s and 36.
28
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other part) ividl a priority greater than the Plaintiff has claimed an interest in the real proper5
tilai is the subject to this actionsyG4

"54fee ayreernent between a lawyer and a client, revised after the relationship has been

established on Perms more favorable to the lawyer than originally agreed upon tnay be void or
voidable unless rhc attorney shows that the contract was fair and reasonable, free from rti~due

infuence, and made aiier a fair and full disclosure of the facts on which it is predicated."'

irulie-~,50"'A V ~ ~ Z ZL.L.C.
II?,

Y.

,riewurll, supra, 153 P.3d at 189. A mortgage lo S G C L I T ~a note for

past attorney's fees has been found to be unfair and unreasonable where it expmds a client's
Liability i j r beyond the terms the lawyer md client originally agreed to. Petit-Clair

I'.

Nelson,

supra, 782 A.3d at 960 {finding that independent counseI may have convinced the client not; to
execute the li~or-tgagesecuring a note for past attorney's fees where the original debt was owed
by eczr13orations, not indi~ridualclients personally).

Here, the original agreement with Bagley was that Erickson was to pay him $140 per hour
plus costs. The original agreement did not inelude any terms for security. The origirsal
agreetnerrt cer-tai~:iy did not include giving Bagfey a security interest over securing Bagley
between $417,000and $572,000. Any independent lawyer not wanting to commit malpracrice
would have advised Ericlcson not to pledge his entire 172 acre farm with a net equity value
bel'c'i~ecsn$317,000 and $572,000 to secure Bagley's $29,173.28 note. Erickson submits that sucli

an over secured pusl~ionheavily irz favor of Bagley is neither fair nor reasonable to Erickson.

"'See Errckson SAiblis 1)-30and 36
54

See Sirius's Cios~ngBrief p , 3
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2.

Ragley did not k I l y disclose the transaction and terns in witill&to Ericksoil at a11

let alonr: in a malmer Erickson could reasonably ur~derstand.'The only documents 11l;et contzin

elte transxtion and iems are the note and mortgage Esickson signed. Bagley was unable to
identi6 any scparnle writing, a case law requires, fillly disclosirig the transaction and th, terms
,
to Erickson that he could rlien consent to as Rule I .S(a) requires. It? re Exlaill-!O ~ U T C I I Y930
M,
h . 2 d 249,253 (D.C. 2007); Irz re Slephe~s,851 N.E.Zd f 256. 1258 (Ilnd. 2006); L U W P ~

Disci/7iir?aq*Board v. Btrrtrer, 566 S.E.2d 24S115 1 W.Va. 2002): and Mailer o f C I ? q f i o ~183
,

B.R. 121, 136-137 (Ba&.E.D. Mich. 1994).
3,

Bagley did not give Erickson a reasonable opportu~zityto seek the adx~iceo f

independent counsel. There tvas no evidence at trial that Bagley gave E-rickson a reasonable
opporturri~to seek the advice of independent counsel. L4s explained above. Bagley bears the
burden of proving his compliance with Rule 1.8(a).

i/ailev/50" Avenue, L.L. C. v Steward.

szcpra, 153 P.3d at t 86. Afthouglr Bagley testified that Erickson had a divorce lawyer who
included the debt to Bagley iri the Maniage Settlement ,Agreement, there was no evidence that
Erichso~ieves had the opportunitji to seek the advice of the divorce lawyer with regard to the
transaction. In fact. the Decree of Divorce was entered on October 19, 1999.j5 But Erickson
signed tlic prnmissoty note and mortgage on November i 3. 1999.3"herefore,

by the time

Erickson signed the promissoy note and mortgage, the divorce case was concluded. Bagley
failed in his busden to present my evidence that the promissor~inote and mortgage xvere even in
existence during :!re ililrorce for Erickson-s divorce attorney to review tit provide advice c?n.
;5

See Sirius Exhibit 6 .
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4.

Hricksorz did not cozzseat in writing to the terms of the transaction. The onlqi

hritterm culiscnt Bagley cnllid point to is the Mmiage SeTtlm~entAgreement the divorce iaqters
prepared m d that Erickson signed on September 14, 1990.j7 However, Bagley admits that the
lal-riagr Setticincnt g r e r ~ n e ncontains
t
none of the terms of the transaction and specifically
does not er eii identrfq.the property in which Bagley would claim a security interest "rough
Sirius. Citcn tliese facts, Bagley cannot meet his burden of proving ""srlct compliance with the
Avenue, L L C v Sicivo~d,
safeguards of Rule of Proicssional Conduct 18(a)." ~aiic~/50"

hitoreover. Erickson submits that Eriekson's simply affixing his name to the R4arriage
Settle~lnerztAgreeme~~t
that refere~~ces
the debt to Bagley is not "informed consent" just as rnerely
siglli~lga listing agreement is insufficient to show a client's "iinfomed cor~sent"in ~iritirzg(in re
Eslufe ofBrol.rj~.supra, 930 A.2d at 249) and merely signing a check is insufficient to show a

client's "ixllonned consent" in writing. L n ~ y e rDisciyllnary Board v. Barber: supra, 565 S.E.2d

E.

Erickson Has Found Two Cases That Have Addressed The Very Issue Presented
Here And Both Hold That A Note And Securitv Agreement A L a w ~ e Obtains
r
111
Violation Of Rule 1.8 Are Not Enforceable.

At least two courts have held that a note and security agreement to secure payrxent of

attorney's fees constitute a '-husfrress trmsactlon" and or "security interest" subjecting the lawyer to
Averrue, L L. C. v. SCeivm-t. sup!-a. 1 53 P.3d
the ~nandator).pro\-isins of Rule I &a,). Ln ~hlle.~/5i?ih

at 1 86. the Suprerne Court of Washington reviewed a sec~redtrarnsaciion between a fir111 a i d its

j6

See Sirius Exhibits 1 and 2
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client. The firm rcqulred d-ie client to sign a promissor); note allit deed of trust as securiq fir pas:
aonley's fees. At the time they enlcred the agreemeiil, the client owed the fm S 160.IilaO.!m.
Affer &e client defaulted, the firin sought to foreclose on the deed of trust. 111its defense, the client

ague3 t!lctt 111e securiv agrcenre~ltwas unenforceable because the attorney oblairri-d it in vinlatiorr

of Ruie 1.8(a). -rile trial court and corn o f appeals nlled thzt the alleged violation of RLllc I .gid

did not render the security agreement mencorceable. However, The Suprernz Cot11-t of 14,'asInin@on
rexersed boll1 the trial court and court of appeals. reasoning as follows:

The deed of trust ti-e., tlie security agreement] at issue in this case has the
cbtamcler v f a business tmnsncfiniz belrveerz a lawfirm and its cjiezzt. Though
described as a fee agreement by the Firm, it was, in fact, relevant to a sigrzt~cnrzl
existirig debt. . . . The relationship was trot merely nttnrp-aey-client;it rvns also
erectitor-ctebtor. . . . [IJt was in reality an agreement between a creditor and a
debtor. Furthemore, the fee agreement entailed the corzveyaitce of a securig
irzierest ijt the client's proper@>a trazzsuctloiz absent safeguasds spec@cal&
proltil~itedby RPC lr.8(a). Finally, we note the Finn advised its o m client on a
mettzod of paying the debt owed to it--a meflzod a clisi~tevestedattorney nzigl'tt izof
h nve erzcournged.

(Emplyasis added .)
Concluding that "the note and deed of trust was more like a business transaction than a fee
agreemer~t,"the J/alley court applied the mandatory requirements of Rule 1.8(a). hportantly, the
I/izlt"iy court never questioned .ivhether the securit-y interest was "adverse." Rather, the court

focused on the "character" of the security agreement and the "creditor-debtor" relationship between
the parties concluding that the lawyer bad entered into a "%businesstrmsaction" requiring

See Slrlus Exl-iibr: 3
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In Pellt-(:!air.

I!

A7elso~,
supra,782 X.2d at 960 (3.J. 2001 1, the Kew Jersey appellate court

residence constimed a security interest ur-tder Rule
held &at a lmq er's mortgage on the cfier~t~s

t .8(a). The court explained, " " ~ l aaorney's
n
freedo~nto contract with a. client is subject to the
constraints of ethical considerations' and the Supreme Court's supervision." Id at 992. The PetitClaw court continued, '" [Aln agomey in his relatioils with a client is bound to the highest degree of

fidelity anct good faith. The strongest idluences of p~tblicpo1ic) require strict adllererzce to s ~ ~ ae h
role of conduct. Gonseyuer~tIy,an otherkvise enforceable agreement behraieen an attorney and client
is invalid "ifit runs afoul of ethical mles governing that relationship."' 62 at 963 (quotations
ornitted'l.

111concluding that

the Lawyer had violaled Rule 1.8(a), the court noted, "By its vei?

tetms. [Rule 1.8(a!] is ma~datov." 'Id: at 963. Based on these obsematims, the cotll-t held. "Hcrere,
it is clear: that defe~~dlmts'
t~iortgageon their personal residence given to plaintiff [attorney] was a
'security . . . interest adverse to [the defendaits]. . . .'" Ic- Because -the lawyer could not prove
compliarice with Rule 1.8(a),the court held that the note and security agreenient were
wienforceabf e.

The J'nlley and Pefit-Clair
eases are strikingly similar to this case. Just like this case, both
17alledvand Petit-Clairi~rvotvean attorney's obtaining a promissoq note and a mortgageideed of
trusr from their clielnts as vehicles to secure the pay~nentof past attorney's fees. Just like this case,
both J izllcj9ar~dPelif-Cluirinxrs1vethe issue of whether the aactrney could foreclose on their

respective clients' real property. Just like this case, the rjauyers in both fialle-y m d Petit-Ctcnirdid
not cornply with the requiremeas of Rule 1.8(a). Just as the courts in both Falle~=d P~rir-CIair

11oid t11at the promissory notes and mortgage a-~ddeed of trust constituted a "'business
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trmsacriorv'securiq interest" within the meaning of Rule 1.S(a), this court should rule that Bagtey's
imte and tnorrgage he obtai~ledth-rougla Sirius coristiturr: a ""business trmsactionisecurity interest"
witl~inthe meaxing of Rule 1.8(a). And just as the courts in both Vatley and Pelif-Clair hold that

the attorneys' failure to corz~plywith Rule 1.8(a) reridered the promissoq notes and naortgage and
dezd of trust invaIld and unenforceable, this court too should mle that Bagley's failure to cctmply

with Rule 1.8~af
retxders the promisso0 note and mortgage invalid and unenforcedle

The trial court mied that Bagley did not violate Rule 1.8(a) because "the note and securing
mortgage were pro~idedas consideration and not as an adverse ouaership, possessoly, security or
other pecmiay interest." If-it were not so, says the court, then ""no attorney could enter illto

agreements for payment as they uioibld be in codict with their clients tthereafier." The COLU?
is
simply wrong on this point. AII aMorney can agree to provide services for paj~ment.This does not
eveti implicate, let alone violate, Rule 1,8(a). The aaomey works, and the client pays. No problem.
Rule 1.8(a) does not even apply or become implicated. Rule f.8(a) applies when the client does not
pay, and the attomy takes a security agreement in the client's property to secure his fees. Now
Rule I .8(aj applies because the at"conzeyhas just taken a "security interest" in his client's property.
The attorney Izas also entered a "'business transaction" because tbe relationship has changed kern

at.iomex~/cliex~t
to er-editoridebtor, Thus, it is simply a false dile

a to say that "'no attorney could

enter into agreements for payment as "iknej-would be in conflict with their clients" if tlris court were
to apply Rule 1,8(a)to the facts of this case.
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Moreover, the trid court wroi1g1y states that ('the note and securing mortgage were
prorrided as considerrztion and not as an adverse ownership, possessay, security or other
pecutiiq interest.'TThis is another false d i l e m a . The note md securing xnofigage are not
either "consideraliurz" or a '"security interest." The note and securing martgage can be both
""consideratio~t"and a ""seuriq interest.'" Xn this regard, the court misreads Rule I .S(a) to require

an 'kwinersfiip," p posses so^," or '%ecurit>;""interest to be ""adverse" before "the rule will apply.
Rule 1.8(rz) addresses "ownership interests," '>ossessory interests," '"ecufity interests,'. or 'ktlteer
peculzinr-v ifzterests adverse to a cliear." Rule 1.8(a) nccesstrrily assumes that all ""ownership
interests," "'ppossessory interests,'. m d "3ecwity interests" "at a lawyer gets in his client's
property x e adverse to t l ~ eclient. Not to limit its application to just these necessarillr adverse
i~~terests,
Rule 1.8(a) contains a '"catch all phrase" to cover all ot!zerpecunl'niy iizferests nrlverse
to n ctietzt. T1iis "catch all phrase" is obviously designed to head off some creatively titinking

Ia\&yertrying to avoid the requirenlents of Rule 1.8(a) tvho says that his pecuniav iriterest may
be adverse, b . ~itt is nei-l-f~er
an "ownership interest," '"ossessory interest," nor a "security
interest.'. Therefore, the ''catch all phrase" is necessav to encompass all other yecuatinry

ifzterests ndvsrse to n client besides just inherently adverse ""ownership interests," ""pssessory
interests," aid ""security interests,"'
Even assuming that the security interest at issue here must be 'badverse" to trigger Rule
1.8ja), tile mofigage clearly is adverse to Erickson. In general theoretical terms, a mortgage

neeessariip is adverse to the fee holder. See r
a
i re Taylor. supra, 741 X.E.2d at 1239 (holding that
a note aid security interest in favor of an attorney in his client's residence to secme the payment
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o f attorney's fees is "an interest in the ciiei~t'spropedy adverse to the client"); and In re

Dczugicilz~,.iupru, bScj A.2d at I069 (holdkg that a note that requires the clierrt to pay money to a

lawyer is cjlt~tenaturitlly understood as an interest "a&erse" to the interests of the client,?. 111
spccif:c 1,iaaical terms. Eickson mortgaged his $602,000 f m for $29,173.38 resulting (1 j in
tile DaglcyiSirius note being the only secured interest in the fm;and

(7)in h i s very laarsuit in

which Bagicy through Sirius seeks to foreclose on Eiicltson's $602,000 fium to pay a alleged
$29,173.38 debt.

FinaUg, by its express terms, Rule 1.8ia) applies also to '-business tmnsactions." ?he ~ i a l
court never even discussed wheil~erthe transaction here mounts to a "business nansaction."'
However. as a matter of Law. a lawyer who takes a security interest in his client's real properly to
secure pajime~lton a note for paynlent ofpast ar-tomey's -fees engages in a '"business transaction"'

Avenue, L.L C r. Sie~ioi-d,
with the client that invokes the protectioiis of Rule 1.8(a). ~aiie~/50'"

st~pri-r,153 P.3d at 186. The reason is that once a lawyer takes a security interest in his client's
property to secure fees, the relationship changes from attomeylclient to creditorldebtor. Id.
For all the reasons stated above, the trial court's analysis with respect to Rule I .&a) is

wrong. Rule I .8(a) applies to this case to prohibit enforcement of the Sirius note and mortgage.

VI.

TIXE COURT'S DECISION IS AGANST THE LAW BECAtTSE THE EVIDENCE IS
CmDISPUTED THAT BAGLEY COMMITTED MALPRACTICE THAT CAUSED
E'FetCKS0S.i DAMAGES.
In U'>roming."[a] t a ~ y e shall
r
not make a11agreement for, charge, or collect a11

u~weasunableike or an uixeasor~ableamount for expenses." Wyo. R. Prof. Conduct 1.5. In
Idaho, the law is identical. See I.R.P.C. 1.5. Thus, whether under MTycsrning law or Xdabo law,
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Rngielr ~nnnot"kchrge. or collect an ulucssonable fee." Id. To the extent the p r o m i s o y note
includes a pol9ion ii,r unreasonable afomey? fees, that poaion of Ihc note is unreasonable, i.e.,
not supported by adcqrrate consideration, and Erickson sl~ouldget a credit or set off for that
ur-~reasonablea111olltlt. However, the trial court gave Eriekson no credit for any unreasonable fees

Bagley eliarged,
In this regar-d, Bagley Gfed a chapter I I for Erickson or1 October 8. 1998. The ban2tluptcqr
court disr-riissed tile CI~apterI I on May 1 1. 1999 for failure to effectuate a plan after giving
Ragley an order to cure the dcfecr(s). At the time Bagley filed the chapter 11, Chapter 12 was
not available. However, 13 days after Bagfey filed the Chapter I I, Congress reinstated Chapter

12 retroactive back before the time Bagley filed the GI-rapter I I . Conversion was available from
a Chapter I I to a Chapter 13, and Bagley could have and should have converted the Chapter 1 1

to a Chapter 12 just 13 days after he filed the Chapter 1 I . See f 1 U.S.C. Section 11 12(d).

As evicicnlce that Bagley's conduct was below the standard of care for not car-ivertingthe
Chapter I I to a Chapter 12 once it became available, Bagley himself testified that he would have
initially filed this case as a Chapter 12 if it had been available because Chapter 12 is Iess
cvqlicated and more debtor 6-ieudly than a Chapter i I where Erickson is a r;j~mel-irancher.~"
Bert Ragley never considered converfing the Chapter L I to a Chapter 12 until after the Chapter 11
xias dis~~issed."h fact. Bagley never even h e w that the Chapter I I could have been converted
in a Chapter 12."' Juiii.ch Shively, Erickson's exper!, testif ed that Bagley's failill-:: to convert

38

rn
see
Eagle] Depo , 7.9-1 6 , 31 20-42.2
See Bagiey Depo , 3 7 5 8
40 1
see Bagiey Depo.. 42.12-14.
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34

from a Chnpter I 1 to a Cbaptm 12 under these l j t l s was conduct below the standard of care
becmsc a Chnpter !:I is much better for farmers and ranchers. Bagley never disputed Ms.

Shit ell's testimony on this 13oi1lt. This means that the evideilce is undisputed that Bagley
engagcd iz: negiigencc when be ilziied to convefl the bankruptcy from Chapter 11 to Chapter 12.
As for damages, Ms. Shivel? took over Crickson's Chapter 12 case after the b a k u p t c y

court discf~argedBagley for his conflict of interest. Ms. Shively was able to get the Chapter 22

plan appro~red.and Erickson successliizlly completed the plan. Eriekson ultiznateiy received a

Chapter 12 discharge order, Tliis proves tIiat if Bagley bad converted to a Chapter 12 and
peribrrned competently, tie too could have gotten a Chapter 12 plan approved, Erickson co~rld
!lave successfu!ly completed the plan, md Erickson ultimately could h a ~ received
~e
a discharge

order, hlore impo13ant, Erickson would not have incurred attorney's fees for the failed Chapter
11. iZs it turns out. Bagfey did not convert to a Chapter 12, but instead was responsible for the
Cfrapter 1 7 get"iing dismissed for what amounts to a Lack of prosecution. In the end, Bagiey

charged Ericksori $Z7,68.57 for a "no value Chapter 11 dismissal" when Erickson should have
gotten a valuable Chapter 12 coril-ir~xationjust like Ms. Shivefy got Erickson-if

Bagley had

converTed and cornpete~itIycompleted the Chapter 12.
Ail this means that the promissory note at issue in this case is inflated by the annount

Bagley's negligence cost Erickson. Because the trial court's previous decision is agai~srthe law,
!his COW
should grant a. new trial to determine this m ~ o u n t . ~ '

.! j

This argument does not even address the clear malpractice that exlsts byB a g i e ~al!uw:ng the cour-t to disrr,~ssthe
Citapler 1 : for farlure to effectuate a plan
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VI1.

THE COLJRT GOMMYTTED E M O R AT TRIAL BY REFUSII.jG TO AlaLOW
EWCKSON'S
EXPERT TO GIVE HER OPmXON E G A m X N G DAhilACES PLND TO
-TAXCEI'HE TESTIMONY ON THb WC0m TO PIeSERVE IT FOR LAPPEAL.
.'In the case of a11inconeet ruling regarding evidence, a new trial is rnerited only if the error

affects a substantial right of one of the parties." Clark v Keiin, 137 Xd&o 154,156 (20021. See ttlso
6'a]?~?sv. Wood, I 10 Idaho 778 ( 1986) (error in excluding testizony was prejudicial error warra~lting

new trial 1; md Lur7zbet.t v. JVorthwcsrentLVal.ff2s. C't, , t I5 Idaho 780 (Ct. App. 1989) (Ilo!ding that
exclusion of expert witness testirnon>iwas prejudicial error).
The trial court colnniitted error at trial by refusing to allow Erickson's expert witness, Ms.

Shivel>,to give her opinion as to the attorney" fees damages Eriekscsn sustained as a result of the
Chapter I 1. On this issue, Ms. Shively testified that First Security Bank and Fir-st National Bank
recovered attorney? fees for the work their aaorneys periitrmed in the Chapter I I that included the
work they did iri bringing a motion to dismiss the Chapter I I that the court did in fact dismiss.
Clearly, atiy anzount of attorney's fces Ericksorz had to pay the two banlcing creditors for their
attorney's fees in the failed Chapter I I (that Bagley should I-lave converted to a Chapter 12 and
gotten eonfir~~led)
should be set off against the Sirius note as damages caused by Bagley's
~sgtigence. Eve11 Bagley admits that Erickson bad to pay these ereditsrsbattorney's fees for the
work they did in the failed Chapter I I .42

After allowing Ms. Shiveliy to r:esti@that Erickson paid $9,750 in attorney's fees to First
Security Baa& for its work in the CL~apterI 1, the trial court would nor:allow Ms. Shively to

42

Se; Bagley Depo.?62:10-17; G3:7-3;6 4 i -65:4; and 192: 13-1 949
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testify tinat Eri&son also paid First National Rank $8.500 for the xvurk it did in the ihiied Chapter
1 i proceedings. The issue bere is tirat h l s Sliivcly kiiew the amount of fees paid to First Securiq

Bank because those fees are a :niizEer of record in the Chapter 12 where they were paid.
E-Iowever, First Yational Bank's fees were paid outside the Chapter 12 and the records
sstablisfiing rile fees were lost. Thus, Ms. Shively was prepared to offer her opiniotz 011the
rwbinimti~ndoliar amount those fees must have been. But the court ruled that she was not an
expert i11 ""dmagrs" although clearly die has the tmining, experience, and education to testi@ on
tile n~ir~lmtlrn
amortnt of attorney's fees Erickson must have paid. But the court did not allow
this testimony.
' I l l i s erzor is pre-judicial because Erickson has a right to receive a set off against the Sirius

n t the damages. Another way to state the right is that the note lacks
note in the a i ~ ~ o uof
consideration to the extent of the damages. In either event, the court's (1) not giving Erickson
any credit for the $9,750 in attorney's fees paid to First Security Rank; and (2) not ailowing Ms.
Shively to testify that Erickson also paid First Natiortal Bank $8,500 is prejudicial enor.

?\/loreover. refusing to aflvui a parry to put into the record excluded testimony is error that
routinely results in a new trial. See Perkins v. Commanweulth, 834 S.bY.2d 182 (Kentucky 1992)
(holding tltat court's refusal to allow defendar~tto make avowal after precluding cross examination of
police officer was reversible error); Sfalev. ,FiOdges, 734 P.2d 1.161, 1168 (Kan. 1987) ("The trial
cow? clearly er~e=l
by denying the State's requested proffer of the testimony of Dr. R4odlin"); and ,%'ix
v. i f l l n ~ r e1~~zur.unce
Cocrzpirnj). 314 S.E.2d 562 (Ct. App. N.C. 1984) (trial c o w ~om~nitted
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rr\~ersihieerror requiring new trial where it refused to piace excluded testimony on the record iur
later appellate review).
Hen:, E2:ickson.s attomey specifically requested at the trial that the court take and report the
evidence in full fro111 Mr. Siiiveiy to preserve the i s u e for appeal as mandated under Idaho Rule of
Evidence 1(13(b). Counsel illtended to ask hds. Shiveiy about her qualifications and the nature of!icr
testimoilr if tire court zvnuld have aiiuured it. However. the court rehsed tit al1o.i.i Ms. Shiveiy to

give her testimony on tile record so that the court reporter could report it iri full as Rule ! ~ 3 ( b )
requires. 'This too is prejudicial error.
VIII.

THE EVIDENCE WAS TNSUFFICIENT '1.0 JUSTIFY THE COURT'S DEGISIOA
THAT TEIE ATTORKEY'S FEES COMPRlSENG THE PROR4iSSORY NOTE AXD
MORTGAGE %TEN3 mASONABLE.
The trial cou-t Iield that Bagley has the burden of establishing that the amount of his

tlttomey's fees is reasonable. However, Bagley has not met his burden to prove that his
attorney's fees of $28.668.57 for the Chapter I I proceedings are reasonable. Specifically. Sagley
lzas tiever testified that $28:668.57 is a reasonable a111ount for at-torney's fees for the work he

performed in the Chapter I I proceedings. Bagley bas not identified the work he performed in the
Chapter I1 proceedings. Bagley has no attorney billings to document what services he
performed in the Chapter 11 proceedings because he lost

Bagley can provide no

itenzhnfiorr or si~owwhat he actually charged for the work in the Chapter 11 proceedings.4'
Bagley can proside no azccouiztitzg or brenkcEcrrwz for vv~hathe charged to arrive at the total figure

45

See Bagley Depo., 69: 19-24.
See Bagley Depi?., 70: 15-19.
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of $141,668.57." 9Bagiey simply cannot locate h s billings to justify his attorney's fees lir: the
Chapter 1 1 j3rocedirigs and has made no effort to recreate the work he performed for iris

services.46
Ai!hougir Ragley charged Erickson for ail rhe w o k Bagley performed In llzc Chapter 1
proceedings.47 Ragley admits that he did not perfom some of his work "effjciemly" as is tile case
where Bagley filed ~nullipleuxasuccessful pertilaclory appications just to retain professionais.

48

Bagley furrhcr admits that it would not be reasonable for him to charge Ericksntl for k e
successive applications to retain professions.'9 But Bagicy did charge for all the successive

he filed in obtaining the orders to appoint professionais.50 Given Bagley'r
applicatio~~s
adrnissio~i011 Illis issue, this court committed ret ersible error when it fomd that 100% of
Bagley's attorrzey's fees were reasonable,
Bagley also charged $165 pcr hour when the b a h u p t c y court approved hirn Ibr only
$140 per hour. BagLey's charged Erickson $; 165 pcr hour for the work he performed in the
Chapter I I pmceedings." Yet, Bagiey's application for employment and the court order allowed
o171y $ I40 per hour." Bagley cvcn filed a verified statement that "pursuant to retention
agreement" with Erickson be .\.;-ascharging $230 per hour.53 Therefore, Erickson is entitled to a
credit of $25 per hour for all the hours Bagfey has charged for services performed in the Chapter
45

See Bagley Depo., 70:20-25.
See Bzgiey Depo., 6"J:X-I 1.
47
See Bagley Depo., 146:20-21.
48
See Bagiey Depo., 14321-22.
49
See Bagley Depa., 136:15-19.
50
See Ragley Depo., 14 1:S- 1 1.
" See Bagley Depo., 2224-23~5;3721-223.
sZ See Erickso:~Exhibits A-25 md A-36.
46
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!I proceedings eve11 assurning dl his hours were reasorable, Stated differenily, Bagley can

charge only $140 per hour for any I-rour he proves was reasonable in the Chapter I 1 proceedings.
Bagley also testified at trial that because of problems he encountered rctaini~zgthe

accuu2ta1ztthat hc personally filed the accoulzting reports. The LJnited States Trustee's Stalus
Ileport dated April 19, 1994 refers to the i34arcti moiltkly financial report and states that "[tlhe
dcbtnr stiaei on the report that Mr. Baglej. is o\ved $7.000in fees over firc relnirrer.'*'4 r his

inems that tllrougl~March, Bagley's attorney's fees, according to the Financial report that Bagley
prepared, were $12.000 Ibr the services he performed in the Chapter I I proceedings. (The

$7.0013in the Marc11 report plus the original $5.000 retainer.) Yet. by May 11, 1999 (the date the
Erickson's Chapter 1 I proceeding), the total attorney's fees he clzarged for the
court dis~l~issed

services he psrfor~~ied
in rl-te Chapter I I proceedings was $28,668.57. Titis means tlzaifor the

nzorztlt qffiipril 1998 andfvr IX rlcrys in May 1999, B n g i q cltarged Ericksort $17,668.57fnr

servi~e~s.
A revier\ of the Chapter I I b a n b u p t ~ yfile shows that Bagley did precious Iittle during
ihis time. More illlportmt, Bagley prosided no evirler-tceat trial (no testimony and rio
docurnentation) to carry his burden that $17,668.57 for attorney's fees for the work done was
reasonable for any services he perfomed between April and May I 1, 1999. Yet, the trial found
that 100% of Bagley's attorney's fees were reasonable.

In the end, Uagiej- has llot carried his burden to establish that his attorney's fees of
$28.668.57 irrcrmed in the Chapter I I pro~eedirngsare reaso~abie.The facts Erickson has raised
on this issue clearly point out that the e\-idence is insrrffieient to warrant a finding that 10C% of

" See Ericksnn Exhibit A-33
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Rngley's fees \:ere reasonable. Accordingly, this court should grant a new trial for it to
deter~~line
the alxuunt of attorney's fees that are reasonable,

1X.

?'HE COURTS DECISION IS AGAIlirST THE L A W TO THE EXTENT IT AWARDS
THE PLAINnFF DAM'kGES FOR ATTOKNEV'S FEES INCUmED WHILE THE
ATTORKEY, h4R. BilG-LEY, ACTED UWDER A CONFLICT OF %TEEST IN HIS
EPESENTTATION OF MR.EHCKSON.
The l a w is clear that a lawyer c m o t recover attorney" fees for services rendered while

the attorney l-tas 3 col~flictof interest. One court explained.

"'"
jtfhe

relationship of attorney and

ts
hold [the attorney] to the
client is at1 extremei?; delicate and i i d u c i w one . . . . [ C j o ~ ~ rjesliously
iitrr~ostgood faith in the discliarge of his duty.' Misconduct in violation o f a statute or acts
against public policy, or in breach of an anorney's fiduciar3; duty to his client. may support a
cotnpiete forfeittire of fees,'' Cran,Sbrd v. Logar?,656 S.U'.2d 360. 364 (Tern. 1 983) (quotation
m d citation omitted); see also Sii~zpsonPeiformance Producls, Jnc.v. Roberr @: Norn, P.C., 92

P.3d 253, 257 ( Wyo. 2004) (t~oldingthat forfeiture of attorney's fees incurred while the lawyer

ltas a conflict of interest is appropriatej; Cal Pak Delivery, It~c.v. trr3itedParcel Service, inc.,52
Cal.App.4th I. f 4 1 1997) (stating the general rule in conflict of interest Gases that where an
attorney violates his or her etliical duties to a client, the attorney is not entitled to a fee for his or
her seryices); 112re S'unjer Bros., Inc., 191. B.R. 738 (Bkrtcy.N.D.Xl1. 1996) (if a debtor's
attorney does not satisfy the dici~tterestednessrequirements, then the b

ptcy court rias st deny

attornel 's fees for tlie period that the conflict existed).

54 Erlckson E ~ l i ~ b'4-83,
lt
p. 3 . iEmpl-iasls added )
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R,loreover, ""a client need not prove actual damages in order to obtain forfeiture of an
afiomey's kt:for the attorney's breach of tiduciarg. duty to the client." Burrow r.. Arcr, 997
S.551.2d 229, 240 (Tx. 1999): Prrmk v. Bloom, 634 F.2d 1245 (lOtb.Cir. 1980) (Where an attornel
represents clients %% ith actual existing conflicts of interest, the attorney's compensation may be
tvitl~l~eld
even M here 110 da~nagesare shotvtn).
A.

i3agiev7sConflict Of Interest That Precluded Hirn From Representing Erickson In
r m w a a n As Early As June 3, !999.

Bagley obt iousiy had a conflict o f interest that prevented him from representing Erickson
in the Ghaptcr 22. The b a k u p t c y court dismissed Bagley relying on 1I U.S.C. Section 327.

'fbe order dis111issii~gBagley states, "Ptrrsuzlat to 11 U.S.C. Section 327, the trustee may, with the

court approval, e11iploy an attorney that does not hold or represent an interest a d ~ e r s eto the estate
and who is disii~te~sted.""The court further relied on I I U.S.C. Section 101(14).'?he

court

continued. "Under Section 101(14), the Code defines a disinterested person as one that is not a
The coiirt found "Mr. Bagley is a credit~r."'~The court then dismissed Bagiey from

further representation.
EricIcson submits that this creditor confiiet that prevented Bagley from representing
Bagley in the Cl-tapter 12 prevented him from even filing the Chapter 12 or from performing
\vork necessary to prepare the Chapter 12 for filing. If a client's attorney has a conflict in

represer~rirzga client afler tile filing of a Chapter 12 because the attorney is a creditor representing

55

See EIlclisorl E\h~bitsD- 156-157
See Ei~rcksonExt~ibttsD-1 56-1 57
<"
" See Erl~ksonExkllblts D-156-157
j8 See Ei.~clisonExln~brtsD-156-157
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tine client 011 crcdltor-related work out issues. the attur~~ey
has the conflict at the time the anomear
bccomzs khc cllei~t'screditor representing the client on creditor-related ttiork out issues, not at the
t h e the petition

is filed. In other ~,vords,the aaorney's conflict arises from his creditor stai-us.

not from him filing rlie petition. The filing of the petition merely makes the conflict open and
obvious.

I11 this regard. Bagley agrees that he actually had a conflict as a creditor in representing
Eric1;son in the Chapter 12 before Erickson signed the promissor)i note.59 This is imporlani
because the i'l-iqtcr 1I! was filed on December 3. 1999," and Erickson signed the promissoly

note eon November 13, 1999.~'Thus, by Bagley's own testimony, the Chapter 12 conflict
actually arose before fiiing the Chapter 12 and eyen belbre November 13, 1999. The Chapter 12
conflict arose cvlien Bagley becan~eErickson's creditor whife representing Erickson in creditorrelated work out issues. In fact. Bagley agrees that he had a conflict for filing the Cliapter i 2
petition as early as June 28, 1999 because he definitely was one of Ericksonk creditors at that
time." In actuality, BagIey's conflict started as early as June 3, 1999 because Aagley admits that
by that time l1e was "preparing and organizing to H e the Chapter I2
Not oi-ilt did Bagley have an actual conflict as of June 3, 1999 that prevented him from
preparing and orgmizing to file the Chapter 12 petition, but Bagley was also required to disclose
to Ericksonl that he u70uldhave a conflict representing Erickson in a Chapter 12. Erickson could
then decide .ivlneti-ierto keep Bagley as counsel knowing that Bagley would get disqualified zAer
59

GO

61

See Bagley Depo., 54: 12-17
See Erickso:~Exhibit D-20.
See Sirius Exhibit 1 .
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filing the Chapter 12 13etition. Erickson testified &at Bagley never disclosed his Chapter 12
conflict. and I-lagie?;.presented no evidence to cont-radlct Erickson's t e s t i n ~ o qon this issue, In
fact, Bagley admits that he did not disclose the conflict to Erickson before lie filed the Chapter 12,
because he did not eX;en see the cor~flictas an issue.64 Erickson also testified that he would not
have used Bagley as h i s attorney to file the Chapter 12 if Bagley Iiad disclosed to him the conflict

that Bagley u~ouldhave in the Chapter 12. If Bagley had disclosed his eorzflict, Erickson would
not have used Bagley, and Bagley would not be entitled to any attorney's fees for preparation of
the Chapter 12 petition, 'This is irnpoflant because although Bagley is not seeking to recover

tfiro~~gli
Sirius ibr his attor11ey3 fees for rep~esentingErickson after filing the Chapter 12. the
promissory rloti: includes attorrzey's fees for Bagley's pre-petition Chapter 13 work that lie cannot
recover.
As a matter of law. Bagley cannot charge Erickson attorney's fees for time periods that he

is p e r f o r ~ ~ services
~ i ~ ~ g undcl- a carlfiict of interest." Thereiitre, Ragle); has the burden to
establisfi any attorrtey's fees he cfiarged after the dismissal of the Chapter 11 w r e both

reasoilabis (as expiailled above) and not incurred under a conflict of interest. However, Bagley
has testified that he cannot quantifq. the time he spent preparing and organizing to file the Chapter
12

012 fact,

Bagiey cannot differentiate between the time he spent preparing the

Chapter 13 petition and other rfiings that he was doing.67 Therefore, Bagley cannot satisfy his
62

See Bagley Depo , S l 23-82 5
See Baglel Depa , 80 22-8 ! I
64
See B a g l e ~Depo , 88 7-1 4
6i
See p I0 of B:ief rn Support of Motron for S u m a r y Judgment dated hlay 9,2008, dteady or, file 1~1ththe court
06
See Bagiey Depo . 80 22-81 6
67
See Bagley Depo . 8 1.7- 14
L?
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burden to prtivc that any of the attnniey"~
fees be chxirged after the dismissal of the Chapter I I

pelition were reasouable a ~ i dnot incuncd under a conflict of hterest.

Wlirle Bagley represented Erickson it1 the Chapter 1 I proceebir-tgs, Bagley Mas one of

F ~1~.k: ~ O I I ' S creditors. Bagley d ~ not
d have a conflict during the pendency of tbc Gliapter 1 I
because Bagley's attorriey's fees were subject to court approval. However. once the Chapter 1 I
was dismissed, Bagle) becarne a general creditor. Once he becarne a genera! creditor, he had a

conflict that prel ented hinil from representing Erickson in connection with the creditor claims
that arose against Erickson once the automatic stay in the Chapter 1 f was lifted, After all.
Bagley could not be expected to negotiate with himself to work out payment of Eriekson"~
debt.
This co~iilictis separate arid apart fioin the conflict of prepaing and organizing to file a Chapter
12 petitioll that Bagley could not file or represent Erickson in after it was filed.
Bagley has failed in his burden to establish that any of the a~tosxzey'sfees he incmed after
the distxissal of ~ i l eChapter 1 I petition were incurred for something other than creditor-related
work out issues whether related to the Chapter 12 or not. Accordingly, Bagley cannot recover

any ai-tonieq's fees incurred afier the Chapter I 1 petition was dismissed while he had a conflict of
interest.68

68

See p 10 of 81ief ~n Support of Motion for S m a v Judgment dated May 9. 2008. already on file -81th the court.
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C.
i111d Collrinued Until Octohe&I

999.

Bagley prepared and filed a nlotlon for Kathleen Erickson while represenling Erickson
and while tile Ericksons were going Ihmugh a divorce." The motion sought to add Kathleen as a
cndebt~r.~%~;ltr
illire11signed the motinn oil December f 4, i 9 ' ~ 4 1 . ~ ~ o l l o w
hisi nu~stlccess!i:l
~
motion, Bagley filed a separate Chapter 11 petition as counsel far Kathleen while Bagley still

rcpesented Ericksoi~aiid while the Ericksons3 divorce was still pending." Both Erickson aiid
Kathleen were represented b? separate ~ounseIin their divorce action. Bagley represented
Kathleen at least as late as September 27. 1 9 9 9 . ~ ~
Ericdson submits that -just as one attorney could not represent both Kathleen and Erickso~l
in their divorce. Bagley could not represent both KatNeen and Erickson in two Chapter I 1

proceedings addressing property issues where both Kathleen and Erickson were dividing up their
property in the divorce. The fact that Kathleen and Eriekson were represented by separate
counsel does rtot resolve the conflict because Bagley was conflicted on Whom he could take

~narcbillgorders from: Kathleen's counsel or Erickson's counsel? Erickson submits that Bagley
~ o ~ lrepresent
ld
them both at tlie same time only if Kathleen and Erickson agreed on how to
divide their property. 111 this case. that agreement did not come until Kathleen signed the Marital
Seltlernsnt Agreerxent on October 12, 1999. Thus, Bagley had a conflict of interest in

60

See EI icksoil Exl~ibitA-35
See E~~ciison
Exhlhit A-35
71
See EI ickson Exhibit A-35
'2
See Ei lcksorr Exliib~tB-2
-3
See Erichsoa Exh~brt6-55
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, OR IK THE AtTE&TiliTXVE, FOR F E W
TRIAL - 3.1
F \ G L I E N T S B L I S \ ~ ~ ~ ~ \ P Br~ef
~ ~ ~m~ Support
I I ~ ~ Sof\ O
Post
~ ~Trlai Motion doc
70

regrese~itingboth Ericlcson and kcathieen that started behre December 14, 1998 and continued
until October 1 2, 1999.
In this case, Erickson testified that he wanted to retain as much of the farm arid ranch as
possible wilereas Katl~leenwanted to liquidate their property and cash out. This testimocly
moved m y lstcrte~~tiai
colzflict Bagiey had to an actual conflict. And Bagley offered no testimony

to rebut Ericl~sori'stestimony. In fact, Bagley admitted on cross exmination that from day one
tliere was ail issue in the divorce court that Erickson wanted to retain possession of the farming
or rmching operations whereas Kathy did not want to do that, and this is fairly typical.74
Bagley's coilduct in representing Erickson and Kathleen while the parties were going

tlxougli a contested divorce constitutes a co~lfliietof interest. Bagley could no more represent
both di\iorei~igparties in b

uptcy than be could represent both divorcing parties in the divorce

itself. Both divorce and b a n h ~ ~ p t eirivolve
y
the division and distribiiLion of property between the

parties and their creditors. The u~idisputedevidence at trial proves that Erickson and Kathleen
~iecessarilyand in fact had adverse interests. Despite the conflict between the parties evideliced
by their pendirig divorce. Bagley represented them both.
As a result of Bagley's representing both Erickson and Kathleen in b

divorce was pending. as a matter of law Bagiey cannot recover his attorney's fees charged from
Decenzber 14, 1948 though October 12. 1999, the period that the conflict existed.'"

74

See Bag!ey Depo.. 172-18:I .

""ee p. 10 of Brief in Suppoi? of R4otion for S w a y Judgment dated May 9,2008. already on file with the court.
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Specificall?, Bagley represented both Erickson and Erickson's wife in bankruptcy while

they were divurcir~p.Moreover, Ragley became an unsecured creditor of Ericksor, afier the
dismissal of Erickson's Chapter 1 I proceeding, but Ragley continued to represent (md charge)
E~ichsclnin dealing v.itii Ericksonasother creditors. The promissoq~note and mo&gage are
une~~forceable
to the cxteni they are based on aEomeyvsfees incurred while the attorney operated
tinder

3

conflict of ~rtterest.

D.

Bartie,. Owes -A $3,000 Credit For XVhich 'The Trial Court Gate No Credit,

The ijcts are not in dispute that Erichson paid Bagiey $3.000 to represent him in the
Chapter 12. The facts are fi~rthernot iri dispute that the barkuptcy court discliarged Bagley
icl
Erickson while at the same time having a creditor-s claim
because fie had a c o ~ ~ f l representing

tl~ougllSirius. Because Bagley had a conflict of interest in representing Erickson in the Chapter

12, Bagley is not entitled to the $3,000 Erickson paid him. Tilerefore, Erickson should get a
$3,000 creditiset o E against the promissory note. However, the trial court gave Ericltsorn

X.

THERE WAS AN IIUCECULARXTY IN THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE TRIAL IY FIIS
CASE BY ViWT-IICWTHE DEFENDANT I$?ASPETTENTED FROM HAVING A FAIR
TRIAL.
In Idaho. a court's failtlre to exclude expert testimony that was not properly disclosed arid

that prejtrciicss the opposing party constitutes an abuse of discretion. Clark 1.. &a@.137 Idaho
333. 347 (6t.ilpp. 20%). The Clark court stated, "[Flallrire to meet the requiremenzs of Rule 26
'tjpically' rcsults in exclusiori of the proffered evidence. The potential for prejudice to the
opposing pa~?.yf i a ~
the ad~ilissiono f evidence that was not disclosed in disc31 sry is pa,-ticuiariy
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acute with respect to exper? testimony, for as the court noted in Radmer, '[elffective crossc x a ~ ~ i n a t iof
oi~
z
iexper? witness requires advance preparlllion," and 'effective rebmal requires
advance luno\~?ledgcof the line of testimony of the other side."TClark, stipra, at 347 (quoting

Xnher

I.

i;ord]Motor Go , 120 Idaho 86. 89 (1991)).

I-lere, Silius called only one witness at trial: \Yilliarn Bagley. Bagley offered expert
testiinolly that "'overall" his attorney's fees %ere reasonable although he never got very specific.
Mr. Bagley also testified that his coriduet was not below the standard of care. This testimony
obviously involves expert opinion testimony. However. Sirius never disclosed Bagley as an
exper?. Sirius never disclosed Bagiey's opinions or the bases for those opinions before trial even
tfiotlgh Ericltson aslted for them in discovery. In response, in a written pleading dated June 17,

2008, Ericiison objected befbre trial to allowing Bagley to testify as an expert and moved to
exclude Ragley3 expert testimony or grant a short continuance of the trial to allow. Erickson to
discovery Bagley's expert opilliotis and the bases for those opinions. The trial court both
ovemled the objection arid denied the motion for a continuance. Erickson raised the same
objection at trial when Bagley started to give expert testimony. The court ovemled that too
telling counsel for Erickson that rlie written objection was sufficient to protect the record on the

Ericicson s~rbmitsthat the court's allowing Bagley's expert testimony constituted an
irregularity in tlie proceedings of the trial that prevented Erickson from having a fair trial under
Ida110 case lain, set out in Clarlc

17.

Xaty. supra. 137 Idaho at 347 and Xadnzer ti. Ford Motor C5 .

supra, 220 Ida110 at 89. Accordingly, the court should grant Erickson a new trial,
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XI.

CONCL~JSION.
Based on die foregomg, this court should reconsider i t s decision and grant judgmenr in

f2vur of Erickson on the gmund that Wyoming I'rofessionai Rule 1.h';ja) prohibited the

transactioii consisting of' a promissory note arid mo13gage. The promissory note m d mol-tgage are
a "security" iittcrest aidiiir "bus~nesstransaction" within !he meaning of Rule I .S(a). 'l'hcreiiire,
Bagley was required to colnply with Rule 1.8(a) but failed to do so. Alternative. this court
should grant a new trial for a11 the reasons set for41 abore.

E S I ' E C r ITVELY SUBl\?l.l.TED this z % a y of October, 2008.

Atto~neyfor Bryce Erickson
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I HEREBE*CERTIFY that on this
ay of October, 2008.1 caused a true and
correct copy o f the foregoing BRTEF"IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FUR
EG0NSXIlEMTZON, OR I N THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR NEW T H A L to be served, by
placing the sane in a sealed envelope and depositing it in the United States Mail, postage
prepaid, or. band deiive~y,facsimile tra~tsmissiol~
or overnigh delivery, addressed to the
foliowing:
A, Bruce Larson, Esq.
Attortzey at Law

I "; South J " " ~ A V G ,
P.O. BOX6x9
Pocaiello, Idaho 83205-6369
Fax: 478-7602

[ &.s.
Mail
[
FrW
[ ] Hand Delivery
[
Overnight Deliveq

I
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Esq. - ISB No. 441f
Bryan D.
&. J, Driscoll, Esq. ISB No. 701 0
SMTR, DRJISGOLL, & ABSOCIATES, PLLC
P.0. Box 50711
4 14 Shoup Avellue
X a o Falls, Id& 83405
TeXeplxsne: (208j 524-073 1
Telefax: (208) 529-4 1 ti6
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STATE OF D,I"LE-EO,IN
SZIZIUS LC,a Wyoming Limited
FlhtiE,
VS.

20013 OCT 1 Y

FOR TEE COmTU OF C N B 0 1 J
)

) Case No. GV-04-284
)
) mFXDAVIT OF
) BRYAN I;). SMTH
)

BRYCE W.ERXCKSBN, AND A h 4 PERSON
CL
G
ER BY OR TmOUGH
1
BRUCE K.ERICKSON LN AkJD TO
1
REAL PROPERTY D E S C m E D AS FOLLOWS: )
)

C a B O L f COWTY, DmO:

1

TO%NSHIP 5 SOUTH, R..A.?VGE 46 E.B.M.:
SECTTON 27: LOTS 1 AND 2,N1/2
NW li4,EXCEPT T m E F R O M
S "/z
NE114 N W % hWli3,

1

Defendmts,

I
1
1
1
1

S T A E OF Dm0

1

County of Bomevillc

1

)

ss.

BRY*WD. SAYrlTiSR,
being first duly swm on oath, deposes and says:
(1)

I m one of ~ %attorneys
e
for rhe defendmi in fhe above-referenced marter

(2)

1m&e this asdavit based on my o w personal h o d e d g e as the atrorney fiat

tried the case on beh& of defendmt.

(3)

There was a;rr inrcs@wiv hFne proceedzslgs ofthe t15alin h s c s e by which the

dcfcndant u r aprevented &om havhg a fair trial.

(4)

Speczcdly, over a witten prekial ot?jection dated June 22,2008 md rn

additional oral objection at rrlill, rfie court allowred the pl&~Xto present the expert festkony of

a previously undisclosed export ~ t a e s sW
, Z f i mBiagliey.

(5)

By d o w h g W. Bagley to tesd@ despite not being disclosed as an expert witness

before trial or before ihe close of discovery, "rhe court prohbited the defendant, from conducting

an expert wibess deposition before trial, from discovering the cxpert o p ~ o n of
s Mi Bagley
before trial, &om dismverlng the basis for Mr. Bagley's expert o p ~ o n before
s
trial, Erom
prepaing his defcnse to Mr. Bagley's e x p testimony
~
at trial, and from effectively cross
exarnirung Mr Bagley at trial.

6

The plGat"Lfffailed to provide "the substance of any opinion, or other tesrkony

h e expert is expetcd to give at trial of this cause" md the "specific facts and data on which

such opinions are based'' as Mr. Erickson had previously requesed in discovery.'

I See Interrog~tory
Na 2 in the Rcsponse to Defendaot Bryce Ericksan's First Set of Interrogatories to Sirius LC
and Requestx for Product~onof Documsn& at~nchedari Exkiibir. "'A" to die Affidatit of B. J. Zh-iscoil dated May 9,
2008, atr,pacfyon fire with hi:court

Arnrni-k'GTT OF ERYM D.Smm - 2
F.\CL7ENTS\BDS\7d513i;Pt~&clings\OS8
MBDS.doc

(9)

f i e pl&tiBfai.led to "&sclose in ~ t * '

my of the t c s ~ o n y "h4x.Bagley inrended to

""eage.t-lzer with
(8)

Mr. Bagley as an expept %tifr?css

in Idaho. a court's failwe to exclude expefi tesiimony that was not properly

disclosed and that prejudices the opposing p q constihltes an abuse of discrerion. Clark v Rnfy,
1.37 I d h o 333,347 (el-App. 2002)-

(9)

The Clark cowl stated, "Fjaiiure to meet the requirements of Rule 26 'typicoliy'

results in exclusion oE&e proffered evidence. The potential for prejudice t~ the o p o s h g p w
from rhe adlnissioln of evidence that was not disclosed in discovery is p&icufarty acute with
respect to expe&testimony, for as tbe court noted in Radme~,'[o]Eective crass-exmhation of

un expert witness requires advance prepara~on,'and 'effective rebuttal r o q e e s advance
-linowIr;dge of the Line of te
Ford iMoror Go., 120 Idaho 86, 239 (lggl)).

(1 0)

The court allowing the plaintiff to present Lbe expert testimony of Mr. Bagley

constiluted an irreguladv in the proceedings ofthe trial in his case by which Mr. Enchon was
prevented fom having a fair trial

F d e r your
DATED &s

See Order for Trial, Pre-Trial Schedule, and Pre-Tr:& Confmence filed in tbh c s e on August 9,2007.
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CERTIFICATE
day of October, 2008, I caused a mc and
I HEWBY CERTIFY that on r k s
correct copy of the foregokg M F W A n T OF fSRYAlV D. SMITH io be served, by placing the
same in a seded envelope rtnd depositing it in h e United States Mail, po&age prepaid, or hond
delivery, facsbile rransrnission or ovcmight delrverq., ddsessed to Ule f o l l o ~ h g :
A. Bruce Larson, Esq.

ABLE LAW PC
Horizon Plaza Ste 225
P. 0. Box 6369
155 S. 2" Avenue

[

I
[

-.s.

I
3

[ ]

Mail
FAX
Wand Dclivcry
Overnight Deliver;

A. Bruce Larson -ISB No. 2093
Able Law PC -- Attorneys at Law
155 South 3"d Ave.
P.O. Box 6369
Pocatelio, ID 83205-6369
Telephone: (208) 478-7600
Fax: (208) 478-7602
.Attorney for l>laintiff

IN 'fHE DISTRfCT COTiRT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IhT
AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CARlBOU

STRILJS LC, a 1hryomingLimited L i a b i l i ~
Company,
PlaintiE.

)

)

Case No, CV-2004-284

1
1

vs.

)

BRYCE H. ERICKSON, AND ANY
PERSON GLAIMNG UNDER. BY OR
THROUGH BRYCE 13. EMCKSON IN AND )
TO THE E , 4 L PROPERTY DESCRIBED
)
,4S FOLLOWS:
)

ORDER DETEkMmLNG ATTOKVEY
FEES

1
1

CANBOII COLihTTY, IDAHO:

1
GE 46 E.B.M.,
SECTION27: LOTS 1 14ND2.Ni/2NW114, )
EXCEPT TWEEFROM THE
1
SI /4NEI!4NWl/4NWl14,
1

TOWr\lSHIP5 SOUTH,

1
1

Defendant,

.Ibc Plaintiff in the above and forgoing action on or about the 8"' d q of October

srrbmitted a timely -Memorandum of Costs and A.ttorney Fees ("'Memormd~m~'')pursuant to

TRCP 54id)(5). The Defendmt failed to file an objection within 14 days of the senice of rhe
Memoran&an as required by IRCP 54(d)(6). The Court finds that based upon :he agreement of
the parties and pursuant to Idaho Code $12-120(3), Idaho Rules of C i ~ 4Procedure 54jd)jl).
Sii(e'j(1) Idaho Appellate Rules

40 and 41. that costs were expended by Plaintiff Sirius

ORDER DETEMINi-NG ATTOLVEY FEES
Pzge

I

in the

amount o f $1335'29 and attorney fees were incuned by said Plaimiff in the mounri of

$29,0 1 129.
Kow therehre:

IT IS H E E B Y O m E E D AUJUDGED AND D E C E E D that the Plaintiff Sirius LC
be aid is Iiereby akvarded costs in the sum of $1335.29 and aMorney fees in the amount of
$?!2,,R:i 1 .?0 t e a h e r with ir?lerest accruirlg thereon at the highest statutoy rate from the 36:"'
day

of September 2008.

/

Dated this f?_ day o

ORDER DETERMmNG ATTOKYEY FEES
Page 2

a R ' f l F I C A T E OF SERVICE

I H E E B Y CERTIFY that 1 caused a true and correct copy of the foregoi~~g
document to be delivered to the following individuai(s) by the method indicated:

[4/1 U.S. h4all. Postage Prepaid

Bua~nD. Smith
B.J. Driscoll
kfcGrath, itileacham & S m i b PLLC
P.O. Box 50731
Id&o Falls, ID 83305-0711

L_I X-Xmd Delivery
C__7 Overnight Delivery
Fax: 529-4166

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Eland Deli\ ery
O~vemightDelivet?,
Fax: 478-7602

A,Bruce Larsoti
Able Law PC -- Attorneys at Law
155 South 2"* Atre.
P.O. Box 6369
Pacatello. ID 83205-6369
DATED this

n

day o

ORDER I>ETERMI%~~G
ATTORNEY FEES
Page 3

2008.

-

9

STFATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COT_fNTyOF C A N

SIRXUS. a Wyorning Limited
Liability Companj.

1

U

1

81:

I/: 04

Case No. GV-04-284

1

Plainiii-f;

1
1
J

ts.

i

BRYCE 14. ERfGKSON. AND ANY
PERSON CLL4Sb4mGBY OR TEIROLrCH
BRUCE EEKSON im AND TO THE
REAL PROPERTY DESCXBED AS
FOLLOU'S :
CARIBOU CC>bxTY, IDAHO:

1
1

1
1
1
1
1

ILIEMOKkNDUPVI DECISION
AND O m E R ON DEFENDANTS"

MOTION FOR
WGONSXDEMTXON OR IN
THE ALTEWATIVE, FOR NEWJ
TRIAL

1

TO17vniSHIP 5 SOUTI-I, RLYGE 46 E.B.fvf. )
SECTION: 27, LOTS 1 P;ND 2. N 54 NW 54 1
EXCEPT THEWFROhl TI IE S !4 NNE %
NW 55 NW %,
1
Defeiidax-rts.
This 111atter is before the Court on a hlotisn for Reconsideration, or in thc
Alternative, for New Trial. Tlie motion was brought pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure I 1 (a)i2)(B) and Tdal~oRule of Civil Procedure 59(a). This matter was tried to
the Court. r1ae Hor~orableJudge Don L.Harding presiding; on June 30, 2008 and July 1,

2008. Otl September 30, 2008, the Court entered its Findings of Fact and Gonclusior~sof

La?;h4srnormdurn Decision and Order. The Court ibund la favor of the Plaintiff, Sirius.
and entered Jridgmer~tto that effect on the same date, September 30, 2 O G S . On October

14,3008,Defendant, Bryce Erickson (Eriekson) filed a motion recjrresting the Court to
reconsider its decision. or in the alternative, to grant his request for a
Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendants'
Motion for Reconsideration or in the Alternative,
1
for Eew Trial

IIPW

trial. 'T'hls

motiun w a s aecompar~iedby tile Affidavit of Bryan D. Smith, filed otr October 14, 308

and a Brief in Srrppsr"iof Motion for Reconsideration, or irr the Alrer~~ative,
-for New
Trial, filctl on October 28, 2008. Plaintiff, Sirius, filed its hitemormdum in Opposition to

the Defendant" Mfv~otiol~for Reconsideration, or in the Alterntltive, for Xew Triai, on
No\ien;ber 17: 2008. Finally, on December I , 2008, Erickson filed Defer1dant.s Repit
Brief to Plarntiffs Mexnorandun~in Opposition to hilotian for Recorrsideraticrn, or in t l ~ e

Aiterriativt;. Keu Triai.

This matter was argued to the Court on December 5, 2008.' At the conclusiolr of
the hearing the Coux-t advised the pil~tiesthat it may require additionai briefing.

0
1
1

December 17, 2008,the Court entered an Order requiring that a tra~iseriptof the trial be
prepared along with a tra~lscriptof t11e bearing on the Motion for Reconsideration. Once
tlie tratlscript was conipleted, the Court allo~vedtfie parties the opporlunity to subrnit
additiolial txiritteti argumetlts. On February 2, 2008. each party submitted a supplemental
brief or memorandum in suppofl of their respectitie position. On February 3, 2008. the
Court took this matter under advisement.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
This ease origir~atedas an action to enforce a promissory note and zn act'ion to

foreclosure real property located in Caribou County. Idaho which was rnnrlgaged io
secure the prorrzissory note in question. Tlse action was brought by Plaintiff, Sirius, a
%/yonling Limited Liability Co~npany,co-owned b~ \Vil!iam Bagley 2nd his %rife.

Zrickson retained the services of William Bagley. a Wyoming a t t o r ~ ~ t1y0, represent him
The Coult's Findrrigs of Fact and Conclusions of Law Memorandum Dec~slonand Order m this case wzs
entered on September 30,2008 This was Judge Don L Wardmg's Iast officlai d a ~on the bench The
foiiowing da), judge Mltcheil W Brown assumed the bench As such the Motlor, filed on October 14,
2008 hnd all subsequent proceedings hate been htlndied by a judge other than the judge who ?resided over
~ i l eti ial of tills inatier

Memorandum Dec~sronand Order on Defendants'
Rnociii?ri for Recons~ieratronor In the Aiiernatrve,
for kievt Trrai

2

in a bankruptcy proceeding. Mr. Bagley filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding for

Ericltson in Wyoming. This baikuptcy proceedir~gwas ultimately disn~issedby tile
h a ~ k l ~ p t ccourt.
y
Erickson again approached Bagley to represent birn ixi a Chapter 12
banhriptcy proceeding, Bagley agrecd to represent Erickson, but as a condition of his

rei~resentatiorirequested that Erickson sign a promissor): mte, payable to Sirius. in the
anlount of $29,f 73.38, which was the amount Bagley eIaims was due and owning for the
work

011 the

origrnal Chapter I I barkmptcy proceeding. This promissory note was also

lo be secured by a niortgage on real property located in Caribou County, Idaho, ivliich

was otvned by Erickson. Erickson agreed to these conditions of representatioti and on
November 13, 1999 signed a promissory ~zote,payable to Sirius, and a mar-tgage securing
the promissosy r~ote.
When Erickson defaulted on the promissory note, Sirius filed the lawsuit in
question. Ericltson iriitia1ly appeared and answered pro se. Following a stipulation of the
parties, Erickson appeared though counsel and filed an Ame~ndedAnswer raising thirteen
separate affirl~lativedefenses.
On April 25. 2005, Erickson moved for Surnrnary Judgment arguing that there
for the pronnissoq note in question. The parties briefed
was a hilure o f eo~~sideration

this issue and argued the motion to the Court. The Court denied Erickson's motion for
summary judg~~lentfinding that there was adequate consideration to support the
promissory note. The Court found that the note was supported by consideration tlrlder
either of two ti~eories,one of which was af5rmed on appeal, the other was dererr-ilir-redto
be i:i er-ror. The G o ~ r tthen went one step further and sua spome granted summary
judgment against Erickson with respect to each of his affirmative defenses. Erickson

[demorandurn Dec~sronand Order on Defendants'
fdction for Reconsideration or In the Alternat~ve,
for Kew Trial

appealed thc Court" decision on summary judgment m d on appeal the Ida110 Supreme
Court affirmed the Court's decision as it related to its finding that consideration existed to

support the prori~issorynote and reversed xhe Court's order granting Sirius s u m n a p
judgmen~on each of Erickson's affirmative defenses. Sirius LC v Ei-ieicj.on, 144 Idaho

Upon rer~~and
this matter proceeded to court trial or1 June 30, 2008 with the Court
ruling in Plaintiffs favor and entering *judgment against Ericksol~in the ari~ountof
$29,173.00.35 plus interest at the trial's conclusion. It from tliis judgment thar Erickson

has filed tbe per~dingmotions.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Ericlcson has filed h ~ motion
s
under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure l l(a)(2)(B).
This rule provides. in relel-ant part, that:

h motiorl for reconsideration of any interlocutory orders of the trial
court niay be made at any time before the entry of filial judgment but not
later than burteen 114) days after tile entry of the final judgme~it.
[Emphasis Added]

In the present ease the order which Erickson is requesting that the Court reconsider is
not a11 iilrerlocutory order, Eirg rather is a final, appealable order, which has been reduced
to judgment. As such the appropriate rule for Erickson to be moving under is Idaho Rule

of C i ~ i lProcedure 59ie) rather than I.R.C.P. 1 l(a)(2)(B). The distinctioti between a
niotio:i to alter or ariiend under I.R.C.P. 59(e) and a motion for reconsideratioti under

I.R.C.2, is discussed by Idaho Supreme Court in Straub
r.3

i

I*.

Smith,145 Idaho 65. 175 P.3d

,.
sl.
(29317). In Strixub the Supreme Cciurt mtes as foiiows:

[a] party may only make a motion ro reconsider interlocutory orders or
orders entered after the entry of final judgment. I.R.C.P.
1I(a)("). The
dismissal was a Gnal judgment and thus, the Smiths' motion to reconsider
Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendants'
Motion for Reconsideration or in t h e Alternative,
for New Trial

4

should be treated as a n-totion to modify or amend the order of dismissat.
The Court reviews an order denying a motion to alter or m e n d judgment
for abuse o f discretion. Slacstthmug v. Allstare Ins. G o , 132 Idaho 705,
707,979 P.2d 107, 109 (1999). Pursuant to 1,R.C.P. 59(e), a district tour?
can correct legal and factual errors occurring in proceedings before it. . , .
145 Iddio at 71. As made clear by the Izxiguage in Straub, if the order the moving party

is seeking recorisiderrttion of is final. the appropriate mcrtion is to alter or m e n d

j~tdgmentunder Icidio Rule of CiviI Procedure 59(e).
111 Slaalhnnug

t..

Allsfale I~zzs. Co.. 132 Idaho 705. 979 P.2d 107, (1939), the

rationale beinind a motion to alter or amend judgment is addressed. In Slaarhaiqug, the
Supreme Court states:

[his a meals to circumvent an appeal, Rule 59(e) provides a trial court a
rneclzarrisrn to correct legal and factual errors occurring proceedings
before it. [Citation Omitted] ... So long as the trial court recognized the
matter as discretionary, acted within the outer boundaries of the court's
discretiori, and reached its coriclusion tkrougli a11 exercise of reason, this
Court will not disturb the decision on appeal.
132 Idaho at 707

Erickson also moves tile Court, in the alternative, for a new trial pursumt ro Idaho
Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a). Erickson cites tlze Court to various bases which he
conte~idssupports the Court ordering a new trial in this matter. Depending upon what
59(a) is being challenged the analysis is different. S o ~ n eof the
subsectiorz of I.R.C.P.
issues raised by Erickson, by ~lecessitjiwould require the Court to co~zsider,weigh and
111akejudgme~ltsconcerning the evidence submitted at trial. T1ie sta~dardutiii-zed Sy the
Coirrt in addressing each su'oparagrzph of I.R.C.P. 59(@ seeking new a trail varies

depending on the subparagraph being raised. However, rhe Court chooses, for reasons
stated below, not io address each of these various standards.
Finally, as the Court !sas grappled mightily with what effect. if any, it has on -ibe
Menorandun? Decrsloi? and Order on Defendants'
Morran f ~ Recons~deration
r
or In the Alternat~ve,
for Ne~vTrial

5

posture of this case that the preseizt judge did not preside over the court trial, or hear the
cvtdei-rce presented. The

Court has come across other applicable law, Idaho T<uIc of Civil

Frocedure 63 addresses the issue of disability of a judge, It provides as follows:
If by reason o f dcatb, sicliness, or other disabiirty, a judge before wliorn an
action bas been tried is unable to perforn~the duties to be performed by
the court under these rules aRer a verdict is returned or findings of fact md
co~ielusionsof law are filed, then any ocher judge regularly sitting in or
assigned to the court in which the action was tried may perform those
duties; but if such other judge is satisfied that the judge cannot perform
those duties because the judge did not preside at the trial or f'or m y other
reason. the judge may in the judge's discretion grant a new trial.
111 the case of -4ncfersun it D e w q , 82 Idaho 173, 350 P . X 7734 (1960) the issue of the
autlnority of cz "'successor judge'311 the context of motions brought under 1.R.C.P. 59 was
addressed, The Suprerzle Goun ~ioresas follows:

In cases tried tliitt~outa jury, the gerieral rule is -that a party litigant is
entitled to a decisiori on the facts by a judge who lieard and saw the
witnesses, and &at a deprivation of that right is a denial of due process.
[Citations Omitted]
82 Idaho at 180. Tlze Supreme Court also slates:

[Ixi'Jhere the lnotion is heard by a successor to the trial judge, such
successor may make new findings and conclusions and direct the entry of
a new judgment under the authority of Rule 63. subject, however, to the
limitation tf~ereincontained; that is, if he '5s satisfied that he cannot
perform those duties because be did not preside at tile trial or for m y other
reason, he may in his discretion grant a new rial." If the successor is not
satisfied with the findings. conclusions =d decree of his predecessor. and
thiriks such should be vacated or modified, but cannot do so because he
did not see and hear the witnesses, then he is limited to the granting of a
ne-* triaf.

82 Idaho at 179.

As such It appears clear "clna~a "'successor Judge" in cor-rsiderir?;ga

motion for r ~ e ~trizl
v "is not required to weigh conflicting evidence or pass upon the
credibility of nitnesses."

In fact to do so would be to deny the iitiganss of their due

process rights
Memora~dumDecrs~onand Order on Defendants'
M o t m for i'ieconslderatlo'i or in the Alternaave,
for Mew Trial

6

ANALYSIS
7'hc Court has cIosel~yreviewed the file in this matter, including all pleadings,

motions, and mcrizora~~dum,
The Court has closely reviewed the memormduin and briefs
subtiiitted by the paties in support of and in oppositiorz to the pendlng motiotz. Finally,
the Cottrt has listened to the arguments of the parties and has reviewed and read the
transcript of the trial proceeding along with the trailscript of the argument on the pending

113ntion. As stated above rlie coui-t has grappled with these issues and has determined that

in accordance wit11 1.R.C.P 63 and the case Law ititerpreting a11d applying 1.R.C.P 63 this
Court callnot rule or? the motion.

At trial, Erickson stipulated that the PIaintiff had proved its entire case. Erickson
furtiler adsised the Court that the sole issue at trial was for Erickson to "put on our

iilfirmative defenses."

Trial Transcript pp. 4-7. Sirius accepted this stipulation and tfie

case proceeded to trial in the mique manlier of defendarrt proceeding first. having

admitted to the substance of the Plaintiffs case. Trial Transcript pp. 7-8, As such the
only issues tried at trial were Erickson's thirteen affirmative defenses, upon which

Eri~lisorthad the burdeli of proof

The Court Lias considered the motion of Erickson requesting a new trial. As the
Court reviews each of these claimed bases for new trial, the Gourt sees the need to

consrder the evidence produced at trial m d make judgments concerning the sufficiency
ald,/or weight to attach to this particular evidence. Each of these considerations is
contrary

10

the general rule cited iii Anderson v. Dewey, supra, which prohibits the

"successor judge" froin weighing a i d evaluating the quality of evidence iiztrodiltced at
tsldi,

Fdemorandum Decision and Order on Defendants'
Motion for Reconsideration or in the Alternative,
for New Trial

7

In applying the rules set forth in I.R.C.P. 63 and the case law interpreting this
rule, the Court concludes that it is nut in a positiol~to fairly evaluate and ccl~~sider
the

motion Ibr recornsideratiori, or in the alternative, request for a new trial. Ths Court

1s

colivinced that to do so, ~7ou!d violate the "'general rule" enunciated by the Idaho
Su~p~.eme
Court in Atzclerson

17.

D e w e j . 82 Idaho 173, 350 P.2d

734 ( 1960). In Ariderson

rlie Slipreme Court notes that "'if the successor is not satisfied with the G~~dings,
cor~clusions and decree of his predecessor, and th~nks such should be vacated or
i~~odified,
but c a n ~ ~ do
o t so because he did not see and hear the witnesses, the11 he is

Limited to the g r a ~ ~ t iof
i ~ ag new trial." 82 fdafio at 179. !-Towever. as set fori-th cIearIy in

I.R.C.P.
63 tlie decision is left to the discretion

o f the ""successor judge" concerning

nrhetlier he should grant a new trial or riot. In tlie present case, the Cou-t is not
dissatisfied tvitl~the trial judge's findings of fact or the cor~clusionsof

based upon

tilose Gndirtgs of fact. However, the Court also concludes that it carmot give full arid fair
coxlsideratio~ito Ericltson's motion atid arguments ~ritlnoutconsiderir~gthe evident;, m d
making judglnents as to the sufficiency and weight to be attached to the evidence, ail of
which is counter to the general rule set forth in Anderson v Deupey,supra.
Tlierefore, the Court has determined the more prudent approach is to deny tlze
~rrotionto aIter and m e n d , pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59(e) and also deny the motion for a new
trial, pmsumt to I.R.C.P. 59(a).

It appears that a review of the trial court's findings of

fact and conclrrsioirs of Ia-w is best left to the province of the appellate colrrts.
As such this Court wiIl not consider the merits of Erickson's Motion for

Reconsideration, or in the Alternative, for New Trial.

It is here5y O m E W B ) ,

DECREED A3D ADJUDGED thzt based on the above the Defendat's Motion for

IUemorandum Decision and Order on Defendants'
Motion For Recons~deratrctnor in the 'Afternatlve,
for New Trial

8

20.5

Recorzsideration or in the -%Iternatitrefor Hew Trial is DENIED.

Dated this

District Judge

Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendants'
Motion for Reconsideration or in the Alternative,
for New Trial

day o

2009.

CERTIFICATE OF MAZLINGISERVXCE

I Isereby cer-ti@ that f sewed a me copy of the foregoing docmele on the
attomey(s)/persunis) listed below by mail with correct pitstqe thereon or causing the same
to be hmd delivered,
Method of Sewice:

Anorney(s)/Person(s):

Wand Delivered
By U.S, Mail

A, Brxce Lars011

AMon~eyat Lavt~
155 S
Secolid Avenue
Post Office Box 6369
Pocatelio, Idaho 83205-6369
Telephor~e:(208) 475-7600
Facsixnile: (208) 478-7602

Fax

sit121

Bryan D.Smith
B.J. DI-iscotl
McGMTH, MEACFI-4M, &r; S-WITH,
PLLG
P.O. Box 5073 1
4 14 Shoup Avenue
Ida110 Fails, Idaho 83405
Tel: (208) 524-0731
Fax: (208) 529-4166

H a ~ dDelivered
By U S . Mail
Fax

Dated:

Memorandum Deas!on and Order on Defendants'
Iflotion for Reconsideration or in the Alternative,
for N e w Trial
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TIzis mattes* i s before tf-rc Court on a Motion for Rccox~rsidora~on,
or
Aitezi~ative,for He%
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and TdaIm Rule of Civil Prooedwe 59(4.
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The rnodon w a s brought pwsum1t to Idaha Rule

111

LIxe

of Civil

This matter was t r r c d to

Court, t h e HonorabXe Judge Don L.Hmdlng presiding, on June 3 0 , 2008 a ~ July
d
1;

2008. On Scpteuzber 30, 2008, the:Court entered its Findings of Fact mcl Coariuc;ior,s of

L a w Msnloraldnm Dccision and Order. T h e Court E i s u r ~ din favor of the Plaintiff, Sirius,
end cntored Inclgxl-iorrt to "hat effect on t h e s m l s dete, Scpte~nhcr3 0 , 2008. O n October
14, 2808,Defe~zd~fi~t,
Bryce Erickson (Ericlrso~~)
filed a r n o - t i o n raqutrsting the Court to
recollsider its decision, or in Uxe alt~rnative,to ;rza,at his request fir a

Memorandum Dectston and Order On Defenda~ts'
Motion for Reconstderatlon or In the Aiternallve,
far New Trial
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1
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T i x i s matter is bafofore t h e Court

Altcrliative. Por New Trial.

on n Motion for Reoonsideratiorx, or in t-l~e

T h e motion was brought pwsuant to Idaho Rule o f Civil

Pracedure 1l<a?C2)CfS)and Idaho Rule of Civil P r o ~ e d w e59Ca). This niaitter was 3icd to

t i ~ cGnil~-t,the Hi-inorabLeJudge Don

L,P-Ia~dingpresiding, on June 30, 2008 and July I:

2005. On Septerm'uer 3 0 , 2005, the C o u t entared its Findings o f F a c t and Conc2usiox-i~of

Law iicijesino~audurn
D G C ~ S ~and
O I IOzdcr.

Court f i u n d h favor of the Plaintiff, Sirius,

and cntererl Judgxnent to that effect on the s m e datete,
September 30, 2008. On October
1 4 , 2005, Defezldant. Bryce Eri~ksonCEricksofij filed n mot5011 reqxzeetir~gt l i ~
Cou* to

recollsicler its decision, or

$11 Uie

alternative, to gfalt his requcsj, fur a new

Mernoraqdum 3ecrs1onand Order on DPfendants'
Motion for Reconsrderation or In r h iiitematlve,
~
far New Trial
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This

Bryan B,Smith, Esq. - LSB No. 341 1
B.J. Driscoll, Esq. - ISB No. 7010
S~r-rx-r,
U R I S C ~ LO;r.
L ASSOC~ATCS,
PLLG
P,0.Box 50731
414 Shoup IIir,enue
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405
Telephone: 1208) 524-073 1
Telefax: (208) 529-4 166
Attorneys for Uefendant!Appellarlt
Bryce 13. Ericksan
firTHE DISTRlCT COURT OF TI-IE SIXTH JUDICIAL BISTRTGT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, XN AND FOR THE COUlc'TU OF CAHBOU

SIRlUS LC, a Wyoming Limited
Liability Company,
PlaintifURespondent.

1
)

Case No. CV-04-284

1
) NOTICE OF APPEAL

vs.

1

BRYCE El. ERTCKSON. AND ANY PERSON
1
CLAIM%G UNDER BY OR THROUGH
,l
BRYCE 1F-I.ERZCKSON XN AND TO THE
1
REAL PROPERTY DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS: )
CRRlBOU COUNTY,IDAHO:

TOWWSI-IIP 5 SQL'TH, RANGE 46 E.B.M.,
SECTION 27: LOTS 1 AND 2, K1/2
NWLI4. EXCEPT THEREFROM THE S X
WEli'lF KIV NWii4,

1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1

f)el^enda1ts/ilppe11ants.

1

TO THE ABOVE NARTEI) PLAINTIFFIRESP0?4DENTfSIRIUS, LC, AND ITS
ATTORIYEY, A.BRUCE LARSOK, ESQ., ABLE LAW, 155 SOUTH SECOND
A'\'Xl;NUE, P. 0, Box 6369, POCATELLO, IDAEIO 83205-6369, AND TO THE CLERK
OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT:

NOTICE OF APPEAL - I
F:tCLICNTS,BDS\7453 Pleadings\Obt "cotice.Appe;rl.doc

NOTICE: IS EIEmIEEY GIVEN THAT:
The above-:~arneddefendant. Bryce H, Erickson, appeals from tile Findings Of

I,

Fact ,kid Conclusions Of Law R4ernorandum Decision And Order dated September 30,2008,
the dudglnsnt dated September 30, 2008. Don I;.Eiarding, District Judge. presiding, the Order
Determining fitomey Fecs dated December 5,2005, and the Memorandum Decision And
Order 011Defendant's Motion For Reconsideration Ckr, in The Alternative, For New Trial
entered April 1,2009, Mitcl~eifMi'. Brown, District Judge, presiding.
.7

Defendant tias the right to appeal to tile Idaho Suprenie Court, and the

memora~ida,decisions. orders, and judgtnellt described in paragrqti 1 above are subject to
appeal pursualt to Rule I 1(a), Idaiio Appellate Rules,
TSie issues which the defendant, Bryce F-I. Ericksori, intends to assert in the

3.

appeal are the following:
a.

Can pla~ntiffrecover on the pramisson; note where William Bagley

violated Wyoitiing Rule of Professional Conduct 1.%,a)that prohibits business tra~~sactions
with clients absent comptiar~cewith Rule 1.8(a)?

b,

Does substa~itialevidence exist that the attorney's fees William Bagley

ctiarged in the arnount of $29,173.38 and awarded bq rbe court for the Chapter 1 1 Bankrrrptcy
are reasonable?
C.

Did UTilliamBagley's ach~ourledgedconflict of interest in represeilting

defendant in the Chapter 12 Bankruptcy predate its fi!ing so as to preciude charging a portion

of the "69.173.38 in attorney's fees the court avlarded?

KOTIGE OF APPEAL - 2
F:,CtiEh'TS\BDS\i453\Pieadings\Ci62 Not~ce.iippeal.doc

d.

Did I$Tilliarn Bagley have a conflict of' interest as a general creditor that

began upon dislnissal of the Chapter 11 Bankruptcy so as to preclude chargirsg a portion of the

$29.1 73.38 in attorney's fees the court awarded?
e.

Did William Bagley have a conflict of interest in represeriting his wife

and the bizlendant together it1 the Chapter 11 B a k u p t c y so as to preclude charging a portion

of 111: $20,173.38 in attorney's lees the court awarded?
f.

Can defendant raise the affimative defense of set off??

g.

Did tlze district court err in failing to apply $830. $9,750, $8,500. sad

$3,000 as set off ddaunages against the $29,173.38 in attorney's fees the court awarded?

11.

Did the district court c o m i t reversible error at trial by refusing to

allow clefendmt's expert to give her opinion regarding darnages and to take the testimony on
the record to preserve it for appeal?
i.

Did the district court commit reversible error by allowing the plaintiff

to offer the expert:testimony of Wiiliani Bagley at trial where (1) the plaintiff never disclosed

UTillim Bagley as an expert before trial; (2) the defendant requested William Bagley's
opinions and the bases therefore in discovery, but the plaintiff never disclosed this
illformation before trial; and (3) where the district court refused the defendant the oppo~-tunity
to depose William B a g i e ~to ascertain his expert opinioias before trial?

4.

There fias been no order entered sealing an! portion of the record in this case.

5.

Tile defendant does not request that the reporter prepare the transcript of the

trial because the reporter has already prepared the trial transcript in connection with the post
trial motions. Defendant requests that the trial transcript already prepared be included as part

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3
F:\CLIEPiTS1BDS\7453~\pieadings:OS2
P;oticc.Appeal.doe

of the appeal, Defendant does request that the reporter prepae the transcript of the June 6,

4008 hearing.

The defendmt requests the followirig documents to be included in the c1erk.s

6.

record in addition to those automatically Included under Rule 28, Idaho Appellate Rules:

a.

Reini"rtitur dated April 19, 2007.

b.

Objection To Allowing William Bagley To Testifq. As Expert And

Motiori To Continue Trial Seaing dated June 12, 2005.

6.

Afiidavit of B.J. Driscoll dated May 9, 3008 with attached exhibits.

d.

Affidavit of Judith A. Shively dated May 9, 2008 with axtacf~ed

exhibits.
e.

Affidavit of B.J. Driscall dated June 19, 2008.

I:

Defendant's Closing Brief dated July 16, 2008.

g.

Defendant's Closing Reply Brief dated August 13, 2008.

h,

Motion For Reconsideration, Or In The AIternati\.e, For New Trial.

1.

The Affidavit of Bryan I>. Smith dated October 14, 2008.

J.

Defendant's Brief In Support Of Motion For Reconsideration, Or In

The Alternative, For New Trial.
li.

The Deposition of M'illiam Bagtey dated April 25, 2008 submitted as

Exhibit at trial together with a11 trial exhibits.

7.

I certifj :
(a)

That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the reporter,

and defendant has paid the estiinated fee for preparation of the reporter's transcript;

NOTICE OF APPEAL, - 1
F:\CLlE~TS~BDS\7453~SIcadtngs\OGZ
Notite.Appeai.doc

jb)

That defendant has paid the clerk of Ibe district court the estimated fee

for preparation of the clerk's record;

(c)

That defendant has paid the appellate filing fee;

(3)

That defendant has made service service tipon all parties required to bil

Idatlo Appellate Rules.

served pursuant

DATED this

a

day of April. 20C9.

SMITI-I. DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC

By:
Attorneys fordcfcndmt/apPe~la~~t

BOTECE OF APPEAL - 5
F:\Cl,TGPiTS\BDS\7453iPleadingstO62
honce.hppeal.doe

,

I $<EREBYCERTIFY t

9.1 caused a true and correct

copy of llte foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL to be served, by placing the same in a scaled
envclope and depositil~git in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, or hand delivery. facsimile
transn~issionor overnight delivery, addressed to the following:

A. Bruce Larson, Esq,
ABEL LAW
j3.O. Box 6369
Poeatelln, Idaho 81205-6363
Fax: 478-7602

Edie Bus11
Clerk of t l ~ cDistrict Collrt
Caribou County Courthouse
229 South Main. Room 203
P'O. Box 775
Soda Springs. ID 83276

Dorothy Snarr
Reporter to Judge MitefieIl W. Brown
159 South Main
Soda Springs, ID 83276

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 6
F.\CLIENTS\BDS'~7453iPleadhgs\062
5otice.Appeal.doc

t
t

fFm

[ ] Overnight Delivery
[ ] Hand Delivery

t

ail
[ ] FAX
[ ] Overnight Delir~ery
[ 1 Wald Delivery

f IFM

[ 7 Overnight Delivery
[ ] Hand Delivery

- ---- - -----

we----"."

In the Supreme Court o f the State o f

?OU9 l'lll'l' 11 [;Iii l g

11.

SIRIUS LC, a Wyoming limited liability
colllp"lyl

)
)

Bl<IrCE H. ERICKSON, and any pcrson
claililing ~ ~ n dby
c r or tllrough BRYCE H,
EIilCKSON in and to thc real property
dcsc~ibcdas follows: Caribou County, Idalto:
Townshil:, 5 Soutli, Range 45 E.B.N., Section
27: Lots 1 and 2, N% NW%, exce~:,tthcrefrom
the S% NE % NW% NW Kt,

Supreme Cour-t Docket No. 36466-2009
Caribou CouMy Docket No. 2004-284

1

1
1
1
1
1

1
1

)

A Rcportcr's Transcript m d Clcrk's Rccord was filcd April 27, 2006, in appcal No.

11

32582, Sirius LC v. Erickson; therefore, good cause appearing,
IT IXEIBBY IS OmERIED that the Appeal Record ir-r this case shall be
AUGMENTED to include the Reporter's Transcript and Clerk's Record filed in prior appeal
No 32582.

1T FUKTI-EER IS ORDERED that the District Court Clerk shall prepare and file a
LIMITED CLERIC'S RECORD with this Court, wliich shall contain the docunle~ltsrequested in the
Notice of Appeal, togetl~erwith a copy of this Order, but shall not duplicate any docur~lentincluded
in tlic Clerk's Record filed it1 prior appeal No. 32552.

lr FUtiTHER IS OFXIERED that the District Court Reporter shall prepare and
lodgc a SUPPLEMENT&

REPORTER'S TRANSCRlPT with the District Court, wl~ichshall

contai~lthe proceedings requested in tile Notice of Appeal, but shall not duplicate any proceedings
included in the Reporter's Transcript filed in prior appeal No. 32582. The LIMITED CLERK'S
RECORD and REPORTER'S TRANSCWT shall be filed with this Court after settlement.
Further, thc exhibits subniitted in prior appeal No. 32582, which werc returned to District Court on

, are not covercd by this Order and they will not be sent to tllc Supreme Court unless
ORDER AUGMENTING APPEAL RECORD - Docket No. 36466-2009

216
--

j/
/I/I /

11

s~>ccificallyrcqucstcd by the parties. I h c party requesting any or all of tlie prior exhibits must
spccifi~aliydcsignstc: tl~oscexl-tibitsbeing rcquestcd.

DATED this 6&day o f May 2009.

For the Supreme Court

cc:

COUIISGJ
o f Record
District Court Clerk
District Court Reporter

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNrY OF CARIBOU

SIRIUS LC , A WYOMING LIMITED LIABILITY
COMPANY
PLAlNTlFFlRESPONDENT

)

1
1

VS

)
)

BRYCE ERICKSON

1

)
AND ANY PERSON CLAIMING UNDER BY OR )
THROUGH BRYCE H ERICKSON IN AND TO )
THE REAL PROPERTY DESCRIBED AS
1
FOLLOWS
1

CARIBOU COUNTY, IDAHO:
TOWNSHIP 5 SOUTH, RANGE 46 E.B.M,
SECTION 27' LOTS IAND 2 , N112 NW114,
EXCEPT THEREFROM THE S112 HE114
NWl14 NW114,
DEFENDANTIAPPELLANT

Case No: CV-2004-0000284
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

1
1
)

9
1
1
1
j

1
-I, Sharon L. Wells, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District
of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Caribou, do hereby certify:
--

That the following is a list of the exhibits which were offered and admitted into
evidence during the proceedings in this cause:
Plaintiff's Exhibit 1: Promissory Note Dated 1111311999
Plaintiff's Exhibit 2: Real Estate Mortgage Dated 1111311999
Plaintiff's Exhibit 3: Marital Settlement Agreement Dated 911411999
Plaintiff's Exhibit 4: Decree of Divorce Dated 1011811999
Plaintiff's Exhibit 5: Warranty Deed Bryce Erickson to Dennis
Sanderson
Plaintiff's Exhibit 6: Quit Claim Deed Bryce Erickson to Kathy
Erickson

Certificate of Exhibit's
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Plaintiff's Exhibit 7: Bill of Sale
Plaintif's Exhibit 8: Defendant's Answers to Interrogatories
Plainties Exhibit 9: Deposition of Mr. Smith
Plaintiffs Exhibit 10: Chapter 12 Petition for Relief
Plaintiff's Exhibit 11: Chapter 12 Applicat~onfor Retention of
Attorney
Plaintiffs Exhibit 12: Letter Dated May 6, 1999 together with
anachments
Plaintiff's Exhibit 13: Chapter 12 Motion to Confirm Debtor's
Chapter 12 Plan
Plaintiff's Exhibit 14: Chapter 12 Order for Debtor in Possession to
Retain Attorney
Plaintiff's Exhibit 15: Chapter 12 Order rescinding Order for Debtor
in Possession to Retain Attorney
Plaintiffs Exhibit 16: Chapter 12 Order on Motion to Dismiss and
Remove Debtor from Possession
Plaintiff's Exhibit 17: Chapter 12 Motion for Release of Mortgage to
Secure Payment of Promissory Note to Sirius
LC
Plaintiff's Exhibit 18: Chapter 12 Order vacating order on Motion for
Release of Mortgage
Plaintiff's Exhibit 19: Chapter 12 Status Report and Motion for
Debtor to Obtain new Counsel and file an
Amended Plan or Re-organization
Plaintiffs Exhibit 20: Chapter 12 Order Granting Motion to Confirm
and Confirming Third Amended Plan
Plaintiff's Exhibit 21: Answer to Complaint for Foreclosure
Plaintiff's Exhibit 22: Certificate of Service of Initial Financial Report
Plaintiffs Exhibit 23: Debtor's Plan of Reorganization

Certificate of Exhibit's

219

Plaintiffs Exhibit 24: Chapter 11 Motion to Dismiss of Kathleen
Ellen Erickson upon withdrawal of Disclosure
Statement and Plan
Plainttff's Exhibit 25: Chapter 2 1 Order Granting Motion to Dismiss
of Kathleen Ellen Erickson upon withdrawal of
Disclosure Statement and Plan
Plainties Exhibit 26: Final Account of Trustee, Declaration of Full
Performance and Petition for Decree

Defendant's Exhibit A: Bryce's Chapter 11 Documents
Defendant's Exhibit B: Kathy's Chapter IIDocuments
Defendant's Exhibit C: Bagley's File
Defendant's Exhibit D: Bryce's Chapter 12 Documents
Defendant's Exhibit E: Deposition of Mr. Bagley
Defendant's Exhibit F: Order Discharging Debtor After Completion
of Chapter 12 Plan

I further certify that all the exhibits in this matter have been sent to the Supreme
Court for review.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of
said District Court at Soda Springs, Idaho, this 1l f h a y of June, 2009.
VEDA MASCARENAS
Clerk of the District Court
By:
~ g r o L.
n Well

P

Certificate of Exhibit's

eputy Clerk

In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho

SIRIUS LC, a Wyoming limited liability
company,

)

1
1
)
)
)
)
)

BRYCE H.ERICKSON, and any person
claiming under by or through BRYCE H,
1
ERICKSON in and to the real property
described as follows: Caribou County, Idaho: )
Township 5 South, Range 45 E.B.M., Section
27: Lots 1 and 2, N ?4NW 54,except therefrom 1
the S% NE % NW% NNW %,
1
\

/if

Defendant-Appellant.

j'l

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
AUGMENT THE RECORD
Supreme Court Docket No. 36466-2009
Canyon County Docket No. 2008-15556

ij

1

$11

)

~ l j

11

\I

1

,l
1;;

/I
11

,4 MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD AND STATEMENT IN SUPPORT
THEREOF was filed by counsel for Respo~identon December 1, 2009. Therefore, good cause

t

'jl

/I1

'jl

!
i

appearing,

I:/

IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Respondent's MOTION TO AUGMENT TI-IE RECORD

111
I'

!I

be. and hereby is, GRANTED and the augmentation record shall include the documents listed
below, file stamped copies of which accompanied this Motion, as EXHIBITS:

\I/
Ij!
II

11

/I!

Ill
L 1

I. Plaintiffs Closing Argument, file-stamped August 5,2008;
2. Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, file-stamped May 8,2008;
3. Memorandum in Opposition to the Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration, or in the
Alternative, for New Trial, file-stamped November 17, 2008; and
4. Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to the Defendant's Motion for
Reconsideration, or in the Alternative, for New Trial, file-stamped February 2, 2009.
DATED this

of December 2009.
For the Supreme Court

Stephen W. ISeny&, Clerk

11

'ij
i

I
I
j

cc:

Counsel of Record

,

$1

Iii

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CARIBOU

SIRIUS LC , A WYOMING LIMITED LIABIL17-Y
COMPANY

1
j
)

1
PLAINTIFF1RESPONDENT
VS

1
)

Case No: CV-2004-0000284

1
BRYCE ERICKSON

1

)
AND ANY PERSON CLAIMING UNDER BY OR )
THROUGH BRYCE H ERICKSON IN AND TO )
THE REAL PROPERTY DESCRIBED AS
1
FOLLOWS:
1
CARIBOU COUNTY, IDAHO:
TOWNSHIP 5 SOUTH, RANGE 46 E.B.M,
SECTlON27~LOTSIAND2,N1/2NW1/4,
EXCEPT THEREFROM THE S112 NE114
NW114 NW114,
DEFENDANTtAPPELLANT

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

1
1
)
)

1
1
1
)

I, Sharon L. Wells, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District

of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Caribou, do hereby certify that The above
and foregoing Record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound under my
direction and is a true, full and correct Record of, the pleadings and documents under
Rule 28 of the ldaho Appellate Rules.

I do further certify that all documents, x-rays, charts and pictures offered or
admitted in the above-entitled cause will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme
Court along with the Court Reporters' Transcript and Clerk's Record (except for Exhibits
which are to be retained in the possession of the undersigned), as required by
Rule 31 of the ldaho Appellate Rules. (See Clerk's Certificate of Exhibits if there are

---.-A

exhibits and no Reporter's Transcript or not listed in the Reporter's Transcript.)

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of

the said Court this II" hay of June, 2009.

VEDA MASCARENAS
(SEAL)

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

Clerk of the District Court

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CARIBOU

SIRIUS LC , A WYOMING LIMITED LIABILITY
COMPANY
PLAINTIFFIRESPONDENT
VS
BRYCE ERICKSON

1
)

i

)
}
)

Case No: CV-2004-0000284

1
)

)
AND ANY PERSON CLAIMING UNDER BY OR )
THROUGH BRYCE H ERlCKSON IN AND TO )
THE REAL PROPERTY DESCRIBED AS
1
FOLLOWS
1

CERIFITCATE OF SERVICE

1
CARIBOU COUNTY, [DAHO
TOWNSHIP 5 SOUTH, RANGE 46 E.B.M.
SECTION 27. LOTS 1 AND 2 , N1/2 NW114,
EXCEPT THEREFROM THE S1/2 NE1t4
NW114 NW114,

)
)
)

DEFENDANTtAPPELLANT

)
)
)

-

I, Sharon L. Wells, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District
of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Caribou, do hereby certify that I have
personally served or mailed, by United States mail, postage prepaid, one copy of the
Clerk's Record on Appeal to each of the parties or their Attorney of Record as follows:
A. Bruce Larson
Able Law PC
P 0 Box 6369
Pocatello ID 83205-6369

Certificate of Service

Bryan D. Smith
McGrath, Meacham & Smith PLLC
P.O. Box 50731
Idaho Falls ID 83405

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of
the said Court this 1$h day of June 2009.
(SEAL)

Certificate of Service

VEDA MASCARENAS
Clerk of the District Court

